State v. Rodriquez

• Decision Date: 05 August 1986
• Citation: 200 Conn. 685,513 A.2d 71
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Andres RODRIQUEZ.

Page 71

513 A.2d 71

200 Conn. 685

STATE of Connecticut v. Andres RODRIQUEZ.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 10, 1986.

Decided Aug. 5, 1986.

Maxwell Heiman, with whom, on brief, was William J. Tracy, Jr., Bristol, for appellant (defendant).

Bernadette Conway, Special Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., James G. Clark, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., and Mary Galvin, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before SHEA, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO, CALLAHAN and MENT, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The defendant was charged in an amended information with arson in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-111 ¹ and 53a-8 ² of the General Statutes. He was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of thirteen years. He has appealed from the judgment rendered on the jury verdict. On appeal, he claims that the trial court erred: (1) in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because of insufficient evidence; (2) in instructing the jury with respect to General Statutes § 53a-8; and (3) in failing to inquire into his trial counsel's conflicting representation of the defendant and a witness. The defendant also claims that the conduct of defense counsel denied him the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. We find no error.

I

The defendant first claims that the evidence adduced at the trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for acquittal. "When a claim on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we undertake a two-part task. 'We first review the evidence presented at the trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict. We then determine whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 691, 495 A.2d 273 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211, 478 A.2d 1005 (1984); State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255, 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084, 104 S.Ct. 1455, 79 L.Ed.2d 772, reh. denied, 466 U.S. 954, 104 S.Ct. 2163, 80 L.Ed.2d 547 (1984).' State v. Sinclair, 197 Conn. 574, 576, 500 A.2d 539 (1985); see State v. McCarthy, 197 Conn. 166, 178, 496 A.2d 190 (1985)." State v. Simino, 200 Conn. 113, 116-17, 509 A.2d 1039 (1986).

Although the jury may "draw reasonable, logical inferences from the facts proven, [it] may not resort to speculation and conjecture." State v. Saracino, 178 Conn. 416, 419, 423 A.2d 102 (1979). Each essential element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The relevant question in our review " ' "is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. [356, 362, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1624, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972) ]." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Scielzo, 190 Conn. 191, 197, 460 A.2d 951 (1983), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).' State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 512, 498 A.2d 76 (1985)." State v. Brown, 199 Conn. 14, 23, 505 A.2d 690 (1986). "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict, this court must construe that evidence in the most favorable manner reasonably possible to support the jury verdict. Josephson v. Meyers, 180 Conn. 302, 313, 429 A.2d 877 (1980); State v. Avcollie, 178 Conn. 450, 461, 423 A.2d 118 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 667, 62 L.Ed.2d 645 (1980); State v. Rossier, 175 Conn. 204, 207, 397 A.2d 110 (1978)." State v. Martin, 189 Conn. 1, 8, 454 A.2d 256 (1983).

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On March 21, 1982, at approximately 1:44 a.m., the Agron Superette, which was owned by the defendant but in his wife's name and located at 113 Putnam Street in New Haven, was firebombed. From her bedroom window across the street, a neighbor saw an hispanic male, with a large "afro" hairstyle, approach the store, look around, and then throw an object against a store window. Immediately after the object was thrown she heard glass break and saw fire. The neighbor knew the defendant and testified that it was definitely not the defendant who hurled the object. The breaking of the window set off an audible outside alarm and also alerted the security company, which monitored the store, to a possible burglary. The security company immediately notified the New Haven police department.

Officer Leo Bombalicki was dispatched to the scene to investigate. When he arrived at approximately 1:52 a.m. he saw, on the ground, flame and smoke emanating from a glass quart Coca Cola bottle with a rag stuffed in it. He referred to the device as a "Molotov cocktail." The bottle was located beneath a broken window between a six foot wire fence and the building housing the Agron Superette. The fence was approximately two feet eight inches from the building. The side of the building in the area of the window was scorched.

Firemen and equipment from a nearby fire station arrived at the scene at 1:56 a.m. and immediately extinguished the fire with a dry chemical. Fire and police personnel were then admitted to the store by the defendant who had come from his home at 139 Putnam Street, a short distance away. The defendant's wife testified that he had been awakened and had gone to the store in response to a telephone call that the store's alarm system had been activated. On gaining entry to the store, firemen found a hazy smoke condition inside caused by smoldering cartons. The cartons had been ignited by a portion of the gasoline soaked rag from the "Molotov cocktail" which had fallen inside the store through a three and one-half to four inch triangular hole in the store window caused by the impact of the bottle. Inside the store, next to a counter and approximately four feet away from, and at a slight angle to the window, firemen found an uncapped plastic gallon container half to three-quarters full of a liquid. The plastic cap from the container was found on the sidewalk outside the building in the area of the broken window. A plastic milk crate of the type used in the store was found in the same area outside the fence. A fire official testified that the perpetrator possibly stood on the crate to hurl the bottle. Later testing established that the liquid in both the quart bottle and the gallon container was gasoline and that the contents of both containers were similar in chemical makeup and "most likely" came from the same source. Testing also established the presence of gasoline on the bottle cap. There was expert testimony that the combination of the gasoline in the plastic container and in the bottle had the potential explosive power of twelve to fourteen sticks of dynamite and that an explosion of that magnitude could have occurred if the bottle had penetrated the window. The bottle did not penetrate because the window was made of plexiglass, which is stronger and more impact resistant than regular window glass. Nowhere in the record, however, is there any evidence that the plexiglass window had been installed while the defendant was associated with the store or that he knew the window was plexiglass or that he was aware of the properties of plexiglass.

Early in the morning of March 21, after the incident, the defendant gave a statement to fire investigator John Esposito of the New Haven fire department in which he said that when he arrived at the scene he saw a Coca Cola bottle on fire next to the store and that he made that observation from some fifty feet away. Prior to this time no one had told the defendant what kind of bottle had been involved and it would have been virtually impossible to observe the label or determine the specific type of bottle from that distance under the existing conditions. Police and fire officials also testified that the defendant was fully dressed when he arrived, not at all disheveled as though he had just been awakened, and that his demeanor, in view of the circumstances, was calm and somewhat unusual.

The Agron Superette was nominally owned by Elizabeth Rodriquez, the defendant's wife. The lease for the premises was in her name and she was the backer for the grocery store beer permit. The defendant, however, actually owned and managed the store although he spent most of his time at another store he owned at 142 Putnam Street. The Agron Superette was run on a day-to-day basis by Francisco Lopez, an employee, who opened and closed the store and waited on customers.

On March 20, 1982, Lopez closed the store for the night at approximately 6 p.m. When he closed, he activated the alarm system, secured the two locks on the front door, and padlocked the gate on the fence surrounding the store. He testified that, at the time he left, the gasoline filled container was not in the store. When police and fire personnel checked the store after the fire they found it secure, all inside and outside doors were locked, there was no sign of a burglary or forced entry, and they found the container in a place where it would have been noticed. Sergeant Robert Lawlor of the New Haven police department and investigator Esposito of the fire department both testified that the gallon container of gasoline could only have been placed in the store by someone with a key. Separate keys were required to unlock the padlock on the gate and the locks on the front door, and to deactivate the alarm system. The only two sets of keys were in the possession of the defendant and Lopez. Lopez and the defendant had a friendly relationship and Lopez had no...