State v. Roller

• Decision Date: 12 January 1903
• Citation: 30 Wash. 692,71 P. 718
• Parties: STATE v. ROLLER.*
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

71 P. 718

30 Wash. 692

STATE v. ROLLER.*

Supreme Court of Washington

January 12, 1903

Appeal from superior court, Skagit county; Geo. A. Joiner, Judge.

E. W Roller was convicted of rape, and appeals. Affirmed.

Henry McLean, for appellant.

M. P Hurd, for the State.

MOUNT J.

Appellant was tried and convicted for the crime of rape committed upon his own 15 year old daughter. From a judgment of conviction and sentence, he appeals, alleging (1) that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain a conviction, (2) errors in the admission and rejection of certain evidence, and (3) errors in instructions given and refused. The evidence in brief was substantially as follows: The appellant and his family consisting of a wife, two daughters, and a son, had lived in Skagit county on a farm for about 15 years. Lulu Roller, the youngest child, was, at the time of the trial in February, 1902, 16 years of age. She testified that her father, on June 25, 1899, when she was about 14 years of age, and frequently thereafter, forcibly compelled her to have sexual intercourse with him. The wife of the appellant at that time was an invalid. On May 3, 1901, she died, after an illness extending over a period of about two years. Lulu Roller, during her mother's lifetime, did not tell any one of the relations existing between herself and her father. On the 19th of May, 16 days after her mother's death, she told her married sister, Mrs. Campbell, of the conduct of her father towards her. These acts and all improper relations were stoutly denied by appellant. Mrs. Campbell, upon being told by Lulu of these relations, immediately told her husband, who in turn told Floyd Roller, appellant's son, who was then about 20 years of age. Floyd was not told the exact nature of the improper relations existing between his sister Lulu and his father, and he testified that at that time he did not know the exact nature of these relations; that on the next morning after this information had been received he armed himself with a revolver, and, in company with another boy about his own age, went to his father, who was then engaged in planting potatoes in the garden, and asked him what the trouble was between him and Lulu; that his father said there wasn't anything, and, if there was anything, she had been telling lies on him, and if she told anything on him he could tell something on her. Thereupon Floyd told his father that the officers were after him, and that he had better leave the country. Thereafter the appellant secreted himself in the neighborhood, while the officers and others were searching for him, and, after a day or two, without seeing any of his children, left his home and went into British Columbia, where he was subsequently arrested and extradited. While he was under arrest in British Columbia he wrote his son Floyd as follows: 'Vernon, B. C. Dear Floyd: They have me in jail. If it comes to court have Lulu to refuse to testify. She can if she wants to. She doesn't have to go against her own father. Please do, and get me out of this scrape. Yours as ever.'

While there are many things in the evidence which seem unnatural and unreasonable, and while the incident of flight may of itself be a very weak indication of guilt under the explanation of the appellant that he was afraid of violence because of the excitement in the neighborhood, yet, after a careful consideration of all the evidence, we are convinced that there was sufficient to go to the jury; and, if the prosecuting witness needed corroboration, sufficient was found in the letter above referred to, in the conduct of the defendant when he was first informed of the charge his daughter had made against him, and his subsequent conduct, to warrant the jury in returning a verdict of guilty. Under the well-established rule, as laid down in State v. Kroenert, 13 Wash. 644, 43 P. 876, State v. Murphy, 15 Wash. 98, 45 P. 729, and many subsequent cases, this court will not disturb the verdict of the jury.

It is complained as error that the lower court permitted the officer of Skagit county in this state, who received the custody of appellant from the British Columbia authorities, to state for what crime the appellant was extradited. No doubt the warrant itself was the best evidence of this fact. It clearly appears from the record that the arrest of the appellant in British Columbia was made under a warrant issued by the judge under the extradition act in British Columbia, which warrant was introduced in evidence. In fact, the record, containing all the proceedings in extradition, except the warrant of extradition issued by the President of the United States, was offered by the state and received in evidence. This record clearly shows that the appellant was arrested in British Columbia, charged with the same crime for which he was afterwards tried and convicted in this action; that the warrant of arrest issued by the authorities of British Columbia charged the appellant with the offense, viz., 'the crime of rape, committed within the jurisdiction of the state of Washington.' If it was error to permit the witness to state what the warrant under which he received the body of the appellant contains, it was harmless error, because, in the absence of a contrary showing, it will be presumed that the proceedings were regular, and that the warrant of extradition was in accordance with the other proceedings which are shown of record. This record of the extradition proceedings was not permitted to go to the jury, but was passed upon by the court for the purpose of determining whether the appellant was extradited upon the same charge for which he was placed on trial. We think this was proper.

It was argued by counsel for the defense that the crime for which the defendant was extradited was not the one for which he was being tried, because the prosecuting witness testified that her father had carnally known her by force, while the information charged that ...