State v. Rosenstein
| Decision Date | 21 January 1921 |
| Docket Number | No. 22112.,22112. |
| Parties | STATE v. ROSENSTEIN. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Municipal Court of Minneapolis; Mathias Baldwin, Judge.
Louis Rosenstein was convicted of violating a city ordinance, and from denial of a new trial he appeals. Affirmed.
An ordinance of the city of Minneapolis adopted March 14, 1916, prohibiting the location and operation of lumber yards within the city without the consent of the city council, is not arbitrary nor unreasonable, and violates none of the constitutional rights of those engaging in business of that character.
The enactment of the ordinance is authorized by subdivision 46 of section 5, chapter 4, of the city charter.
The enlargement, subsequent to the enactment of the ordinance, of an existing lumber yard to the extent and in the manner stated in the opinion, without permission from the city council, constitutes a violation of the ordinance.
A person violating the ordinance cannot be heard to urge in defense a claim that the city council in refusing a permit acted arbitrarily and discriminated against him.
Whatever remedy may be available in the correction of arbitrary discrimination of the kind stated, it is not found in a defiance of the law by a commission of the prohibited act. Josiah E. Brill, of Minneapolis, for appellant.
C. D. Gould and J. T. O'Donnell, both of Minneapolis (L. W. Crawhall, of Minneapolis, of counsel), for the State.
Defendant was convicted in the municipal court of the city of Minneaplis of the violation of a city ordinance, and appealed from an order denying a new trial.
The material portion of the ordinance charged to have been violated, adopted by the city council on March 14, 1916, provides in substance as follows:
Subsequent sections provide for the issuance of permits on application to the city council.
It appears from the record that prior to the passage of the ordinance defendant was a dealer in new and secondhand lumber and building material, the secondhand material being in the main wreckage from demolished or otherwise destroyed buildings. His business had grown to such an extent that in 1919, subsequent to the date of the ordinance, it became necessary to enlarge his business premises. To that end he secured a block of land on the opposite side of the street from the existing yard, and installed therein in piles and otherwise lumber and material of the character used in his business. The new premises were somewhat larger than the old, but no buildings were erected thereon; the business being conducted from an office situated on the old premises, which were not abandoned. On August 6, 1919, he applied to the city council for a license or permit to carry on and conduct the business upon the new premises, which after due consideration was denied. Notwithstanding the action of the council and its refusal to grant a permit, defendant continued to operate and conduct his business upon the new premises, in violation of the terms of the ordinance referred to, and was prosecuted and sentenced to pay a fine of $50.
It is contended by defendant in support of the appeal: (1) That the city council was without authority to enact the ordinance; (2) conceding the authority, that the ordinance is arbitrary ond unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional and void; and (3) that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence tendered by defendant for the purpose of showing that in denying his application for a license or permit the city council arbitrarily discriminated against him.
[1][2] 1. The contention that the city council was without authority to enact the ordinance is not sustained. Subdivision 46 of section 5, chapter 4, of the city charter provides, among other things, that the city council shall have full power and authority,
‘To regulate the piling of lumber, shingles, or laths in said city, and to require any...
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State v. Houghton
...at the suit of a private party who is injured. State v. Amor & Co., 153 Minn. 244, 190 N. W. 59 (undertaking); State v. Rosenstein, 148 Minn. 127, 181 N. W. 107 (lumber yard); State v. Dirnberger, 152 Minn. 44, 187 N. W. 972 (laundry); State v. Bjork, 157 Minn. 276, 195 N. W. 926 (marble ma......
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State v. Clarke Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 35802
...itself are invalid. For cases involving the former defense, see State v. Amor & Co., 153 Minn. 244, 190 N.W. 59; State v. Rosenstein, 148 Minn. 127, 181 N.W. 107; State v. Lindquist, 171 Minn. 334, 214 N.W. 260. Furthermore, we do not mean to indicate what the rights of the licensee may be ......
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City of Juneau v. Badger Co-Operative Oil Co.
...386, 221 N.W. 423;State v. Dirnberger, 152 Minn. 44, 187 N.W. 972;Larkin Co. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637, 638;State v. Rosenstein, 148 Minn. 127, 181 N.W. 107;Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361, 24 S.Ct. 673, 48 L.Ed. 1018. The Fischer Case, supra, has been repudiated by the Misso......
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State v. Northwest Linseed Co.
...by the ordinance. This court has sustained a number of similar ordinances. State v. Bjork, 157 Minn. 276, 195 N.W. 926; State v. Rosenstein, 148 Minn. 127, 181 N.W. 107; State v. Dirnberger, 152 Minn. 44, 187 N.W. 972; State v. Amor & Co., 153 Minn. 244, 190 N.W. 59; Meyers v. City of Minne......