State v. Ross

Decision Date03 April 2020
Docket NumberNo. 19-0939,19-0939
Citation941 N.W.2d 341
Parties STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Charles Edward ROSS, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Dylan J. Thomas, Mason City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Katie Krickbaum, Assistant Attorney General, Carlyle Dalen, County Attorney, and James O’Hollearn, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in this case is whether a padlock secured to a steel cable constitutes a "theft detection device" under Iowa Code section 714.7B(3) (2018). Among other charges, the defendant pled guilty to possessing a tool with the intent to use it in the unlawful removal of a theft detection device under section 714.7B(3) after he was found in possession of bolt cutters that he used to cut the padlock off of a steel cable wrapped around a riding lawn mower on display outside of a Mills Fleet Farm. He now argues his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty to this charge because the padlock-steel cable combination was not a "theft detection device" under the statute. Thus, the defendant maintains there was no factual basis to support his guilty plea to this charge. We agree.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Around 4:00 a.m. on September 24, 2018, Charles Ross and his codefendant, Calvin Lacey, arrived at a Mason City Mills Fleet Farm in a Penske rental truck. Ross used bolt cutters to cut the padlock off of the steel cable that was wrapped around a riding lawn mower on display outside of the store. He then helped Lacey load the lawn mower onto the rental truck without permission to take the lawn mower or the intention to return it to its lawful owner. As they were loading the lawn mower onto the rental truck, a Mills Fleet Farm employee who was arriving for work observed them and called the police. Ross and Lacey fled, but police located them and conducted a traffic stop of their vehicle shortly thereafter. The police searched the vehicle pursuant to a search warrant and discovered bolt cutters, the lawn mower from the Mason City Mills Fleet Farm, a ski mask, and methamphetamine, among other items.

On October 5, 2018, the State charged Ross by trial information with theft in the second degree, a class "D" felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 714.1 and 714.2(2) ; possession of a "tool, instrument or device to remove [a] theft detection shielding device," a serious misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 714.7B(3) ;1 and first offense of possession of methamphetamine, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5). Ross filed a motion to dismiss his possession of methamphetamine charge, which the district court subsequently denied on January 22, 2019. On February 15, the State filed an amended trial information to add a habitual offender enhancement to Ross’s theft charge. On April 1, the State and Ross reached a plea agreement in which the State agreed to drop the habitual offender enhancement to Ross’s theft charge and jointly recommend a seven-year term of incarceration in exchange for Ross’s guilty plea to theft in the second degree; possession of a tool, instrument, or device with the intent to use it to unlawfully remove a theft detection device; and possession of methamphetamine.

With Ross’s consent, the district court relied on Ross’s written plea of guilty and the minutes of testimony to accept his plea to the two misdemeanor charges, including the charge of possession of a tool, instrument, or device with the intent to use it to unlawfully remove a theft detection device in violation of Iowa Code section 714.7B(3).2 In relevant part, Ross admitted in his written plea that "on or about September 24, 2018, in Cerro Gordo County, IA[, he] possessed a tool, instrument, or device with the intent to use it in the unlawful removal of a theft detection device and the value of the items exceed[ed] $200.00." (Emphasis omitted.) After an in-person colloquy concerning Ross’s felony charge of theft in the second degree, the district court sentenced Ross to three consecutive sentences totaling seven years. This included a 365-day term in jail for his conviction of possession of a tool to remove a theft detection device with associated fines and surcharges.

Ross filed a timely notice of appeal on May 31, 2019, asking us to vacate his conviction for possession of a tool to remove a theft detection device in violation of Iowa Code section 714.7B(3) because he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pled guilty to this charge without a factual basis to support it. We retained Ross’s appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

Ross concedes that he failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment in order to preserve error on his challenge to the factual basis of his guilty plea. Consequently, Ross contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the district court to accept his guilty plea without a factual basis supporting his charge of possession of a tool to remove a theft detection device and for failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment after the district court accepted his plea. Ineffective-assistance claims are rooted in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. State v. Brown , 930 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2019). We may decide such claims on direct appeal if the appeal was already pending on July 1, 2019, when Senate File 589 eliminating the ability to pursue ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal, took effect, see State v. Macke , 933 N.W.2d 226, 231–32 (Iowa 2019), and the record is adequate to warrant a ruling, see Brown , 930 N.W.2d at 844. Here, Ross’s challenge is properly before us on direct appeal because he filed his notice of appeal on May 31, 2019, and we agree with both parties that the record is adequate to warrant a ruling. Our review is de novo for claims that the defendant’s guilty plea was due to trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. State v. Nall , 894 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Iowa 2017).

III. Analysis.

Ross claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing him to plead guilty to possession of a "tool, instrument, or device with the intent to use it in the unlawful removal of a theft detection device," a serious misdemeanor, in violation of section 714.7B(3). Iowa Code § 714.7B(3). To succeed on his ineffective-assistance claim, Ross "must prove (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted." Brown , 930 N.W.2d at 855. Counsel fails to perform an essential duty when he or she allows the defendant to plead guilty to a charge for which a factual basis does not exist. Nall , 894 N.W.2d at 525. "Prejudice is inherent in such a case." Id. (quoting State v. Gines , 844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014) ). The success of Ross’s argument hinges on whether the combination of the padlock and steel cable used to secure the riding lawn mower on display outside of the Mills Fleet Farm constitutes a "theft detection device" under section 714.7B(3).

Section 714.7B(3) criminalizes the possession of "any tool, instrument, or device with the intent to use it in the unlawful removal of a theft detection device." Iowa Code § 714.7B(3). Section 714.7B(4) defines "theft detection device" as "any electronic or other device attached to goods, wares, or merchandise on display or for sale by a merchant." Id. § 714.7B(4). Ross maintains that the padlock and steel cable combination wrapped around the riding lawn mower does not fit this definition of a "theft detection device" because it did not serve any clear theft detection function and served only to prevent or deter thefts.

According to Ross, interpreting the definition of "theft detection device" broadly to include the combination at issue would lead to absurdity and render the words "theft" and "detection" meaningless. In contrast, the State believes a "theft detection device" simply has to be something "attached" to any item on display or for sale regardless of whether it will immediately alert the owner to the property theft. Therefore, we must resolve the conflicting theories of "theft detection device" in order to determine whether a factual basis supported Ross’s guilty plea.

"The first step in our statutory interpretation analysis is to determine whether the statute is ambiguous." State v. Coleman , 907 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Iowa 2018). If the statutory language is unambiguous, our examination of the statute ends with the plain language. Id. But

"if reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of the statute" based on the context of the statute, the statute is ambiguous and requires us to rely on principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.

Id. (quoting State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. , 889 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Iowa 2017) ). As noted above, the legislature’s definition of "theft detection device" presents at least two differing yet reasonable interpretations: Ross’s interpretation that the device must clearly detect and indicate that an item has been stolen and the State’s interpretation that a theft detection device is anything "attached" to an item on display or for sale, regardless of whether it immediately detects theft. Consequently, the statute is ambiguous because both of these interpretations are reasonable, and we must rely on our tools of statutory construction to determine the meaning of "theft detection device" under Iowa Code section 714.7B.

While we apply the rule of lenity in criminal cases, we still must construe criminal statutes "reasonably and in such a way as to not defeat their plain purpose." Coleman , 907 N.W.2d at 136 (quoting State v. Hagen , 840 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Iowa 2013) ). Our goal in interpreting criminal statutes "is to ascertain legislative intent in order, if possible, to give it effect." Id. (quoting State v. Finders , 743 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2008) ). In doing so, we examine the legislature’s chosen statutory language, "not what it should or might have said."...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • State v. Middlekauff
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 27, 2022
    ...analysis is to determine whether the statute is ambiguous." State v. Zacarias , 958 N.W.2d 573, 581 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Ross , 941 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Iowa 2020) ). "Our inquiry ends with the plain language if the statute is unambiguous." Id. A statute is ambiguous " ‘if reasonable m......
  • State v. Warren
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 5, 2021
    ...grounded in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. State v. Ross , 941 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Iowa 2020). Though Senate File 589, which took effect on July 1, 2019, eliminated the ability to pursue ineffective-assistance claims on......
  • Carreras v. Iowa Dep't of Transp.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • June 17, 2022
    ...analysis is to determine whether the statute is ambiguous." State v. Zacarias , 958 N.W.2d 573, 581 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Ross , 941 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Iowa 2020) ). "Our inquiry ends with the plain language if the statute is unambiguous." Id. A statute is ambiguous " ‘if reasonable m......
  • State v. Schiebout
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • June 5, 2020
    ...and apply statutes using "the legislature's chosen statutory language, ‘not what it should or might have said.’ " State v. Ross , 941 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div. , 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) ). We can't exercise legislative power to amend the I......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT