State v. Roy

• Decision Date: 27 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. SD 35443,SD 35443
• Citation: 597 S.W.3d 710
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Lorenzo Darnell ROY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

597 S.W.3d 710

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Lorenzo Darnell ROY, Appellant.

No. SD 35443

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

Filed: January 27, 2020

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied February 18, 2020

Application for Transfer Denied April 28, 2020

Appellant’s Attorney: William J. Swift, of Columbia, Missouri.

Respondent’s Attorneys: Eric S. Schmitt, Attorney General, and Karen L. Kramer, Assistant Attorney General, of Jefferson City, Missouri.

WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., J.

Lorenzo Darnell Roy ("Roy") appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, of one count of first-degree murder, and one count of armed criminal action. Roy challenges his convictions in seven points on appeal. Finding no merit to Roy’s points, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural Background

We recite the facts of this matter in accord with the principle that we view the evidence (and the reasonable inferences therefrom) in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Lammers , 479 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Mo. banc. 2016).

Roy and Victim met in 2012—they began a stormy relationship and moved into Victim’s house together. On April 9, 2014, the couple looked at wedding rings. On the evening of April 9 or the early morning of April 10, Victim found a "chat app" or text messages from other women on Roy’s phone and accused Roy of cheating on her. The couple argued at the house, and at approximately 2:00 a.m. on April 10, 2014, Roy left the house. A lengthy argument ensued through text messages between the couple.

At approximately 9:30 a.m. on April 10, the couple went to breakfast at Hardee’s. There, Roy recognized a woman with whom he had previously worked and spoke to her. This led to a fresh round of argument between Roy and Victim. The couple left the restaurant separately, and at around noon, Victim texted Roy and continued arguing about Roy’s infidelity.

At approximately 4:53 p.m. on the same day, Roy took a bus to his sister’s house. Around 10:00 p.m., Victim called Richard Snodgrass ("Snodgrass"), and asked him to drive her on various errands. Snodgrass picked Victim up from her house at approximately 10:31 p.m. They returned to Snodgrass’ apartment, had sex, and then Victim called Roy from Snodgrass’ phone.¹ They ran a few more errands, and Snodgrass drove to an ATM where he withdrew $200, which he gave to Victim. When Snodgrass returned Victim to her home, he observed a man walk out of the house and wave at him—he "figured it was [Roy]." Then Snodgrass drove home.

Sometime after 1:32 a.m. on April 11, when Snodgrass brought Victim home, Victim was stabbed 20 to 30 times² (suffering several defensive wounds ), and sustained blunt force injuries from a cylindrical object. She bled to death from those injuries.

At approximately 6:54 p.m. on April 11, 2014, police arrived at Victim’s home on a dispatch regarding a possible stabbing. Officer Taylor Bolton ("Officer Bolton") observed a man and a woman (later identified as Victim’s mother) on the porch. Victim’s mother ("Mother") was frantic and upset: "She was screaming that her daughter was dead inside the residence," and that Roy "had killed her daughter." Police searched the house after obtaining a warrant—they found Victim dead on the kitchen floor. There were no signs of forced entry.

In an alley down the street, officers found a pair of yellow rubber gloves turned inside out (one had Victim’s blood on it), a large kitchen-style butcher knife (with Victim’s blood on it), Victim’s driver’s license, fingernail polish, a black bra, a plastic handle to a pot, a trash bag with a knife blade sticking out of it (the blade had Victim’s blood on it), a purse, a wallet containing Victim’s Social Security card, a prescription for Victim, Roy’s paystub, and a piece of mail addressed to Roy at Victim’s address.

Next to the alley on the other side of a fence, officers also found a frying pan with blood on it, a dented saucepan missing its handle, a mop, and Roy’s baseball cap which Roy was seen wearing in bus security footage on the afternoon of April 10, 2014, and which now had blood "all over it."

Police interviewed Mother and Snodgrass, and sought Roy out at the home of his sister, Brenda Boykins ("Boykins"). Roy agreed to accompany police and was interviewed at the police station.

On August 12, 2014, Roy was charged by felony information with the class A felony of murder in the first degree (Count I), pursuant to section 565.020;³ and armed criminal action (Count II), pursuant to section 571.015.

A jury trial commenced on December 11, 2017. Roy testified in his own defense. The jury found Roy guilty of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. The trial court sentenced Roy to life imprisonment, and 50 years’ imprisonment, respectively, with the sentences to run concurrently.

Roy challenges his convictions in seven points on appeal. Additional facts are included below as necessary to address each of Roy’s points.

Principles of Review

A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence during a criminal trial, and error occurs only when there is a clear abuse of this discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision to admit or exclude evidence is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration. This Court will reverse the trial court’s decision only if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial or deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

State v. Wood , 580 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Point I: No Confrontation Clause Violation

In his first point, Roy argues that the trial court "erred" and "abused its discretion" in overruling defense counsel’s objection to Officer Bolton’s testimony that Mother said Roy killed Victim. Roy claims that this evidence was "testimonial," and therefore inadmissible pursuant to the Confrontation Clause.

Roy’s challenge directs us to the following proceedings at trial, which comprise the underlying substance of his argument:

[STATE:] And on [April 11, 2014], were you called to 1121 North Sherman in Springfield, Missouri?

[BOLTON:] I was.

....

[STATE:] Why were you dispatched to that location?

[BOLTON:] We had a report that a possible stabbing had occurred at this location.

[STATE:] Was that all the information you had as you went to that residence?

[BOLTON:] That there was a female to the home that had been stabbed and that there was another person there at the home that had called 9-1-1.

[STATE:] Were you alone or with someone else when you went to that residence on North Sherman?

[BOLTON:] I was with another officer as an Adam unit, which is two officers to a vehicle.

[STATE:] And who was that officer?

[BOLTON:] Officer Bowling.

....

[STATE:] You said that [Mother] was standing out there by the front porch -- or by the front door when you arrived at the house. Can you describe for the jury her demeanor at that time?

[BOLTON:] She was very frantic and upset. She was screaming that her daughter was dead inside the residence.

[STATE:] Did she make any other statements about what she thought had happened?

At this time, defense counsel asked to approach the bench, and the following colloquy ensued:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Judge, I'm going to object at this time to any elicitation as to what [Mother] said to the officer as to what her opinion is of what happened, for a number of reasons. One, because although it does get over the hearsay hurdle of excited utterance, because she was clearly distraught -- I don't challenge that -- but she was making it to an officer; so, it’s testimonial. Therefore, I would respectfully submit it violates the right to confrontation.

And, two, if I'm correct, [the prosecutor] is trying to elicit [Mother]’s statements that she believes Lorenzo Roy did it. That’s an ultimate fact and invades the province of the jury. Obviously the State believes he did, but I don't believe it’s appropriate for [Mother]’s statements to come in. It is speculative. It goes to an ultimate issue which is for the jury alone. She’s not an expert.

[STATE:] First, there is a hearsay exception that applies. It’s an excited utterance; so, I don't think that’s an issue.

As far as about what the actual content of the statement is, there won't be any evidence that she saw the crime committed or really that this is anything other than speculation on her part.

I think what’s significant for the jury to hear is because it helps start to shape the course of the investigation of the law enforcement officers. When knowing that the police officers could have looked into all of these other people, but they decided from the git-go they thought it was Lorenzo Roy and started investigating him first, I think it makes sense to then share the statement that was made by [Mother].

She obviously had an interest in finding who murdered her daughter, and the first thing she said, that it was Lorenzo Roy, is what caused the law enforcement officers to start looking in to [sic] Lorenzo Roy.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, your point about it being testimonial and, therefore subject to [ Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.E.2d 177 (2004) ], I suppose is what you're telling me, that’s what makes the hearsay rule applicable if it’s going to be applicable. Excited utterance is an exception to that; so, that’s a circular argument.

The fact it goes to the ultimate issue, the entire trial is about the ultimate issue, and the evidence presented goes to the ultimate issue. The jury makes that determination. It’s not an opinion. It’s excited utterance and part of what happened there during the res gestae of the offense itself.^[4]

So objection’s overruled. It’s received.

"We typically review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion but determining whether a criminal defe...