State v. Ruffin

• Decision Date: 24 September 1913
• Citation: 164 N. C. 416,79 S.E. 417
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE. v. RUFFIN.

79 S.E. 417

(164 N. C. 416)

STATE.

v.RUFFIN.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 24, 1913.

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 3991-4003.]

Appeal from Superior Court, Vance County; Cline, Judge.

James Ruffin was convicted of larceny, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The facts in evidence tended to show that on a certain Sunday night, 1913, Robert Royster had several letters written, and same were put in envelopes sealed and addressed to the respective parties; that one of these letters so inclosed and sealed was addressed to Ms father, Spot Royster, Vergilina, Va., and in that one said Robert had put $10 in bills. Next morning Robert gave these letters to Eugene Sandiford to mail, and Sandiford handed them to defendant for like purpose. There was further evidence tending to show that defendant, having opened the envelope and taken the money, resealed and mailed the letter at the post office in Henderson. The court charged the jury that if they should find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant secured the letter from Sandiford for mailing and undertook to mail same at his request, that the money was then in it, and he broke open the letter and took it out and appropriated it to his own use, they would render a verdict of guilty; that the breaking of the letter was a sufficient taking within the proper definition of the crime. There was verdict of guilty, and from sentence to jail for eight months defendant excepted, assigning for error that on the facts in evidence defendant could not be convicted of larceny, having acquired possession by consent of owner or his bailee.

Thomas M. Pittman, of Henderson, for appellant.

The Attorney General and T. H. Calvert, of Raleigh, for the State.

HOKE, J. (after stating the facts as above). At common law it was regarded as an essential feature of the crime of larceny that the party charged should have acquired possession of the property against the will of the owner and ordinarily with intent to steal at the time. The taking considered necessary to make out the offense involved the idea of a trespass on the possession of the owner either actual or constructive. The principle was held to include cases where possession was acquired from the owner animo furandi, by trick or fraudulent contrivance. State v. McRae, 111 N. C. 665, 16 S. E. 173; People v. Miller, 169 N. Y. 339, 62 N. E. 418, reported with instructive editorial note 88 Am. St Rep. 546. And convictions were upheld when the party charged had only the custody of the property; the constructive possession remaining with the owner. Instances of this occurring when a servant or employe intrusted by the master with goods or money for a specific purpose, in breach of this purpose, appropriates same to his own use with felonious intent. State v. Jarvis, 63 N. C. 556.

There is high authority for the position that the conviction in the present case could very well be sustained on the ground that defendant had only the care or custody of the property and not the possession. Murphy v. People, 104 111. 528; Walker v. State, 9 Ga. App/ 863, 72 S. E. 446. We are not called on to determine whether this view is in accord...