State v. Rumbaugh

• Citation: 550 S.W.3d 492
• Decision Date: 26 December 2017
• Docket Number: No. SD 35057,SD 35057
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Matthew M. RUMBAUGH, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

550 S.W.3d 492

STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Matthew M. RUMBAUGH, Defendant-Respondent.

No. SD 35057

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One.

Filed: Dec. 26, 2017
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied January 12, 2018
Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied April 3, 2018

NATHAN J. AQUINO, and CHRISTINE K. LESICKO, Jefferson City, MO, for Appellant.

S. DEAN PRICE, Springfield, MO, for Respondent.

DON E. BURRELL, J.

The State appeals the trial court’s order suppressing statements Matthew M. Rumbaugh ("Defendant") made on separate occasions to a sheriff’s detective and the sheriff regarding two murders committed in Laclede County in July 2014. See 547.200.1(3).¹

The State’s first point claims the trial court erred in suppressing Defendant’s statements to the detective

because Defendant did not unequivocally assert his Fifth Amendment right to counsel in that: (1) Defendant’s anticipatory invocation with [a particular sheriff’s deputy] was ineffective; and (2) Defendant told [the detective] only that he "maybe" should get an attorney, which is not a clear and unequivocal request for an attorney.

The State’s second point claims that the statements Defendant made to the sheriff should not have been suppressed

because: (1) Defendant did not unequivocally assert his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, in that Defendant stated only that he "maybe" should get an attorney; and because (2) even if Defendant had unequivocally asserted his right to counsel, he reinitiated a conversation regarding the investigation in that he asked to speak with [the sheriff] and he volunteered information about the investigation before any questioning by [the sheriff].

Applicable Principles of Review and Governing Law

"At a motion to suppress hearing, the state bears both the burden of producing evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the motion to suppress should be overruled." State v. Collings , 450 S.W.3d 741, 753 (Mo. banc 2014) (quotations omitted). "On appeal, the appellant, not the respondent, has the burden of showing erroneous action on the part of the trial court." State v. Stone , 430 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (quotation omitted). We "will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress only if it is

550 S.W.3d 495

clearly erroneous." State v. Holman , 502 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Mo. banc 2016).

"In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the facts and any reasonable inferences arising from the facts are to be stated most favorably to the order challenged on appeal. We will disregard any evidence that contradicts the order." State v. Kinkead , 983 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Mo. banc 1998) (internal citation omitted). "Where, as here, the trial court makes no findings of fact in ruling on the motion to suppress, we presume the trial court found all facts in accordance with its ruling." State v. Selvy , 462 S.W.3d 756, 764 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).

Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. State v. Gaw , 285 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Mo. banc 2009). "The determination of whether a suspect invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel is a question of law, and we need not defer to the trial court’s conclusion on such questions." State v. Benedict , 495 S.W.3d 185, 194 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016).

Evidence and Procedural History

In keeping with our standard of review, see Kinkead , 983 S.W.2d at 519, the following is a summary of the relevant evidence presented at the July 2017 hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress ("the hearing").

"[I]n the early morning hours" of July 8, 2014, law enforcement officials were dispatched to "a shooting out on Atlanta Road" involving two male victims ("Victim 1" and, a minor, "Victim 2"). Defendant was identified as a suspect in the shooting. That same morning, Sheriff Wayne Merritt ("Sheriff") located Defendant sleeping in a bed at Defendant’s son’s residence. Sheriff woke Defendant, and Defendant "agree[d] to go with Sheriff" to the Lebanon Police Department.

After Defendant was transported to the police department, Laclede County Sheriff’s Corporal Steven Price ("Corporal Price") contacted Defendant later that morning and asked Defendant to consent to a search of his vehicle and the house in which he was found. Corporal Price did not recall advising Defendant of his Miranda² rights, and he was not sure whether a Miranda warning was included on the consent form Corporal Price presented to Defendant. Defendant did not consent to the search. When asked at the hearing whether he told the officers at the police department that he wanted to talk to his attorney, Defendant replied:

I didn't—I don't believe I specifically said I wanted to talk to my attorney. [Corporal] Price asked me if I would sign a consent form. I told him it wasn't my house and I said, you know, before I do much of any of that, probably ought to—you know, somebody ought to call my attorney, Gary Smith. That was the extent of it.

Corporal Price did not ask Defendant "any other questions about what had happened[.]"

Around 10:40 that same morning, Laclede County Sheriff’s Investigator Robert Finley ("Detective Finley") interviewed Defendant at the sheriff’s department. The interview was video recorded, and a DVD disc containing the recording was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing as State’s Exhibit 1. Detective Finley informed Defendant of the nature of the matter, read him his rights using a "Miranda card[,]" and, as each item was read, asked Defendant if he understood. Defendant acknowledged that he understood each item read to him by Detective Finley.

550 S.W.3d 496

The detective asked Defendant again whether Defendant understood his rights as they had been explained to him, and Defendant replied, "I think so. Seems simple enough."

Detective Finley asked if Defendant would talk with him, and Defendant replied: "Well, I might talk to you a little bit, I—I'm thinking, as serious as this is. You say I'm under arrest. I mean, I'm thinking maybe—and I know I can't afford an attorney. So, I'm thinking maybe I better get one. Something, you know at least ask." Detective Finley then told Defendant that the detective believed that Defendant had knowledge about the investigation. Defendant responded by saying "that he had a lot of knowledge about Atlanta Road." Detective Finley’s interrogation of Defendant proceeded, and it "lasted approximately three hours and 19 minutes[.]"

The next morning, Sheriff was at the jail, and staff advised him that Defendant wanted to talk to Sheriff "about a matter that happened between [Defendant] and a DFS worker."³ Sheriff told Defendant that they could talk after Sheriff finished something he was doing at the moment. About 20 to 25 minutes later, around 9:30 a.m., Sheriff went to the interview room where Defendant was located and told him to have a seat. Sheriff left to take a phone call, returned, and then interviewed Defendant. Sheriff’s interview of Defendant was video recorded, and a DVD disc of the recording was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing as State’s Exhibit 2.

Exhibit 2 begins with Defendant walking into the interview room, and a voice is audible telling Defendant, "be with you in just a second." Sheriff entered the room approximately two-and-a-half minutes later and stated, "Okay. You wanting to talk to me, Matt?" Defendant replied, "Um," and Sheriff stated, "Okay, now, before you say anything, remember, you're still under—do you remember your rights that we read to you yesterday? So you still understand your rights and everything?" Defendant indicated that he understood his rights, and Sheriff said, "Alright, go ahead."

Defendant then complained about the way someone from "social services" ("the social services investigator") had treated him when bringing some papers to him at the jail. Defendant said he thought that other individuals, including Detective Finley, had been "professional[,]" but the social services investigator was not. Defendant said that he did not know if he wanted to file "this" and gestured toward a paper that he later said the social services investigator had given him. Defendant said that he would rather make his complaint "verbally[.]"

As Defendant finished describing his interaction with the social services investigator, the following exchange occurred:

...