State v. Rumsey

Decision Date04 November 1981
Docket NumberNo. 5042,5042
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. Dennis Wayne RUMSEY, Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
CourtArizona Supreme Court
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III, and Jessica Gifford, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee-cross-appellant

Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by Charles R. Krull, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant-cross-appellee.

CAMERON, Justice.

Defendant, Dennis Wayne Rumsey, was convicted by a jury on 6 June 1980 of first degree murder in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1105, and armed robbery in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1904. He was adjudged guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years for the first degree murder conviction and 21 years for the armed robbery conviction. A.R.S. §§ 13-701, 13-702, and 13-604. The terms of the sentences were to run consecutively. A.R.S. § 13-708. Defendant now appeals the consecutive nature of his sentences. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4035.

We must answer the following questions on appeal:

1. Does the imposition of consecutive sentences in this instance violate Arizona's multiple punishment statute?

2. Does the imposition of consecutive sentences violate the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution?

3. Did the trial court err in imposing life imprisonment rather than the death sentence for the murder conviction?

The facts necessary for a determination of these issues are as follows. On 16 October 1979, a badly decomposed body of a white male was discovered on the desert alongside Interstate 10, approximately 20 miles outside of Phoenix, Arizona. The corpse carried no identification, and a subsequent autopsy revealed that the victim died of two gunshot wounds to the chest. Through fingerprint analysis and dental examination, the victim was later identified as one George Koslosky.

On or about 5 November 1979, the Phoenix Police Department was notified by the Indiana State Police that a girl by the name of Kimberly Holmes had come forward as a witness to a murder in the State of Arizona. Through an interview with Kimberly Holmes, the police arrested the defendant in Las Vegas, Nevada, at his parental home and he was charged with the murder and robbery of George Koslosky.

At trial, Kimberly Holmes testified that in October of 1979 she and defendant were hitchhiking from Indiana to the home of the defendant's parents in Las Vegas. In New Mexico or Texas, they were picked up by the victim, George Koslosky. When they reached Phoenix, the defendant and the victim went into a store to buy some beer. When the defendant returned, he told Kim that the victim had over $300 in his wallet and that he was going to rob him. Elsewhere in Phoenix, they stopped at a restaurant where the victim bought food for them. The defendant again told Kim of his plans to rob Koslosky. When they left Phoenix, defendant was driving the vehicle and the victim was sleeping in the back. After driving for approximately 45 minutes, defendant pulled over to the side of the road and told Kim, "I'm going to do it now." Defendant then woke the victim and ordered him at gunpoint to empty his pockets and to get into the trunk. The victim refused, saying he would "smother" in the trunk. The defendant fired one warning shot and repeated his demands. When the victim refused, the defendant shot the victim twice and he fell to the ground. The defendant then dragged the victim off the road and Kim testified that she then heard a third shot. Prior to leaving the scene in the victim's car, defendant threw some money at Kim and told her to count it. They then proceeded to Riverside, California, and then on to Las Vegas. Shortly thereafter, Kim returned to Indiana where she notified the authorities of the incident.

William Rumsey, defendant's brother, testified that in October, 1979, his brother came back to Las Vegas. At that time, defendant told him that he had shot a man in Arizona and did not know if he had killed him or not. While they were speaking, defendant showed his brother a wallet and a watch that were later identified as having belonged to the victim, George Koslosky.

When testifying in his own behalf, defendant denied even discussing the robbery of George Koslosky with Kimberly Holmes. Defendant testified that the victim was driving the car when they left Phoenix and that it was he who went into the back seat where he passed out from drinking and using narcotics. When he awoke, it was Kim who was driving the car and she was shaking and crying. Defendant said that at that time, Kim admitted killing the victim because he had tried something with her. Defendant admitted that upon his return to Las Vegas, he told his brother that it was he who shot a man in Arizona, but that this was done to cover-up for Kimberly Holmes and to protect her from being arrested.

MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT

Defendant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is in violation of "An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent. * * * " A.R.S. § 13-116.

Arizona's multiple punishment statute which reads as follows:

Under a previous statute with slightly different language, we have held that a defendant convicted for murder under the felony-murder rule may receive two sentences when the underlying felony and the homicide were two separate and distinct offenses. State v. Lujan, 124 Ariz. 365, 604 P.2d 629 (1979); State v. Miniefield, 110 Ariz. 599, 522 P.2d 25 (1974).

In State v. Tinghitella, 108 Ariz. 1, 491 P.2d 834 (1971), we adopted the "identical elements" test for determining whether the proscription of Arizona's multiple punishment statute applies to a particular case. Under that test, the court must eliminate the evidence supporting the elements of one charge and determine whether the remaining evidence supports the elements of the other charge.

The elements of first degree murder are: (1) knowingly; (2) causing the death of another person; (3) with premeditation. A.R.S. § 13-1105. Armed robbery is: (1) the taking of any property; (2) of another; (3) from his person or immediate presence; (4) against his will; (5) by using or threatening to use force; (6) with the intent either to coerce surrender of the property or to prevent resistance to such person taking or retaining property; (7) where the perpetrator is armed with a deadly weapon or uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or dangerous instrumentality. A.R.S. §§ 13-1902 and 13-1904.

A.R.S. § 13-1902 reads:

"A person commits robbery if in the course of taking any property of another * * * such person threatens or uses force * * *." (emphasis added)

In a case wherein the defendant shot and killed a taxicab driver by a bullet in the back of the head after which he took the victim's night's receipts we stated in setting aside the consecutive sentences:

"It is apparent that the elimination of the evidence supporting the elements of first degree murder does not leave sufficient evidence to support the armed robbery charge. Although the first five elements of robbery are supported by the remaining facts, the sixth element 'by means of force or fear' is not supported. This evidence is necessary to support the first two elements of the murder charge: the unlawful killing of a human being. Under the peculiar facts of our instant case, the taxicab driver was shot in the head from behind, apparently with no knowledge of what was about to take place. This shooting was the only force available to support the subsequent acts which might otherwise be characterized as robbery. * * * Accordingly, the robbery conviction and sentence are set aside." State v. Ferguson, 119 Ariz. 55, 61, 579 P.2d 559, 565 (1978).

We do not find that State v. Ferguson, supra, is applicable. In the instant case, the defendant demanded the victim's wallet and threatened him with a gun prior to shooting him. Even though the victim's wallet was not taken until after the victim was shot and presumably dead, the acts which constituted the robbery were separate and apart from the acts which constituted the murder. The fatal shooting constituted first degree murder independent of the armed robbery. Under the facts of this case, we hold that the intervening crime of murder does not preclude a conviction of armed robbery as well as murder, and the trial court was correct in imposing consecutive sentences for armed robbery and murder.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Defendant also contends that his consecutive sentences violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Defendant relies on the United States Supreme Court case of Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). Whalen was decided on the basis of a District of Columbia statute, and the United States Supreme Court, interpreting that statute, concluded that Congress did not intend to allow the crimes of rape and murder in the course of rape to be punishable by consecutive sentences. The court in Whalen made it clear that Congress could have provided for a different sentencing scheme. Arizona has such a scheme and specifically permits the imposition of consecutive sentences. A.R.S. § 13-708. We do not believe Whalen is applicable. We find no double jeopardy violation.

FAILURE TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY

Before sentencing, the trial court made the findings required by the statute, A.R.S. § 13-703, as to mitigating and aggravating factors. The trial court specifically found:

"5. The defendant did not commit the offense as consideration for the receipt or in expectation of...

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  • Gerlaugh v. Lewis, CIV-85-1647-PHX-RGS.
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    ...that Arizona's legislature intended multiple punishment for first degree murder and the underlying felony. In State v. Rumsey, 130 Ariz. 427, 431, 636 P.2d 1209, 1213 (1981), Rumsey argued, in a similar fashion to Petitioner, that his consecutive sentences for armed robbery and first degree......
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