State v. Rush
| Decision Date | 27 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007, September Term, 2006.,2007, September Term, 2006. |
| Citation | 921 A.2d 334,174 Md. App. 259 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Cindi Renee Katherine RUSH. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Diane E. Keller (Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, on brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
David A. Martella, Rockville, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: DEBORAH S. EYLER, WOODWARD, JOHN F. McAULIFFE, (Ret'd, Specially Assigned), JJ.
In its murder prosecution against Cindi Renee Katherine Rush, the State has appealed a pre-trial ruling by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County suppressing from evidence inculpatory statements Rush gave to the police. The State asks whether the circuit court erred in ruling that the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Rush maintains that the Miranda ruling was correct but asks, beyond that, whether the suppression ruling should be upheld because, contrary to the alternative ruling of the circuit court, her statements were not voluntarily made.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that 1) in the circumstances of this interrogation, there was no Miranda violation; 2) this Court has jurisdiction to decide Rush's alternative involuntariness argument; and 3) some of Rush's statements to the police were not voluntarily given. Accordingly, we shall affirm the circuit court's suppression ruling in part, although on an alternative ground, vacate it in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Rush stands charged with the first degree murder of Patricia Caniglia, first degree assault of Antonio Caniglia, and other related offenses. The underlying events took place on April 19, 2006.
That evening, at about 7:30, Mrs. Caniglia and her adult son Antonio were inside their home in the Fort Washington area of Prince George's County. An assailant armed with a handgun broke into the house, confronted Mrs. Caniglia in an upstairs bedroom, and shot her in the head, killing her. Antonio was in the basement when the intruder entered. When he heard his mother cry out, he armed himself with a shotgun and confronted the intruder, who aimed the handgun at him. Antonio shot the intruder, killing him. The intruder, who was a stranger to the Caniglias, later was identified as one Jeffrey Gilbert, nicknamed "DC".
That same night, at the time of the shooting, a witness noticed a red car parked in front of the Caniglia house. The car was occupied by a man and a woman, both of whom were slouching down, as if to avoid being seen. The woman was about 20 years old, Caucasian, with black hair.
Prince George's County Police Department ("PGCPD") officers investigating Mrs. Caniglia's murder became interested in Rush as a suspect once they obtained Gilbert's cell phone records. From those records, the police learned that Rush, Gilbert, and another suspect, Larry Ellis (nicknamed "JR"), were together and in the immediate area of the Caniglia home when the shooting happened. The police investigation further disclosed that, a few years before the shooting, Rush had worked at the Caniglia family's restaurant and had been romantically involved with Antonio. Indeed, for some period of time, Rush had lived with the Caniglias. Also, Rush matched the witness's physical description of the woman in the red car.
In the District Court of Maryland for Prince George's County, Detective Kerry Jernigan, the lead homicide detective on the Caniglia case, filed an application for statement of charges against Rush. On the basis of the information in the application, Rush was charged with first-degree murder of Mrs. Caniglia, and an arrest warrant was issued for her.
On May 1, 2006, Corporal William Chinn and other officers in the PGCPD's Homicide Unit arrested Rush on the warrant, at her aunt's home in Baltimore County. They transported her to the unit's Criminal Investigation Division, in Upper Marlboro. There, Rush signed an Advice of Rights Form and was interrogated by Detective Jernigan. The interrogation was digitally recorded and saved on a DVD.
After initially saying that she had had nothing to do with the murder, Rush made several inculpatory statements, at first oral and then in writing.
On May 30, 2006, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, a grand jury indicted Rush for first-degree murder of Patricia Caniglia, armed robbery of Antonio Caniglia, and other related charges. Rush filed a timely motion to suppress from evidence the inculpatory statements she made to Detective Jernigan.
The circuit court held a suppression hearing on September 27, 2006. Detective Jernigan and Corporal Chinn testified in the State's case-in-chief; Rush testified on her own behalf; and Detective Jernigan testified on rebuttal. The DVD of the interrogation, the Advice of Rights Form, the Application for Statement of Charges, and Rush's written statement were moved into evidence as State's exhibits. The defense did not offer any exhibits. The issues before the court were whether Rush's statements were obtained in violation of Miranda and whether her statements were made voluntarily, under the standards imposed by federal constitutional, Maryland constitutional, and Maryland non-constitutional law.
After hearing closing arguments of counsel, the circuit court ruled that Rush's statements had been obtained in violation of the dictates of Miranda, and would be suppressed on that ground. The court made plain that it was granting the suppression motion on the Miranda violation ground only, and was not granting it on the alternative involuntariness ground.
On October 12, 2006, pursuant to Md. Code (2006 Repl.Vol.), section 12-302(c)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ"), the State noted this appeal from the circuit court's suppression decision. Rush noted a cross-appeal, challenging the circuit court's ruling that her statements were voluntary, and hence were not subject to suppression on that alternative ground.
This Court issued an order directing Rush to show cause "why the Court should not conclude that the cross-appeal is an interlocutory appeal not allowed by Raimondi v. State, 8 Md.App. 468, 261 A.2d 40 cert. denied 256 Md. 747 (1970), and Pearce v. State, 8 Md.App. 477, 261 A.2d 39 (1970), and not expressly permitted by § 12-302 of the Courts Article and, thus, subject to dismissal pursuant to Md. Rule 8-602(a)(1)." Rush responded, inter alia, that even without a cross-appeal this Court has jurisdiction to uphold the suppression ruling on the alternative involuntariness ground that was rejected by the circuit court.
On January 12, 2007, this Court entered an order dismissing Rush's cross-appeal. The cross-appeal was dismissed without prejudice to Rush to argue that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the alternative voluntariness issue.
Corporal Chinn arrested Rush on the first degree murder warrant and transported her from her aunt's home to Upper Marlboro. After Rush was placed in an interview room, Detective Jernigan entered, introduced himself, and said he wanted to talk to her about Mrs. Caniglia's death. He asked whether Rush had been arrested before, or had had any prior dealings with the police. She responded, "No." He then said, Before starting with the advisements, Detective Jernigan said he understood that Rush used to work for the Caniglias, and asked if she knew Antonio; Rush responded that she had worked for the Caniglias about three years prior and that she used to live with them.
Detective Jernigan then proceeded to advise Rush, using a standard Advice of Rights Form, to which he made a handwritten alteration. The form with the alteration stated, in relevant part:
I am now going to read to you your rights under the law. If you do not understand something that I say to you, please stop me, and I will explain it to you.
1. You have the right to remain silent. If you choose to give up this right, anything that you say can be used against you in court.
On the original document, the phrase we have italicized and put in bold is the handwritten addition made by Detective Jernigan.
To confirm Rush's literacy, Detective Jernigan had her read a portion of the form aloud. He then read the form to Rush, as follows:
I'm now going to read you your rights under the law. If you do not understand something that I say to you, please stop me and I will explain it to you. You have the right to remain silent. If you choose to give up this right, anything that you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you're asked any questions. You have the right, you have, you have the right to have a lawyer with you while being questioned. If you want a lawyer and can't afford one one will be provided to you at some time at no cost. If at some point in time during our questioning you decide you don't want to talk anymore, that's your right as well. Okay?
(Emphasis added.)
After reading the Advice of Rights Form, Detective Jernigan asked Rush whether "[a]ll that make sense to ya?" She replied in the affirmative. He then asked several questions to verify that Rush understood the advisements stated in the Form, and had Rush place her initials next to four answers to questions on the form. Rush's...
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