State v. Ruth

• Citation: 98 Idaho 879,574 P.2d 1357
• Decision Date: 16 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 12280,12280
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Larry Allen RUTH, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Page 1357

574 P.2d 1357

98 Idaho 879

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Larry Allen RUTH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12280.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Feb. 16, 1978.

John F. Greenfield, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

McFADDEN, Justice.

Defendant-appellant Larry Allen Ruth appeals from a judgment finding him guilty of second degree murder and sentencing him to an indeterminate prison term not to exceed life. We affirm.

Appellant was charged with first degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon. The charges arose out of appellant's participation, apparently while intoxicated, in a drunken brawl and barroom shooting that left one man dead and another wounded. To these charges appellant pleaded not guilty by reason of mental defect on September 5, 1975. Apparently his court-appointed counsel intended to rely on evidence, some of which is in the record, that, in the words of the superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital where appellant had voluntarily committed himself earlier, he suffered from "alcohol addiction, severe" and an "explosive personality."

Three weeks later, appellant changed his plea to guilty. In return, the prosecutor dismissed the assault charge and reduced the murder charge to second degree. The court accepted appellant's guilty plea to second degree murder and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. After receiving the pre-sentence report, the court sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term not to exceed life imprisonment.

On appeal, appellant asserts two errors. The first is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Appellant maintains that his appointed counsel advised him to plead guilty to second degree murder and that such advice was clearly incompetent in light of overwhelming evidence of alcohol addiction so serious as to render him incapable of the mens rea for either degree of murder. The second issue appellant raises on appeal is that the court erred in accepting his plea because he did not understand its significance.

On the first issue, the record contains no evidence supporting appellant's claims. The only direct evidence on this issue comes from appellant's trial counsel. At the change of plea hearing, in the presence of appellant, his trial counsel told the court:

" * * * I told Mr. Ruth that I had planned to file certain preliminary motions prior to the trial based on my knowledge of the law in the State of Idaho. I asked him at that time he indicated he wished to enter a plea to a reduced charge and I told him that it was my advice that he wait until I was able to file my motions and await a decision of the court on the motions before he decided to enter such a plea. And, in spite of my advice and in spite of my personal opinions on the case, Mr. Ruth decided to enter a plea at this time against the advice of counsel. Now, I don't believe that he decided to do this because he was dissatisfied, although I would ask the court to inquire into that aspect of it, but he felt that, although he didn't agree with the evidence presented, he personally could not see any way to defend against it, and that was in spite of what (co-counsel) and myself talked to him about."

With that assertion appellant made no objection or protest.

In light of these statements in the hearing transcript, appellant's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is meritless.

On the basis of the record before us, we also find meritless appellant's claim that the court erred in accepting his plea without insuring that he understood its significance. The record shows that the court made every reasonable attempt to make certain that appellant's plea was entered voluntarily and with a full understanding of its import. ¹ On the basis of the trial court record, appellant's second claim is groundless.

The conviction is affirmed.

SHEPARD, C. J., and DONALDSON and BISTLINE, JJ., concur.

BISTLINE, Justice, specially concurring.

In the ordinary situation it might well be improper to decide the issue of competency of counsel on direct appeal, if there is a likelihood that an appellant could, when given the opportunity in post conviction proceedings, bring up a record supporting claims of inadequate representation. Justice Bakes, concurring in State v. Kraft, 96 Idaho 901, 539 P.2d 254 (1975), cogently set forth the reason why a hearing should ordinarily be required:

The question of competency of counsel is an extremely complex factual determination which, in all but the most unusual cases, requires an evidentiary hearing for determination. See, State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975). The resolution of those factual issues for the first time upon appeal, based upon a trial record in which competency of counsel was not at issue, is at best conjectural. Id. at 906, 539 P.2d at 259.

If, on appeal, counsel prematurely raises the competency of counsel issue, and gains an adverse determination in this Court, he may very well subject himself to like charges of incompetency keeping in mind the threat of res judicata should the client later seek to have his claim of incompetence of trial counsel heard at a post conviction proceeding. On the other hand, there is an equal threat of later being told that competency of counsel should have been raised on direct appeal whenever appeal counsel is other than trial counsel. In calling for a reservation of the competency issue until a post-conviction hearing, Justice Bakes so far presents the better approach, both for adjudication by this Court and for guidance to counsel faced with the dilemma outlined above.

In this case nothing has been presented to this Court even tending to raise a factual issue as to the competence of trial counsel. For my part, I consider it so improvidently raised, that it would be better to consider it as not having been raised at all. The Court's opinion is bottomed on a record which leaves no doubt but that trial counsel had, so to speak, an incompetent client, a man who would not take the advice of counsel. The overall flavor of the record is that defendant entertained an extreme and compelling fear that the jury would, as he stated, convict him of first degree murder. Mr. Ruth,...