State v. Rutherford

• Docket Number: 22-0553
• Decision Date: 03 November 2023
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. MURPHY LEE RUTHERFORD, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

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STATE OF IOWA, Appellee,
v.
MURPHY LEE RUTHERFORD, Appellant.

No. 22-0553

Supreme Court of Iowa

November 3, 2023

Submitted September 14, 2023

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Mark E. Kruse, Judge.

The defendant seeks further review from court of appeals decision affirming his sentence following guilty plea. Decision of Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part; District Court Judgment Affirmed.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Court, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, Mansfield, McDonald, and May joined. McDermott, J., filed an opinion concurring specially.

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OPINION

Oxley, Justice

Murphy Lee Rutherford entered a written guilty plea to second-degree theft and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (all class "D" felonies) after he was arrested for taking two firearms from an acquaintance's home. The district court sentenced him to three consecutive five-year sentences of imprisonment. Rutherford appealed, and we transferred the appeal to the court of appeals. The court of appeals found good cause to address Rutherford's challenge to his sentence as required by Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2021), exercised jurisdiction over the appeal, and affirmed the sentence. But the court of appeals declined to address Rutherford's second argument on appeal-that there was an inadequate factual basis to support his guilty plea to theft-because it concluded that good cause was lacking on that issue.

We granted Rutherford's application for further review to confirm what we said last year in State v. Wilbourn: "An appellate court either has jurisdiction over a criminal appeal or it does not." 974 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2022). If good cause is lacking, the court has no jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. See State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 110 (Iowa 2021) (dismissing appeal and explaining that "[b]ecause Treptow has not established good cause to pursue a direct appeal as a matter of right, this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal"). But "[o]nce a defendant crosses the good-cause threshold as to one ground for appeal, the court has jurisdiction over the appeal." Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 66.

I. The Distinction Between Jurisdiction and Authority.

"Courts . . . have more than occasionally [mis]used the term 'jurisdictional ....'" Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)); see also Holding v. Franklin Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 565 N.W.2d 318, 319 (Iowa 1997) (en banc)

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(noting the "poetic justice" of our court's attempt to correct a "widespread misimpression that often confused a court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction with a court's lack of authority to act in a particular matter" where the confusion could be traced to our own prior cases).

There is an important difference between a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its authority to act. See, e.g., State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993) ("The importance of this distinction becomes evident when issues of waiver arise."). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). Once a case is within a court's adjudicatory power, other rules or statutes may limit the court's authority to act, but that does not make those provisions jurisdictional. In Holding v. Franklin County Zoning Board of Adjustment, we explained the distinction this way:

Subject matter jurisdiction is not lacking in the present case because the legislature has clearly given Iowa courts the power to act in challenges to decisions of county zoning commissions. At issue is only whether authority to act in this controversy should be withheld because of the claimed premature filing of the court challenge

565 N.W.2d at 319. In Scarborough v. Principi, the United States Supreme Court explained a similar distinction: "In short, [28 U.S.C.] § 2412(d)(1)(B) does not describe what 'classes of cases' the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims] is competent to adjudicate; instead, the section relates only to postjudgment proceedings auxiliary to cases already within that court's adjudicatory authority." 541 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added) (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455).

Jurisdiction goes to a court's power to adjudicate a particular class of cases,

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while authority goes to a court's ability to act in a particular case within that class.

Iowa Code sections 814.6 and 814.7 are prime examples of the difference between our court's jurisdiction and its authority. "Iowa Code section 814.6 contains the standards for subject-matter jurisdiction for the review of a criminal defendant's appeal." State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa, 2017). Section 814.6(1)(a) grants a right of appeal to a defendant from "[a] final judgment of sentence," with certain exclusions, one of which is an appeal from "[a] conviction where the defendant has pled guilty." Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). As a result, we generally lack jurisdiction over direct appeals from guilty pleas. But the provision creates two exceptions to that exclusion: "This subparagraph does not apply to a guilty plea for a class 'A' felony or in a case where the defendant establishes good cause." Id. So if a defendant who pleaded guilty to a non-class "A" felony can establish good cause, the statutory prerequisites for appellate jurisdiction are met, the ban on the right to appeal from a guilty plea does not apply, and the defendant is entitled to appeal the entire case-the "final judgment of sentence" from the guilty plea conviction as identified in section 814.6(1)(a). To that end, section 814.6(1)(a)(3) creates a class of cases over which we have appellate jurisdiction: guilty plea convictions where the defendant establishes good cause to appeal.

Section 814.7, on the other hand, addresses our authority over specific claims. It provides:

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction relief pursuant to chapter 822. The claim need not be raised on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim for postconviction relief purposes, and the claim shall not be decided on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.

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Id. § 814.7 (emphasis added). "Section 814.7 does not limit jurisdiction; it limits the authority of Iowa's appellate courts to resolve ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal." State v. Jordan, 959 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2021); see also Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109 ("Because we have just upheld the constitutionality of section 814.7, this court is without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal." (emphasis added)).

The court of appeals was concerned about not circumventing our holding in State v. Treptow. See 960 N.W.2d at 109 (holding that defendant failed to establish good cause to appeal from a guilty plea because "[h]is failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment preclude[d] appellate relief" under our criminal rules of procedure). But in that case, Treptow's only challenge on appeal was that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis, and our prior caselaw required that challenge to be brought as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the defendant failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment. See id. at 103. And because section 814.7 now prevents us from considering ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, we could provide no relief to Treptow on the sole issue raised on appeal. Id. at 109. As such, Treptow failed to establish good cause and could not avoid the ban on his appeal from a guilty plea. Id. at 109-10.

Once good cause is established under section 814.6(1)(a)(3) as to one issue, we have jurisdiction over the entire appeal even if section 814.7 otherwise limits our authority with respect to specific issues raised in the appeal. See Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 66 ("We may lack authority to consider all issues, but that is a different matter."). Thus, when the court of appeals properly found good cause to address Rutherford's appeal of his discretionary sentence, see State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) ("[G]ood cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges . . . a discretionary sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to as part of her

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plea bargain."), it had jurisdiction over the entire appeal. Indeed, the court of appeals exercised that jurisdiction by affirming the district court's judgment against Rutherford's challenge that the district court abused its discretion by not suspending his sentences in light of his medical condition. We let the court of appeals decision stand on this issue. See Farnsworth v. State, 982 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 2022) ("When we grant further review, we may exercise our discretion to let the court of appeals decision stand as the final decision on particular issues." (quoting State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 n.1 (Iowa 2019))).

Having jurisdiction over the appeal, the court of appeals should have also addressed his challenge to the factual basis...