State v. Rynhart

• Decision Date: 22 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 20040115.,20040115.
• Citation: 2005 UT 84,125 P.3d 938
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Tanja RYNHART, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

125 P.3d 938

2005 UT 84

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Tanja RYNHART, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 20040115.

Supreme Court of Utah.

November 22, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christine Soltis, Marian Decker, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

James M. Retallick, Ogden, for defendant.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

PARRISH, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Tanja Rynhart was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance after police officers discovered a small bag of cocaine in her purse. At the time of the discovery, Rynhart's purse was in her van, which she had left unattended in a marsh after driving off the road and crashing through two fences. Rynhart filed a motion to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the police officer illegally searched her van in violation of her rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State argued that the search was valid because Rynhart had abandoned her van. Alternatively, it relied on the emergency aid doctrine. The district court concluded that the search was not justified under the doctrine of abandonment, but nonetheless denied Rynhart's motion, holding that the emergency aid doctrine applied. Rynhart sought interlocutory review of the district court's order with the court of appeals, which reversed, holding that the search could not be upheld under either doctrine. Because we conclude that Rynhart abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in her van and purse, we hold that the search was permissible under the abandonment doctrine. Accordingly, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 At 8:30 a.m. on Sunday, January 6, 2002, a Brigham City police officer was called to the scene of a single-vehicle accident. Upon arriving, the officer observed that a van, which was then located in the middle of a privately owned field, had traveled "over the curb, down an embankment, [and] through two fences" before coming to rest in the field. Because the tire tracks were covered with freshly fallen snow, the officer deduced that the accident occurred prior to the snowfall, which had begun approximately five hours earlier.

¶ 3 The officer approached the van and opened a door to determine whether anyone was still inside. Although the officer did not see anyone in the van, he did observe a purse, a briefcase, and a partially consumed bottle of vodka. When he opened the purse, he discovered a wallet containing nearly $330 in cash, Rynhart's driver's license, and "a small bag that had a white powdery substance in it."

¶ 4 The officer attempted to reach Rynhart by phone, but was unsuccessful. Thereafter, the owner of the field in which the van had come to rest spoke to the officer, requesting the van's removal so that he could begin to repair the damaged fences. Accordingly, just prior to 10:00 a.m., the officer had the van towed to a wrecking yard. The officer remained at the scene for a short time thereafter, but Rynhart did not return. At approximately 2:00 p.m. that same day, the towing company notified the officer that Rynhart had arrived to arrange for the retrieval of her van. The officer met Rynhart at the wrecking yard and inquired about the small bag found in her purse. Rynhart admitted that the substance was cocaine. She was subsequently arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor.

¶ 5 Prior to trial, Rynhart moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the warrantless search of her van and purse. She argued that the search violated both the United States and Utah Constitutions because "[t]he officer lacked any justification to search the vehicle pursuant to any public safety or warrantless search exception." The State responded by arguing that the search was constitutional under either one or both of two theories: (1) the abandonment doctrine, and (2) the emergency aid doctrine. Pursuant to State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct.App.1991), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), the district court rejected the State's theory that Rynhart abandoned her privacy expectation in the van, declaring that "[t]he apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the single vehicle nature of the accident all combine to belie the officer's imputing an intent to abandon the vehicle." The district court upheld the constitutionality of the search, however, under the emergency aid doctrine.

¶ 6 On September 23, 2002, Rynhart filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which the court of appeals granted. The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that the emergency aid doctrine did not apply. State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, ¶ 15, 81 P.3d 814. The court of appeals also held that the search could not be upheld under the abandonment doctrine, stating that

the State suggests that we should, without the benefit of a cross-appeal, reverse the [district] court's ruling that Rynhart had not abandoned her expectation of privacy in her vehicle. Not only does the record offer scant support for that proposition, it offers no support whatsoever that Rynhart abandoned her expectation of privacy in her purse and the contents thereof, or her wallet and the contents thereof.

Id. ¶ 9 n. 3 (emphasis added).

¶ 7 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Thorne embraced the State's position, concluding that Rynhart had abandoned any privacy interest she may have had in the van and the purse when she "left the vehicle, and its contents, illegally parked and unsecured for several hours following her accident." Id. ¶ 32. Additionally, Judge Thorne criticized the rule of law applied by the majority, as articulated in State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, ¶ 14, 76 P.3d 178, and Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736, which requires the State to prove by "clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence" that Rynhart intended to abandon her privacy interest in the property. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, ¶ 24 n. 4, 81 P.3d 814. According to Judge Thorne, this "abandonment standard" is flawed and should be rejected. Id. ¶ 39.

¶ 8 The State petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari, presenting the question for review as follows: "Did [Rynhart] retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in her minivan and its contents when she left the vehicle wrecked and unlocked on another's property without reporting the single-car accident to either the police or the property owner?" We granted the State's petition and have jurisdiction pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(a) of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 "On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the [district] court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, ¶ 8, 116 P.3d 290 (internal quotations omitted). An appellate court reviews a district court's decision concerning the constitutionality of a search and seizure for correctness, applying no deference to the district court's legal conclusion. See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶¶ 7-9, 112 P.3d 507.

¶ 10 In this case, the court of appeals suggested that the issue of abandonment was not properly before it because the State did not file a cross-appeal. But this court has recognized that

an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the [district] court to be the basis of its ruling or action and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court.

First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1137. Because the doctrine of abandonment was apparent on the record and was, in fact, considered by the district court and raised in the State's brief to the court of appeals, it was properly before the court of appeals and is properly before us.

ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The State identifies two alleged deficiencies in the court of appeals' analysis. First, the State asserts that the court of appeals erred when it required the State to prove abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Second, the State argues that the court of appeals erred when it applied an abandonment test that focuses solely on a defendant's subjective intent. We address each issue in turn.

¶ 12 Before beginning our analysis, we pause to note that "federal Fourth Amendment protections may differ from those guaranteed our citizens by our state constitution." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 506; see also State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 12, 996 P.2d 546 ("While this court's interpretation of article I, section 14 has often paralleled the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we have stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this state's citizens."). But because neither party has adequately analyzed the state constitutional claim as an issue separate and distinct from its federal counterpart, we will not address it. See Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 14, 122 P.3d 506 ("Because we are resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional issues which have not been properly preserved, framed and briefed, we are once again foreclosed from undertaking a principled exploration of the interplay between federal and state protections of individual rights without the collaboration of the parties to an appeal." (citations omitted)); Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, ¶ 75, 73 P.3d 334 ("Without analysis, the court can make no informed decision regarding whether the state constitutional provision in question was intended to mirror its federal counterpart, or...