State v. S.B.

• Decision Date: 20 July 2017
• Citation: 230 N.J. 62,165 A.3d 722
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. S.B., Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

230 N.J. 62

165 A.3d 722

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.S.B., Defendant–Respondent.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued April 25, 2017

Decided July 20, 2017

Claudia Joy Demitro, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Claudia Joy Demitro, of counsel and on the briefs).

Alison S. Perroneargued the cause for respondent (Alison S. Perrone, on the brief).

JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we determine whether a youth ministry associated with a church or religious organization is exempt from the definition of a "youth serving organization" under N.J.S.A. 2C:7–22, a provision of Megan's Law.

Defendant S.B. has two prior convictions for sexually assaulting teenage victims, which render him subject to the provisions of Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7–1 to –23—including registration and strict prohibitions concerning the supervision of children. The latest indictment against defendant arose from his participation as a supervisor of children in a youth ministry associated with his church. In pre-trial motions, the trial court dismissed the indictment, finding that the church's youth ministry was not a "youth serving organization" under the statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the indictment's dismissal. We disagree and reverse.

We conclude that a plain-language reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:7–22 does not exempt a youth ministry associated with a church or other religious organization from the definition of "youth serving organization." We therefore reinstate the indictment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.

The facts advanced are undisputed. Defendant S.B. was a congregant of the Eternal Life Christian Center (ELCC), a registered non-profit and religious institution. Defendant was also subject to Megan's Law because of two sexual assault convictions in 1991, stemming from the sexual assaults of two teenage victims. To comply with the Megan's Law reporting requirements, defendant notified the ELCC pastors and elders of his convictions.

Defendant participated in the church's No Limits Youth Ministry (NLYM), the stated goal of which is "to prepare students to be effective at home, junior high, senior high, and college." Defendant volunteered for the program as a youth leader, counselor, mentor, and chaperone for children ages twelve to seventeen. Specifically, he supervised children at concerts, youth group meetings, day camp, and movie nights.

Based on defendant's participation in the NLYM, the grand jury indicted him for third-degree prohibited participation in a "youth serving organization," in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:7–23. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the NLYM was not a youth serving organization under Megan's Law. The trial court granted defendant's motion, reasoning that the statute was vague with respect to how religious institutions fit within the definition of youth serving organization. The court distinguished the case from State v. J.B.W. , 434 N.J.Super. 550, 85 A. 3d 1010 (App. Div. 2014), which found a violation of Megan's Law where a defendant participated in a school marching band's pit crew because it was separate from the school, making the statute's school exemption inapplicable. The trial court here determined that the NLYM was indistinguishable from the ELCC and defendant's indictment should be dismissed.

The State appealed; the Appellate Division affirmed the indictment's dismissal. State v. S.B. , 445 N.J.Super. 49, 58–59, 135 A. 3d 997 (2016). The panel rejected the State's argument that the definition of youth serving organization encompassed the NLYM. Id. at 55, 135 A. 3d 997. It reasoned that because the definition does not specifically address religious organizations, the Legislature did not intend to include religious organizations in the definition of youth serving organization. Ibid. The panel added that Megan's Law makes specific reference to religious organizations in another section of the statute, finding its omission from the definition of youth serving organization purposeful. Id. at 56, 135 A. 3d 997.

We granted the State's petition for certification. 227 N.J. 124, 148 A. 3d 748 (2016).

II.

A.

The State argues that the Court should reverse the Appellate Division for three reasons: (1) a youth ministry associated with a church or religious organization is a youth serving organization as defined by Megan's Law; (2) religious organizations are not categorically exempt from the statute's protections; and (3) the question of whether a group is a youth serving organization is a factual one that should be determined by a jury. In the State's view, children in religious settings should receive the same protection under Megan's Law that children in secular groups receive.

B.

Defendant maintains that the NLYM is part of the ELCC and therefore is not a "youth serving organization" as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:7–22. Defendant asserts that religious organizations are exempt under the statute because of (1) the statute's plain language; (2) the Legislature's design of Megan's Law as a whole; and (3) the Appellate Division's decision in J.B.W.

III.

A.

The issue in this case is one of statutory interpretation: whether a youth ministry associated with a church may constitute a "youth serving organization" pursuant to the definition of that term in N.J.S.A. 2C:7–22.

Questions related to statutory interpretation are legal ones. State v. Revie , 220 N.J. 126, 132, 104 A. 3d 221 (2014). We review such decisions de novo, "unconstrained by deference to the decisions of the trial court or the appellate panel." State v. Grate , 220 N.J. 317, 329, 106 A. 3d 466 (2015). Similarly, in cases like this, we review a trial court's decision to dismiss an indictment de novo because it did not involve "a challenge to fact-finding on the part of the trial court." State v. Cagno , 211 N.J. 488, 505, 49 A. 3d 388 (2012), cert. denied , 568 U.S. 1104, 133 S.Ct. 877, 184 L.Ed. 2d 687 (2013).

B.

The overriding goal of all statutory interpretation "is to determine as best we can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent." State v. Robinson , 217 N.J. 594, 604, 92 A. 3d 656 (2014) (quoting State v. Hudson , 209 N.J. 513, 529, 39 A. 3d 150 (2012) ). To ascertain legislative intent, we begin with the statute's plain language and give terms their ordinary meaning. DiProspero v. Penn , 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A. 2d 1039 (2005). In order to construe the meaning of the Legislature's selected words, we can also draw inferences based on the statute's overall structure and composition. State v. Hupka , 203 N.J. 222, 231–32, 1 A. 3d 640 (2010). If the Legislature's intent is clear on the face of the statute, then the "interpretative process is over." Id. at 232, 1 A. 3d 640 (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys. , 192 N.J. 189, 195–96, 927 A. 2d 543 (2007) ).

When the Legislature sets out to define a specific term, "the courts are bound by that definition." Febbi v. Bd. of Review , 35 N.J. 601, 606, 174 A. 2d 481 (1961). "It is not our function to rewrite a plainly written statute or to presume that the Legislature meant something other than what it conveyed in its clearly expressed language." Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad , 210 N.J. 581, 592, 46 A. 3d 1262 (2012). When the plain language is ambiguous, however, we consider extrinsic interpretative aids, including legislative history. Hupka , supra , 203 N.J. at 232, 1 A. 3d 640.

With those principles in mind, we turn to the language of the statute.

IV.

A.

N.J.S.A. 2C:7–23(a) provides, in relevant part, that "it shall be unlawful for an excluded sex offender to hold a position or otherwise participate, in a paid or unpaid capacity, in a youth serving organization." N.J.S.A. 2C:7–22 defines "youth serving organization" as

a sports team, league, athletic association or any other corporation, association or organization, excluding public and nonpublic schools, which provides recreational, educational, cultural, social, charitable or other activities or services to persons under 18 years of age.

We reject defendant's contention that the statutory language is ambiguous. Rather, the text of N.J.S.A. 2C:7–22 is clear on its face: "[A]ny other corporation, association, or organization" that provides activities or services to minors is a youth serving organization. The broad "any other" language reveals that the list of organizations in the definition is not exhaustive. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal , 536 U.S. 73, 80, 122 S.Ct. 2045, 2049–50, 153 L.Ed. 2d 82, 89–90 (2002) (holding that statutory language "may include" indicated non-exclusivity of list that followed); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec , 104 N.J. 1, 7–8, 514 A. 2d 832 (1986) (holding that statutory language "in any of the following ways" did not imply exclusion of all other unnamed ways). Churches clearly fall within the blueprint of the statute and its "any other" language.

The statute's only exemption is "public and nonpublic schools." N.J.S.A. 2C:7–22. The Legislature decidedly and explicitly exempted schools. It chose not to categorically exempt any other type of organization, including religious organizations. We may not read "religious organizations" into the school exemption clause; a court may not rewrite a statute to add language. See State v. Munafo , 222 N.J. 480, 488, 120 A. 3d 170 (2015) ; DiProspero , supra , 183 N.J. at 492, 874 A. 2d 1039.

The Legislature's definition of youth serving organization is thus clear and unambiguous. We are bound by that definition. See Febbi , supra , 35 N.J. at 606, 174 A. 2d 481. Because of that clarity, we need not consider other sections of the statute.

Had the language of the statute been riddled by ambiguity, the legislative history of Megan's Law nevertheless would have guided us to the same conclusion. As stated in the "Findings, Declarations" section of the law, the Legislature's primary...