State v. S.L.H., No. A06-1750.

• Decision Date: 04 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. A06-1750.
• Citation: 755 N.W.2d 271
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. S.L.H., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

755 N.W.2d 271

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. S.L.H., Appellant.

No. A06-1750.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

September 4, 2008.

Kim Ruckdaschel-Haley, Karla M. Vehrs, Lindquist & Vennum, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Roberta B. Walburn, Anne M. Lockner, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Council on Crime and Justice.

Daniel L. Gerdts, Brink & Gerdts, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Lindsay W. Shaw, St. Paul, MN, Charles H. Thomas, Mankato, MN, for amicus curiae Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc.

OPINION

GILDEA, Justice.

Appellant S.L.H. filed a petition for expungement of the criminal records related to her fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance conviction on the ground that expungement was necessary for her to achieve her employment goals. The district court granted S.L.H.'s petition as to her criminal records held by the judicial branch but denied her petition as to her criminal records held outside the judicial branch. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. Because we conclude that the district court did not err in declining to exercise inherent authority to expunge the records at issue, we affirm.

S.L.H. was charged with two counts of second-degree controlled substance crime in February 1992, when she was 20 years old. The complaint alleged that a police officer found 17 grams of cocaine in plain view in a vehicle occupied by S.L.H. and operated by T.E.H. in Robbinsdale, Minnesota. S.L.H. pleaded guilty to fifth-degree felony possession of a controlled substance in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2006). The district court stayed imposition of S.L.H.'s sentence and placed her on probation for 3 years. The record indicates that upon completion of her 3-year probationary term, S.L.H.'s offense was deemed a misdemeanor. See Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (2006).

S.L.H. filed her first petition for expungement in September 2000, but it was denied by the district court.¹ On May 4, 2006, S.L.H. filed another petition for expungement of the criminal records related to her 1992 controlled substance offense. In her petition, S.L.H. stated that she is a single parent who is solely responsible for supporting her four children and claimed that expungement would enable her to "be better able to support [her] family" and to "be a more productive member of society." S.L.H. explained that she desired to become a Head Start teacher or a medical assistant but that she would be unable to achieve either of these goals absent expungement of her criminal records. Hennepin County, the City of Crystal, and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension objected to S.L.H.'s expungement petition.

At her expungement hearing on July 6, 2006, S.L.H. requested expungement of all records related to her 1992 controlled substance offense or, in the alternative, expungement of the judicial branch records related to that offense. On July 18, 2006, the district court found that the benefit of expungement to S.L.H. outweighed the disadvantage to the public from eliminating her records and ordered that all judicial branch records concerning the offense be sealed. The district court also concluded that S.L.H.'s constitutional rights had not been violated and held that "[w]here there is no infringement of the petitioner's constitutional rights, the judicial branch does not have the authority to order non-judicial records sealed in situations where the court used its inherent authority to expunge a record."

S.L.H. appealed the district court's conclusion that her constitutional rights had not been violated and its denial of her petition as to her criminal records held outside the judicial branch. The court of appeals held that the district court correctly determined that S.L.H.'s constitutional rights had not been violated and "that, absent a constitutional violation, it had no authority to expunge the non-judicial records." State v. S.L.H., No. A06-1750, 2007 WL 2769652, at *2 (Minn.App. Sept.25, 2007). Noting that "criminal records maintained by the executive branch, or non-judicial criminal records, implicate the separation of powers doctrine," the court of appeals concluded "that a court's inherent authority to expunge non-judicial records extends to executive branch records only when executive agents abuse their discretion or otherwise infringe on a petitioner's constitutional rights." Id. at *1. The court of appeals therefore affirmed the district court. Id. at *1, 3. We granted S.L.H.'s petition for review.

I.

There are two bases for the expungement of criminal records in Minnesota-Minn. Stat. ch. 609A (2006),² and the inherent judicial authority of the courts. State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 257 (Minn.2000). S.L.H. does not claim that she is entitled to statutory expungement; she argues instead that the district court possessed inherent authority to order the expungement of her criminal records held outside the judicial branch. The judiciary possesses inherent authority to expunge criminal records when expungement is "necessary to prevent serious infringement of constitutional rights." State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn.1981). But S.L.H. concedes that there is no constitutional violation before us. The question presented in this case therefore is whether, in the absence of a violation of constitutional rights, the district court erred when it did not invoke inherent authority to order the expungement of S.L.H.'s criminal records held outside the judicial branch.³

The judiciary's inherent authority "grows out of express and implied constitutional provisions mandating a separation of powers and a viable judicial branch of government."⁴ In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts' Comp., 308 Minn. 172, 180, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (1976). In order for a court to exercise its inherent authority, however, "the relief requested by the court or aggrieved party [must be] necessary to the performance of the judicial function as contemplated in our state constitution." Id. at 181, 241 N.W.2d at 786. We do not resort to inherent authority to serve the "relative needs" or "wants" of the judiciary, but only for "practical necessity in performing the judicial function." Id. at 181, 241 N.W.2d at 786; see also In re Office of Dist. Pub. Defender, 373 N.W.2d 772, 775 n. 1 (Minn.1985) (rejecting the argument that the judges of the First Judicial District possessed inherent authority to withdraw from the public defender system because the "case involve[d] `relative needs or judicial wants,' rather than action necessary to the preservation of the judicial branch of government"). Accordingly, the judiciary's inherent authority "`governs that which is essential to the existence, dignity, and function of a court because it is a court.'" C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358 (quoting In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts' Comp., 308 Minn. at 176, 241 N.W.2d at 784).

A.

We recognized in C.A. the relevance of the judiciary's inherent authority in the context of expungement of criminal records. Id. Because S.L.H. relies extensively on C.A. in contending that the district court should have ordered the expungement of her criminal records held outside the judicial branch, we turn next to a discussion of that case.

In C.A., the petitioner had been convicted of "consensual sodomy" and temporarily committed to the state hospital in St. Peter and to the state correctional facility in Stillwater. Id. at 355. After his conviction was set aside, the petitioner sought "wide-ranging" relief, requesting that "every local or state government record documenting the fact of his arrest, trial and conviction" be sealed, returned, or erased and that "public officials and employees [be] stopped from divulging these facts." Id. The district court concluded that Minn. Stat. § 299C.11 (1980) authorized none of the petitioner's requests except his request that the county sheriff return the petitioner's identification data.⁵ Id. at 356-57. We affirmed the district court "in all respects" but went on, in dicta, to provide "future guidance" regarding inherent expungement authority, noting that "it is within the power of the courts to grant broader relief" than had been granted in that case. Id. at 357.

Before examining the entities that the petitioner in C.A. sought to subject to the requested expungement order, we first identified the judicial function at issue. We had to identify this judicial function because, as noted above, the inherent authority of the judiciary is limited to those functions that are "`essential to the existence, dignity, and function of a court because it is a court.'" Id. at 358 (quoting In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts' Comp., 308 Minn. at 176, 241 N.W.2d at 784). The judicial function at issue in C.A. was that of controlling "court records and agents of the court in order to reduce or eliminate unfairness to individuals." Id.

We explained that in addition to the use of expungement to remedy constitutional violations, "[u]nder appropriate circumstances" the judiciary's inherent authority "extends to the issuance of expungement orders affecting court records and agents of the court."⁶ Id.; see also Barlow v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 365 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn.1985) (discussing C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358). We did not further define what constitutes "appropriate circumstances."

But we did say that in a case where such "appropriate circumstances" are present, "the court must decide whether expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing and monitoring an expungement order." C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358....