State v. S.A.M.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2017
• Docket Number: A15-0950
• Citation: 891 N.W.2d 602
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. S.A.M., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

891 N.W.2d 602

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.S.A.M., Appellant.

A15-0950

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: March 15, 2017

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota, for respondent.

David L. Liebow, Restovich Braun & Associates, Rochester, Minnesota, for appellant.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, William Ward, State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Board of Public Defense.

Joshua Esmay, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Council on Crime and Justice.

Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Roseville, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Yaima Couso, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Volunteer Lawyers Network.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

In 2005, appellant S.A.M. pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary, a felony offense. The district court stayed imposition of the sentence, and when S.A.M. was released from probation the conviction was deemed a misdemeanor under Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (2016). S.A.M. filed a petition for expungement in January 2015. The district court denied S.A.M.'s petition and the court of appeals affirmed. Because we conclude that felony convictions later deemed misdemeanors by operation of law under Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2), are not eligible for expungement under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3) (2016), we affirm.

I.

On the night of December 5, 2003, S.A.M. and two other people were involved in a burglary of a home-based motocross supply business. S.A.M. claimed that he drove the two co-defendants to the area and waited in the car until they returned with a large bag of stolen goods. His co-defendants told a different story; they stated that S.A.M. wanted to steal a motorcycle, used a credit card to open the door, and entered the building with them.

S.A.M. eventually pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary, a felony offense. Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a) (2006). Because S.A.M.'s criminal history score was zero, the district court stayed imposition of his sentence and ordered probation for up to 10 years. Less than 3 years later, S.A.M. was discharged from probation because he had completed all court-ordered conditions of probation, including that he remain law-abiding. As a result of the stay of imposition and S.A.M.'s compliance with the terms of probation, S.A.M.'s felony conviction was deemed a misdemeanor under Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2).

In January 2015, S.A.M. filed a petition for expungement under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3). In support of his petition, S.A.M. stated that he had obtained a bachelor's degree, purchased a house, stopped drinking alcohol, taken responsibility for raising his 8-year-old son, and ceased associating with his co-defendants. The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Rochester City Attorney, Rochester Police Department, and Olmsted County Attorney all objected to the expungement petition, arguing that S.A.M.'s felony burglary conviction cannot be expunged under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3), because that provision allows the expungement of only misdemeanors. They also argued that S.A.M.'s conviction cannot be expunged under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(5) (2016), which provides for expungement of certain enumerated felonies, because burglary is not included in the list of felonies that are eligible for expungement.

The district court denied the expungement petition, concluding that S.A.M. was not "convicted of" a misdemeanor and therefore could not petition for expungement under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3). The court of appeals affirmed. State v. S.A.M. , 877 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. App. 2016). We granted review to determine whether a felony conviction that is deemed a misdemeanor by operation of law under Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2), can be expunged under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3). Because we conclude that such convictions cannot be expunged under this provision, we affirm.

II.

This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728 , 814 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. 2012). The goal of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). We construe words and phrases in a statute according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Allan v. R.D. Offutt Co. , 869 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn. 2015). We interpret a statute as a whole to give effect to all of its provisions. In re Welfare of J.J.P. , 831 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 2013). We may also consider the structure of the statute in determining its meaning. See State v. Wenthe , 865 N.W.2d 293, 303 (Minn.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 595, 193 L.Ed.2d 471 (2015).

This case requires us to interpret the expungement statute, Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3 (2016). There are two expungement provisions in section 609A.02, subdivision 3 that are relevant to S.A.M.'s appeal. The first, subdivision 3(a)(3), allows a person to petition for expungement when the person "was convicted of or received a stayed sentence for a petty misdemeanor or misdemeanor and has not been convicted of a new crime for at least two years since discharge of the sentence for the crime." Id. , subd. 3(a)(3). The second is subdivision 3(a)(5), which allows a person to seek expungement when the person "was convicted of or received a stayed sentence for a felony violation of an offense listed in paragraph (b), and has not been convicted of a new crime for at least five years since discharge of the sentence for the crime." Id. , subd. 3(a)(5). Because burglary is not one of the felonies "listed in paragraph (b)," S.A.M. cannot petition for expungement under subdivision 3(a)(5).

But S.A.M. argues that he can petition for expungement under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3), because his felony conviction was deemed a misdemeanor under Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2). That statute states: "Notwithstanding a conviction is for a felony: ... the conviction is deemed to be for a misdemeanor if the imposition of the prison sentence is stayed, the defendant is placed on probation, and the defendant is thereafter discharged without a prison sentence." Id . S.A.M. argues that because he now has a misdemeanor conviction, rather than a felony conviction, on his criminal record, he may petition for expungement under section 609A.02, subdivision 3(a)(3), as though he had been originally convicted of a misdemeanor. We disagree.

We first note that we have previously interpreted section 609.13, subdivision 1(2), and these prior cases guide us here. For example, in In re Peace Officer License of Woollett , 540 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1995), we considered whether the Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training (the "POST Board" or "Board") properly revoked Woollett's peace officer license. The POST Board determined that, under the Board's administrative rules, Woollett's 11-year-old conviction of third-degree assault was a disqualifying felony. Id. at 831 (citing Minn. R. 6700.0601, subp. 1(G) (1993) (stating that "having been convicted of a felony in any state or federal jurisdiction" shall be grounds to deny eligibility for a license)). Woollett challenged the revocation in the court of appeals, which reversed the Board's determination, holding that Woollett's conviction became a misdemeanor under section 609.13 once Woollett was discharged from probation without a prison sentence. Id. We reversed the court of appeals, concluding that "[s]ection 609.13 does not require felony convictions where guilt is adjudicated, but sentencing is stayed, to be treated as misdemeanors in every conceivable situation." Id. at 833. We found two factors determinative. First, we noted that even if Woollett had not been sentenced for a felony, he had indeed been "convicted of a felony." Id. at 832. Second, we noted that the phrase "conviction of a felony" as used in the POST Board regulation at issue covered a person who was charged with, and convicted of, a crime punishable by more than one year " ‘regardless of a stay of imposition or stay of execution.’ " Id. (quoting Minn. R. 6700.0100, subp. 21 (1993)).

In State v. Anderson , we were asked to decide whether a felony burglary conviction that is later deemed a misdemeanor under section 609.13 is a "crime of violence" within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2008). 733 N.W.2d 128, 134 (Minn. 2007). Anderson pleaded guilty to felony second-degree burglary in 1995, and after he successfully completed probation, the conviction was deemed a misdemeanor under section 609.13. Id. at 131. Several years later, Anderson was convicted of violating Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a) (2016), which prohibits the possession of a firearm by "[a]ny person who has been convicted of a crime of violence, as defined in section 624.712, subdivision 5." Section 624.712, subdivision 5, defines "crime of violence" to include "felony convictions" of first- or second-degree burglary. We affirmed Anderson's conviction, rejecting his contention that, under section 609.13, upon his discharge from probation, "he was a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor," not a felony. Anderson , 733 N.W.2d at 135-36. Relying on our decision in State v. Moon , 463 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1990), we stated that, when determining whether a prior offense is a "crime of violence," a court must consider the elements of the offense, not "its subsequent disposition." Anderson , 733 N.W.2d at 136. Anderson, we said, "has been convicted" of felony second-degree burglary, and even if the conviction was later deemed a misdemeanor, " ‘that does not change his underlying conviction for the purposes of the [firearm prohibition] statute.’ " Id. (citation omitted) (brackets in original).

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