State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 18 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-1974 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Marcus Tavon Brown, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Cottonwood County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Nick Anderson, Cottonwood County Attorney, Windom, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from his convictions of felony domestic assault and false imprisonment, appellant Marcus Tavon Brown argues that his conviction of felony domestic assault was improper because the felony domestic assault statute unambiguously requires predicate offenses to arise from two separate instances of conduct. Appellant also objects to the jury instructions, the submission of his unredacted conviction record to the jury, and multiple sentencing issues. Appellant submitted a pro se brief alleging a number of other issues. We affirm appellant's convictions, reverse his sentence, and remand for resentencing.
Appellant argues the two predicate offenses required for felony domestic assault cannot arise out of the same instance of conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2016). We conclude the statute unambiguously allows the two predicate offenses to arise from one instance of conduct and affirm the district court.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. S.A.M., 891 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2017). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to "ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016); see also State v. Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2012). We construe statutes in accordance with their "plain and ordinary meaning," and if the statute is unambiguous, we apply the plain language. State v. Zais, 805 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. 2011). A statute is unambiguous if it has only one reasonable interpretation. State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Minn. 2014). If the language of a statute is unambiguous, we "[do] not engage in any further construction and instead look[] to the plain meaning of the statutory language." State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Minn. 2011) (citation omitted). We do not add terms ormeanings that are absent from unambiguous statutory language. See Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Minn. 2015).
A defendant is guilty of a felony in Minnesota if they commit domestic assault "within ten years of the first of any combination of two or more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions." Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4. Appellant argues that "the first . . . of two or more previous" offenses unambiguously indicates the offenses must be from two separate incidents. Respondent argues "any combination of two or more previous" offenses unambiguously indicates that two convictions entered on the same day would qualify as "any combination" of offenses. Appellant argues the phrase "any combination of two or more" exists to allow any of the 22 distinct predicate offenses to satisfy the rule. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 16 (2016) ().
We agree with respondent's reading of the statute. The phrase "any combination of two or more previous" offenses is broad and plainly encompasses two convictions entered at the same proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4. Here, appellant was convicted of two counts of assault for assaulting two different victims. The statute does not contain language that would treat two convictions entered on the same day any differently than two convictions entered on two different days. The only time-related language in the statute refers to the range of time in which the predicate offenses must have been committed, within ten years. To reach appellant's reading, this court would have to add language, which we will not do. See Dupey, 868 N.W.2d at 40.
The statute is unambiguous in requiring "any combination" of two prior domestic violence-related convictions, which includes two convictions entered on the same day. Accordingly, we affirm appellant's conviction of felony domestic assault.
Appellant has a conviction of simple assault from the State of Georgia. The district court judge instructed the jury that "simple assault is a qualified domestic-assault-related conviction" of felony domestic assault. Appellant equates this statement to a directed verdict on the element of predicate convictions and argues the judge deprived the jury of its fact-finding role.
Appellant did not object to this jury instruction. When there is no objection at trial, the appellate court has discretion to consider a claim of error on appeal under the plain-error standard. State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). Plain error requires a showing of: (1) an error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights. State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 2002).
Here, appellant does not satisfy the first prong of the plain-error test. The district court did not commit error by giving this jury instruction. A district court has "considerable latitude" in the selection of language for jury instructions. State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 147 (Minn. 2011). It is the role of the district court to "fairly and adequately explain the law" to the jury. Id. Whether an out-of-state conviction is a qualified domestic violence-related offense is a matter of law. See State v. Moen, 752 N.W.2d 532, 535-36 (Minn. App. 2008); see also State v. Wiskow, 774 N.W.2d 612, 616-17 (Minn. App. 2009)( that there is no right to a jury finding on whether an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a "violent crime" for enhancement purposes). Whether an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a predicate offense in Minnesota is a question of law. The district court judge's instruction that appellant's prior out-of-state convictions qualified as domestic-assault-related convictions was a fair and accurate statement of the law well within the district court judge's wide latitude to select jury instructions.
The district court submitted an unredacted conviction record to the jury for the purposes of showing two prior assault convictions, which were predicate offenses for felony domestic assault. The unredacted conviction record also showed that appellant held two people at gunpoint and stole one of their smart phones. Appellant objects to the district court submitting his unredacted conviction record to the jury as being irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, inadmissible under Spreigl, and a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
We review evidentiary rulings applying an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). Where there is no objection to an evidentiary ruling, the appellate court considers a claim of error under the plain-error standard. State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249, 258 (Minn. 2007). Plain error requires a showing of: (1) an error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights. Id. An error is "plain" if it is clear or obvious. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 688 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993)). Plainness is shown if the error "contravenes caselaw, a rule, or a standard of conduct." State v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted). A new trial shall be awarded only if the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d at 437 (citation omitted).
Before trial, appellant provided a written statement stipulating to his two prior assault convictions. The day of trial, the judge asked appellant to confirm that he wanted to stipulate to his prior convictions. After conferring with his attorney, appellant chose to withdraw his stipulation, and said he wanted "[the jury] to get the full intel of the case." Appellant seemed to understand that the jury would receive information about his prior convictions. Respondent then admitted a copy of appellant's conviction record into evidence to establish his prior convictions. Appellant's counsel never objected to the full conviction record being admitted, presumably in furtherance of his client's wishes that the jury see the "full intel."
The issue before the court, then, is not whether the district court erred in admitting the conviction record, since the court was never asked to rule on that issue. Instead, the question is whether the court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte redact the conviction record. This question is almost identical to the one in Vick, where a witness's testimony about a defendant's prior bad acts was admitted without objection. State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 2001). The record indicated there was no prior notice about the possible prejudicial nature of the witness's testimony, so the court did not have the opportunity to rule on admissibility or the scope of the Spreigl notice. Id. at 685. In the absence of an objection, the district court found "there was no reason for the trial court tointercede sua sponte and, as a result, the trial court did not err in not striking [the] testimony." Id.
Here, appellant's conviction record was...
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