State v. Sagapolutele-Silva

• Decision Date: 03 June 2022
• Docket Number: SCWC-19-0000491
• Citation: 151 Hawai‘i 283,511 P.3d 782
• Parties: STATE of Hawai‘i, Petitioner and Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tiana F.M. SAGAPOLUTELE-SILVA, Respondent and Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

151 Hawai‘i 283

511 P.3d 782

STATE of Hawai‘i, Petitioner and Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Tiana F.M. SAGAPOLUTELE-SILVA, Respondent and Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee.

SCWC-19-0000491

Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.

JUNE 3, 2022

Brian R. Vincent for Petitioner and Respondent State of Hawai‘i

Alen M. Kaneshiro for Respondent and Petitioner Tiana F.M. Sagapolutele-Silva

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, J., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE WONG, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY, WITH McKENNA, J., DISSENTING SEPARATELY, WITH WHOM WILSON, J., JOINS, AND WILSON, J., DISSENTING SEPARATELY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Tiana Sagapolutele-Silva was arrested after a traffic stop in 2018 and charged with Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (OVUII) and excessive speeding. Sagapolutele-Silva moved to suppress any statements she made during the traffic stop on the ground that she was not advised of her Miranda ¹ rights during the encounter. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Sagapolutele-Silva was in custody during the investigation for OVUII because the investigating officers had probable cause to arrest her for excessive speeding, a petty misdemeanor. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed.

On appeal, the State asks us to clarify when a suspect is in custody for purposes of administering the prophylactic warnings against self-incrimination required by article I, section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution. Although our cases have consistently stated that the custody test is one of totality of the circumstances, some of our precedent has nonetheless indicated that the presence of probable cause alone is dispositive.

We hereby clarify that a court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a suspect is in custody such that Miranda warnings are required before a police officer may interrogate them. That formulation is consistent with the purposes of Miranda since it focuses the inquiry on whether police have created a "coercive atmosphere." See, e.g., State v. Melemai, 64 Haw. 479, 482, 643 P.2d 541, 544 (1982) ( Miranda warnings are required when "the totality of circumstances created the kind of coercive atmosphere that Miranda warnings were designed to prevent"); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 299, 687 P.2d 544, 549 (1984) ("the ultimate test is whether the questioning was of a nature that would subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Almost forty years ago, we considered the coerciveness of roadside questioning in Wyatt. The defendant there was ordered to pull over after officers observed her driving at night with no headlights on, and officers then smelled alcohol emanating from her vehicle. We held that Miranda warnings were not required at that point since the circumstances were not intimidating or coercive, but rather constituted "on-the-scene questioning of brief duration conducted prior to arrest in public view." Wyatt, 67 Haw. at 300, 687 P.2d at 550 ; see also State v. Kuba, 68 Haw. 184, 188, 706 P.2d 1305, 1309 (1985) (holding, under facts "almost indistinguishable" from Wyatt, that Miranda warnings were not required before the police began asking questions). Wyatt and Kuba have not been overruled and their totality-of-the-circumstances approach should be applied here. Accordingly, probable cause is relevant but not dispositive to determining whether a person is in custody.

This case illustrates why it is important to assess the relevance of probable cause in light of all the circumstances. Sagapolutele-Silva was observed driving at thirty-two miles per hour over the speed limit; if she had been driving just three miles per hour slower, the officer would not have had probable cause to arrest her for the offense of excessive speeding. Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-105(a)(1) (2007).² That three-mile-per-hour difference had no effect on the coerciveness of the situation from Sagapolutele-Silva's point of view. Under the totality of the circumstances, Sagapolutele-Silva was not in custody when she was pulled over or during the administration of the standardized field sobriety test (SFST). Accordingly, Miranda warnings were not required, and there was no illegality which would taint her subsequent statements as fruit of the poisonous tree.

We therefore vacate the district court's order suppressing Sagapolutele-Silva's statements, vacate the judgment of the ICA affirming that Sagapolutele-Silva was in custody during the traffic stop, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

II. BACKGROUND

Sagapolutele-Silva was arrested after a traffic stop on March 31, 2018. She was charged in the District Court of the First Circuit³ with one count of OVUII, in violation of HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3) (Supp. 2015),⁴ and one count of excessive speeding, in violation of HRS § 291C-105(a)(1) (2007).⁵

Sagapolutele-Silva moved to suppress any statements she made during the traffic stop on the ground that she was not advised of her Miranda rights during the encounter. At the hearing on the motion, the Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers involved in the traffic stop, Officers Franchot Termeteet and Bobby Ilae, testified. Officer Termeteet testified to pulling over Sagapolutele-Silva after observing her driving seventy-seven miles per hour in an area where the speed limit was forty-five miles per hour, and drifting between lanes without signaling on the H-1 freeway in Honolulu. On cross-examination, Officer Termeteet testified that based on his observations of her speeding, he had probable cause to arrest Sagapolutele-Silva for excessive speeding and that after being stopped, she was not free to leave.

Officer Termeteet informed Sagapolutele-Silva "that I was stopping her for speeding"; in response, she acknowledged that she had been speeding. Officer Termeteet testified that he smelled "a strong odor of alcohol coming from within the vehicle," but he could not determine from whom the odor emanated because there were four passengers in the car. He asked Sagapolutele-Silva for her license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. She produced a permit for a commercial driver's license, and explained that she had a regular license but did not have it with her; she also provided him with a safety-inspection card. Officer Termeteet observed that Sagapolutele-Silva had red, watery, and glassy eyes. Officer Termeteet asked Sagapolutele-Silva if she would participate in the SFST; she agreed to do so.

Officer Ilae testified that he was "covering Officer Termeteet on a traffic stop" and administered the SFST to Sagapolutele-Silva.⁶ After asking her again whether she would be willing to participate in the SFST, he asked a series of "preliminary questions" sometimes referred to as the medical rule-out questions: (1) "[d]o you have any physical defects or speech impediments," (2) "are you taking medication," (3) "are you under the care of a doctor or dentist," (4) "are you under the care of an eye doctor," (5) "are you epileptic or diabetic," (6) "[do you have an] artificial or glass eye," (7) "are you wearing any contact lenses or corrective lenses," and (8) "are [you] blind in any eye." Officer Ilae testified that these questions are asked "to help [him] gauge whether or not the impairment [he is] seeing is medically related or if ... there's a medical emergency." He testified he would not administer the SFST if there were a medical emergency, but if someone did not want to answer the medical rule-out questions, he would nonetheless continue with the test. On cross-examination, however, he testified he had never in fact administered the SFST without asking the medical rule-out questions.

Officer Ilae then administered the SFST. He instructed Sagapolutele-Silva on each of the three components – the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand – to which she replied that she understood and had no questions. After completing the SFST and giving Sagapolutele-Silva a preliminary alcohol screening, Officer Ilae then told her "that she was over" and was being arrested. As Officer Ilae walked back to his car with Sagapolutele-Silva following him, he heard her state that "she's not going to lie, she had a few beers but her friends [were] more impaired than she was."

The district court orally granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Sagapolutele-Silva was in custody and subject to interrogation because Officer Termeteet had probable cause to arrest her when he pulled her over. In its written order, the district court made, as relevant here, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

...

2. Officer Termeteet ... measure[d] Defendant's speed at 77 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone.

...

5. While following Defendant's vehicle, Officer Termeteet observed Defendant drift into lane number 1, completing a lane change without signals and then drift from lane 1 back to lane 2, completing another lane change without signals.

6. Officer Termeteet activated his blue flashing lights and Defendant's vehicle came to a complete stop in the right shoulder lane.

7. Officer Termeteet approached Defendant's driver's side window and noticed the odor of alcohol coming from her breath. ... [and] from within the vehicle. ...

8. Officer Termeteet asked Defendant for her driver's license. ... Officer Termeteet asked Defendant if she would be willing to participate in a [SFST]. Defendant verbally consented to participate in the SFST. Defendant exited her vehicle and HPD Officer [Ilae] took over the investigation.

9. When Officer Ilae arrived on scene, Officer Termeteet apprised him of his observations. Officer Ilae approached Defendant's vehicle and began conversing with her. Officer Ilae asked Defendant if she would be willing to participate in an SFST. Defendant

...