State v. Sam, A14–0096.

• Decision Date: 17 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. A14–0096.,A14–0096.
• Citation: 859 N.W.2d 825
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Dominic Jason Allen SAM, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

859 N.W.2d 825

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent
v.
Dominic Jason Allen SAM, Appellant.

No. A14–0096.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Feb. 17, 2015.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and John K. Carlson, Pine County Attorney, Michelle R. Skubitz, Assistant County Attorney, Pine City, MN, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Bridget Kearns Sabo, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN; and Reid J. Golden, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Considered and decided by HOOTEN, Presiding Judge; RODENBERG, Judge; and KIRK, Judge.

OPINION

RODENBERG, Judge.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance with a firearm enhancement, arguing that the circumstantial evidence of his guilt is consistent with reasonable inferences other than guilt. Appellant also challenges his conviction of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, which conviction respondent agrees cannot stand. We reverse.

FACTS

On June 28, 2013, appellant Dominic Jason Allen Sam drove a car belonging to P.M., with R.S. in the front passenger's seat. Appellant drove past State Trooper Marc Hopkins, who decided to check the car's registration. Finding that the car had expired license plates and that its owner had a suspended driver's license, Trooper Hopkins followed the car, eventually activating his emergency lights and initiating a traffic stop. As Trooper Hopkins pulled behind the car, he observed the passenger, later identified as R.S., make “a lot of movement towards the center of the vehicle.” This movement alerted Trooper Hopkins to the possibility that the passenger in the car may be “hiding drugs, hiding weapons, stolen items[, or a]nything ... that might be illegal” and caused Trooper Hopkins to approach the car with caution after the traffic stop. Trooper Hopkins testified that he did not see the driver make any movements toward the center console at any point.

Trooper Hopkins approached the driver's side of the car and asked whether either occupant of the car was the registered owner. Each said he did not own the vehicle. Trooper Hopkins asked appellant whether he had a driver's license, and appellant admitted that he did not. Trooper Hopkins ordered appellant out of the vehicle and frisked him for weapons or contraband. None were found. Trooper Hopkins continued to watch appellant and the passenger while he waited for backup.

Within a minute or two of the traffic stop, Deputy Carl Hawkinson arrived to assist Trooper Hopkins. Trooper Hopkins instructed Deputy Hawkinson to watch R.S. while Trooper Hopkins continued his investigation of appellant. Trooper Hopkins asked appellant his name, and appellant recited that his name was “John Marcus Sam,” pausing between the first and middle names. Trooper Hopkins warned appellant that he would be arrested if he was lying about his name. After this

859 N.W.2d 829

warning, appellant correctly identified himself as Dominic Jason Allen Sam. Trooper Hopkins confirmed that appellant did not have a valid driver's license.

Trooper Hopkins then turned his attention to R.S. As Trooper Hopkins was speaking with R.S., he observed what he recognized as an open beer bottle between the passenger's seat and the center console of the car. Ordering R.S. out of the car, Trooper Hopkins searched the car's interior, because of R.S.'s earlier movements toward the center console that had given Trooper Hopkins the “instinct” that “if [he] just ended [his] investigation at a beer bottle, [he] could end up shot.”

During the search, Trooper Hopkins opened the center console. As he did so, Deputy Hawkinson observed a small baggie containing what he believed to be marijuana, which he then picked up and showed to Trooper Hopkins. Trooper Hopkins then leaned over the center console, reached in, and found a loaded 9mm Baretta handgun beneath a stocking cap. There was a bullet in the Baretta's chamber and the safety mechanism was not engaged.

Deputy Hawkinson continued the search of the car and found a small bag of methamphetamine in the glove compartment along with a scale and some bindles. Neither officer recalls precisely where within the glove compartment the methamphetamine was found. A backpack containing 50 rounds of ammunition suitable for the 9mm Baretta was also found in the back seat of the car. Deputy Hawkinson also searched R.S. and found a small amount of methamphetamine in R.S.'s wallet.

Appellant was charged with fifth degree controlled substance possession in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1) (2012), with a firearm enhancement (Minn.Stat. § 609.11, subd. 5(a) (2012) ); receiving stolen property in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2012) ; being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm in violation of Minn.Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(10)(i) (2012) ; and giving a false name to a police officer in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.506, subd. 1 (2012). Before trial, appellant pleaded guilty to giving a false name to a police officer and stipulated that he was ineligible to possess a firearm. After a two-day trial, a jury found appellant guilty of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance with a firearm enhancement and being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. The jury acquitted appellant of receiving stolen property.

Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal after the verdict pursuant to Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(3)(a), arguing that there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to convict him of possession of the methamphetamine and the gun. The district court denied the motion. It declined to apply the Al–Naseer/Silvernail two-step analysis of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. The district court observed that appellant “may prevail on appeal” but “that the heightened review standard is the appellate standard, not the trial court standard.” This appeal followed.

ISSUES

I. On a motion for a judgment for acquittal based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, must a district court apply the Al–Naseer/Silvernail two-step analysis of the circumstantial evidence?

II. Is the evidence sufficient to support appellant's convictions?

ANALYSIS

Appellant argues on appeal that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove that he possessed either the handgun

859 N.W.2d 830

or the methamphetamine, and, alternatively, that indefinitely prohibiting a nonviolent felon from possessing a firearm is contrary to the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because the record establishes, and the state concedes, that, despite the stipulation before the district court, appellant was not a prohibited person ineligible to possess a firearm, and because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant constructively possessed the methamphetamine in the car, we reverse both convictions.

I.

We review the sufficiency of the state's circumstantial evidence de novo. State v. McCormick, 835 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn.App.2013), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013). Because our standard of review is de novo, a district court's ruling on a motion for a judgment of acquittal would typically be of little significance on appeal. But here, the district court's uncertainty concerning the rule of law applicable to a motion for judgment of acquittal makes further discussion and clarification appropriate.¹

After the guilty verdict, appellant moved the district court for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(3)(a). The district court denied the motion, stating that the heightened standard of review required by Al–Naseer is “based on the standard of review for the appellate court [and] may prevail on appeal,” and “that the heightened review standard is the appellate standard, not the trial court standard.” In this, the district court erred.²

“A motion for acquittal is procedurally equivalent to a motion for a directed verdict.” State v. Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d 70, 74 (Minn.2005) ; see also McCormick, 835 N.W.2d at 506. A motion for judgment of acquittal presents the district court with a question of law. See McCormick, 835 N.W.2d at 506. In Slaughter, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained the appropriate standard of review a district court should use when presented with a motion for judgment of acquittal. 691 N.W.2d at 75. It held that a district court may deny such a motion if “the state's evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, was sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Id. This standard is the same standard an appellate court applies when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.1989) (“Where there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our review on appeal

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is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they...