State v. Schmid, A13–0337.

Decision Date25 February 2015
Docket NumberNo. A13–0337.,A13–0337.
Citation859 N.W.2d 816
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Roger Benedict SCHMID, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Carl Ole Tvedten, Assistant Stearns County Attorney, Saint Cloud, MN, for respondent.

Daniel M. White, Scott M. Flaherty, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, MN; and John J. Neal, Willenbring, Dahl, Wocken & Zimmerman, PLLC, Cold Spring, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

LILLEHAUG, Justice.

A Department of Natural Resources officer encountered Roger Schmid sitting in a camouflaged ATV blind in an open field, wearing blaze orange, and possessing a loaded gun. Schmid was charged and convicted under Minn.Stat. § 97B.301 (2014), which states that a person may not “take” deer without a license. Schmid moved for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied his motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals defined “take” by the statutory definition of “taking,” which includes “pursuing” and “attempting to take,” and held that Schmid's conduct constituted “pursuing” deer.

On review by our court, the first issue is whether to define “take” by its narrower common law definition or by the broader statutory definition of “taking.” The second issue is whether Schmid's actions constituted a “take” under the applicable definition. We hold that the statutory definition of “taking” applies to “take,” and under that definition, a jury could reasonably conclude that Schmid was “pursuing” or “attempting to take” deer, and thus violated Minn.Stat. § 97B.301, subd. 1. Therefore, we affirm.

I.

Chad Thesing, a DNR enforcement officer, received a complaint about hunting activities on the evening of November 12, 2011. The next morning, while he investigated the complaint, Officer Thesing observed Schmid sitting on his ATV in an open field. Schmid had raised a folding camouflage blind on the ATV. Officer Thesing approached Schmid's blind and saw that Schmid was wearing blaze orange clothing. Schmid told Officer Thesing that he had killed a deer the previous evening. Discovering that Schmid had a loaded gun with him on the ATV, Officer Thesing performed a regulatory check of Schmid's license and permit.

Schmid possessed an expired permit to hunt from a motor vehicle. He also possessed what appeared to be a valid hunting license. However, Officer Thesing noted that the site validation tag was missing from the license.1 Officer Thesing informed Schmid that a hunter may only tag multiple deer if part of a hunting party or possessing bonus tags. Because Schmid was hunting alone and did not possess a bonus tag, Officer Thesing informed him that he was hunting with an invalid license. Officer Thesing told Schmid that he would “give him a break” and write him a citation for a lesser charge. Schmid immediately became hostile. According to Officer Thesing, Schmid was angry to be charged with “a chicken shit violation.”2 Officer Thesing then advised Schmid that he was going to write a citation for the more serious charge.

At that point, according to Thesing, Schmid gave several different reasons as to why he was in the field.3 He first said that he was part of a hunting party. Officer Thesing questioned that story, as Schmid's claimed hunting partners did not typically hunt.4 Schmid then told Officer Thesing that he was not hunting, but rather was out “nature watching.” Then, Schmid claimed that he was coyote hunting. Not believing any of Schmid's assertions, Officer Thesing issued Schmid a citation for hunting deer without a valid license, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 97B.301, subd. 1, which states that a person “may not take deer without a license.”

Before trial, Schmid moved the district court to dismiss the charge, arguing that there was no evidence that he was “taking” a deer, which he defined by reference to Minn.Stat. § 97A.015, subd. 47 (2014), as “pursuing, shooting, [or] killing ... wild animals,” or “attempting to take wild animals.” The court denied his motion.

At trial, Schmid testified that he was in the field to pick up a deer that he had shot just before dark the previous day. He was unable to load it onto his ATV, so he tagged it and left it in the field. He testified that he came out the next morning to try again to load it, but was unsuccessful. So, he decided to wait until his wife got home from church so that she could help him.

Schmid testified that he wore blaze orange for safety reasons and because the law required him to do so. See Minn.Stat. § 97B.071(a) (2014) (requiring blaze orange if hunting or trapping during open season “where deer may be taken by firearms”). He further testified that he possessed a loaded gun because it is “common sense,” and because there could have been coyotes preying on the tagged deer carcass. The blind was up to keep him warm while he waited, he said. Schmid asserted that the carcass was actually within 30 feet of the ATV, but that Officer Thesing did not see it.

In response, Officer Thesing testified that at no point did Schmid explain that he was in the field waiting to transport a tagged deer carcass. Officer Thesing recalled that he observed a gut pile near Schmid, but did not observe a carcass.

The district court instructed the jury that under Minnesota law “a person may not take a deer without a valid license,” and that it needed to determine whether Schmid “was taking a deer.” The court defined “taking” by its statutory definition under section 97A.015, subdivision 47 : “pursuing, shooting, killing, [or] capturing ... wild animals. Taking includes attempting to take wild animals, and assisting another person in taking wild animals.” The jury found Schmid “guilty of the charge of taking deer without a license.”

Schmid moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing for the first time that the statutory definition of “taking” did not apply to “take” in Minn.Stat. § 97B.301. Schmid instead contended that “take” was defined by the narrower common law definition: “to gain possession or control.” Schmid argued alternatively that his conduct did not constitute “taking” under the statutory definition. The district court denied the motion.

Schmid appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals affirmed in a published decision. State v. Schmid, 840 N.W.2d 843 (Minn.App.2013). Like the district court, the court of appeals used the statutory definition of “taking” to define “take.”5 Id. at 845. The court of appeals rejected Schmid's argument that one must chase deer in order to “pursue” them. Id. at 846–47. The court of appeals reasoned that “it would be silly” to limit pursuit to a physical chase, “especially in the deer-hunting context.” Id. at 846. Citing hunting articles and books, the court determined that “pursuit” in the deer hunting context had a particular definition: “entering deer habitat, anticipating a point of interception, and waiting to take a shot.” Id. at 847. The court of appeals held that “entering a deer-hunting area and sitting in a blind armed with a deer-hunting weapon loaded with deer-hunting ammunition is ‘pursuing’ deer within the meaning of section 97B.301.” Id.

We granted Schmid's petition for review.

II.

We consider first the meaning of the word “take.” Schmid argues that “take” in Minn.Stat. § 97B.301, subd. 1, is defined by the common law: to acquire possession or control. Because he did not acquire possession or control of a deer on the day in question, Schmid argues, he did not violate the statute. Evaluating whether Schmid's conduct was sufficient to convict him under the statute requires us to define “take,” a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn.2009). After we define “take,” we must examine whether “the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” State v. Simion, 745 N.W.2d 830, 841 (Minn.2008).

A.

Minnesota Statutes section 97B.301, subdivision 1, states: [a] person may not take deer without a license.” The statute does not explicitly define “take,” but Chapter 97B, along with Chapters 97A and 97C, is part of the “game and fish laws.” Minn.Stat. § 97A.011 (2014). Chapter 97A defines “taking.” See Minn.Stat. § 97A.015, subd. 47 ; see also Minn.Stat. § 97A.015, subd. 1 (“The terms defined in this section apply to this chapter and chapters 97B and 97C.”).

In interpreting a statute, we must first determine “whether the statute's language, on its face, is ambiguous.” Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn.2001). A statute is unambiguous if, as applied to the facts of a case, it is not “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” A.A.A. v. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., 832 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn.2013). If a statute is unambiguous, then we “must apply the statute's plain meaning.” Larson v. State, 790 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn.2010). We may use the canons of interpretation in Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (2014) to determine if a statute is unambiguous. Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Minn.2009). We construe words and phrases “according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1). However, if words have acquired a special meaning, we construe them “according to such special meaning or their definition.” Id. We do not turn to the common law definition of a word if the statute provides its own definition. Cf. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Minn.1985) (turning to the common law because the Legislature did not provide a statutory definition).

The statute before us is unambiguous, as only one reasonable interpretation exists: “take” is defined by the definition of “taking” in the game and fish laws.6 By the rules of grammar, “take” and “taking” share the same underlying definition. “Take,” as used in Minn.Stat. § 97B.301, subd. 1, is a verb. “Taking,” as defined in Minn.Stat. § 97A.015, subd. 47, can be used as a verb, noun, or adjective. When “taking”...

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