State v. Sanders
| Decision Date | 06 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | 2019-UP-100 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The State, Respondent, v. Rhajon Akeem Reshae Sanders, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2016-001785 |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Heard December 3, 2018
Appeal From Charleston County W. Jeffrey Young, Circuit Court Judge.
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.
In this criminal appeal, Rhajon Akeem Reshae Sanders appeals his convictions of attempted murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. On appeal, Sanders argues the circuit court erred in (1) failing to give an "act on appearances" charge to the jury, (2) excluding testimony regarding the dangerous nature of the neighborhood where the shooting occurred, (3) refusing to allow Sanders to refer to "high crime" neighborhood evidence through inferences during his closing argument, (4) failing to give a "no duty to retreat" charge to the jury, (5) confusing the jury as to the burden of proof in its self-defense charge, (6) overruling his objection to the State's questioning regarding whether police found drugs in his home, and (7) excluding Nicholas Washington's (Victim) prior inconsistent statement offered as extrinsic impeachment evidence. We affirm.
1. We find the circuit court did not err in refusing to give Sanders' requested act on appearances charge. In charging self-defense, the circuit court should consider "the facts and circumstances of the case at bar in order to fashion an appropriate charge." State v Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 443, 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989). In this case, neither Sanders nor Victim knew each other. Sanders testified there had never been any issues, problems threats, or altercations between him and Victim prior to the shooting. On the night of the shooting, Victim testified he was standing outside smoking. Sanders initiated the contact with Victim when he waved across the street at Victim, called out to Victim, and stepped off his porch towards Victim before ultimately firing his weapon when Victim reached into his waistband. Sanders admitted he never saw a weapon or any other type of shiny object on Victim. We find the circuit court correctly determined an act on appearances charge did not fit the facts and circumstances of this case. See State v. Lee, 298 S.C. 362, 364, 380 S.E.2d 834, 836 (1989) () (citation omitted).
Moreover even if we found the circuit court erred in refusing Sanders' requested act on appearances charge, the error is not reversible because Sanders suffered no prejudice. See State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010) (). Although it rejected Sanders' specific charge, the circuit court did issue the following charge as part of its self-defense instruction:
The defendant has the right to use so much force as appeared to be necessary for complete self[-]protection in which a person of ordinary means and firmness would have believed to be needed to prevent death or serious bodily injury.
Although the circuit court's instruction did not contain the identical verbiage as the instruction requested by Sanders, we find its instruction was substantially correct and covered the substance of the law requested by Sanders. See id. at 478, 697 S.E.2d at 583 (); State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318-19, 577 S.E.2d 460, 464 (Ct. App. 2003) (). Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's refusal to give Sanders' requested act on appearances charge.
2. We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the high crime neighborhood evidence Sanders sought to admit. See State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 35, 538 S.E.2d 248, 256 (2000) (). Throughout his trial, Sanders repeatedly attempted to elicit testimony from witnesses about the level of crime in his neighborhood. Each time, the circuit court sustained the State's objections to this questioning as irrelevant. Sanders attempted to introduce this evidence to foster his theory that he shot Victim in self-defense based on his general fear of the community. However, the elements of self-defense are inherently specific to the person perceiving fear and the distinct circumstances causing that fear. See State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984) (per curiam) ( ) (emphasis added). We find an accused's general fear of the community is not a relevant factor in a self-defense claim arising out of a very specific set of circumstances. See State v. Sweat, 362 S.C. 117, 127, 606 S.E.2d 508, 513 (Ct. App. 2004) (). The objective evidence and testimony in this case showed that Sanders shot Victim because the street was dark, Victim wore dark clothing, Victim threw down his cigarette before taking steps towards Sanders, and Victim reached into his waistband. We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the subjective high crime neighborhood evidence as irrelevant.
3. We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting Sanders from referencing the neighborhood's alleged dangerous nature during his closing argument. See State v. Finklea, 388 S.C. 379, 385, 697 S.E.2d 543, 547 (2010) (). The defendant's closing argument is confined to statements pertaining to the evidence in the record and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts in evidence. State v. Durden, 264 S.C. 86, 92, 212 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1975); State v. Huggins, 325 S.C. 103, 107, 481 S.E.2d 114, 116 (1997); 23A C.J.S. Trial and Incidental Proceedings § 1752 (2016). Because the circuit court repeatedly sustained the State's relevance objections to this evidence during the trial, allowing Sanders to reference this evidence for the first time during closing argument may have confused the jury in their consideration of his case. See Rule 403, SCRE ("[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of . . . confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . ."). We also find that referring to the neighborhood's "crime infested character" is not a reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts in evidence. The only testimony related to the neighborhood--on the record without objection--was Victim's testimony that a friend of his was recently killed in the neighborhood. A single homicide in the neighborhood is not sufficient to create a reasonable inference that the entire neighborhood is dangerous, unsafe, or "crime infested." See Hoeffner v. The Citadel, 311 S.C. 361, 366, 429 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1993) ("Arguments by counsel which invite the jury to base its verdict on considerations not relevant to the merits of the case are improper."). We affirm as to this issue.
4. We find the circuit court correctly refused to charge the jury with Sanders' requested "no duty to retreat" charge because the evidence presented at trial does not support the requested charge. See State v. Marin 404 S.C. 615, 619, 745 S.E.2d 148, 151 (Ct. App. 2013), aff'd as modified, 415 S.C. 475, 783 S.E.2d 808 (2016) (). In order to claim immunity from the law of retreat, an accused must demonstrate that he was attacked on his own premises without fault on his part. See State v. Long, 325 S.C. 59, 62, 480 S.E.2d 62, 63 (1997) ( the exception to the duty to retreat element of self-defense). Here, although Sanders was standing in his yard when he opened fire on Victim, the evidence showed Sanders fired multiple rounds across the street and struck Victim in the leg while Victim was either on the sidewalk or a couple steps into...
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