State v. Sanders, 79-1866
| Decision Date | 16 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-1866,79-1866 |
| Citation | 387 So.2d 391 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Paul A. SANDERS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty., Gen., and G. P. Waldbart, Legal Intern, Tampa, for appellant.
Peter M. de Manio, Sarasota, for appellee.
A loaded revolver was taken from the glove compartment of appellee's truck during an inventory search following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. On a second charge of illegal possession of a hand gun, appellee moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds of an illegal search and seizure. We reverse the suppression order.
Appellee was stopped by police officers on a Sarasota thoroughfare at about 4:00 a. m. He pulled over and parked in the outside land, which was for right turns only. There was no parking lane. Although the street was fairly deserted at that early hour, it was a main thoroughfare and would become increasingly congested as the morning rush hour approached. A vehicle parked in the "right turn only" lane would constitute a hazardous impediment to traffic.
Field sobriety tests at the scene revealed appellee's intoxication. He was arrested and placed in the police cruiser. When he requested permission to lock his truck, the officers advised him that it could not be left where it was, consequently they were impounding it for safekeeping and its contents would be carefully inventoried. Appellee made no response or any further requests or comments.
Appellee's home is only a few blocks from the scene of his arrest, and his wife was home at the time. Appellee himself was at least temporarily residing at a motel about a block from where he was stopped. There are several phones in the immediate area, but at no time did appellee ask to use one of them.
Sarasota Police have standing instructions to remove any arrestee's illegally parked vehicle by (1) permitting a qualified passenger to do so, (2) contacting a qualified relative of the arrestee, (3) permitting the arrestee to arrange removal by a private towing service or (4) impoundment. There is no department rule or policy requiring officers to advise arrestees of the options available to them. In the present instance, appellee did not request any alternative method of removing his truck, and the arresting officers did not apprise him of any alternative to the one (impoundment) they selected.
It is well established, of course, that contraband discovered during an "inventory" search of a vehicle properly in custodia legis is admissible into evidence to establish the crime of possession of such contraband. Godbee v. State, 224 So.2d 441 (Fla.2d DCA 1969). Appellee's motion in this case was predicated on the proposition that his truck was not "properly" impounded because the officers who arrested him violated their affirmative duty to advise him of the other permissible methods of having the vehicle removed from its admittedly illegal parking spot. Had they done so, argued appellant, he would have either called his wife or a private tow truck to remove the truck to either his motel or his home.
At the very threshold of that argument the court is called upon to speculate, or at least to make what might well be a completely unfounded assumption, about what appellee "would have done if." We are somewhat hesitant to make such an assumption in this case because appellee candidly admitted that he was "very intoxicated" and, in addition, the evidence would seem to indicate that he and his wife were estranged at the time.
However, in order to get to the heart of the real issue here, we will assume that had appellee been aware of his options in the matter he would have elected not to have his truck impounded. In other words, we will presume for purposes of this case that any breach of a duty to advise appellee of the alternatives open to him would be prejudicial. However, we do not want to be understood as indicating that prejudice must be presumed in all such cases. We are not prepared to say that if such a duty ever arises (e. g., by police department regulation) it will be clothed with the sanctity of a Miranda type...
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Miller v. State
...There is conflict that needs resolution. The Second District Court of Appeal, in the decision sought to be reviewed, in State v. Sanders, 387 So.2d 391 (Fla.2d DCA 1980), and in State v. Dearden, 347 So.2d 462 (Fla.2d DCA 1977), has held that a law enforcement officer has no duty to advise ......
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Nealy v. State, 80-1253
...itself lawful (and necessary) must also be answered in the affirmative in order to uphold the instant inventory. See State v. Sanders, 387 So.2d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Altman v. State, supra; Chuze v. State, 330 So.2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Benton v. State, 329 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 19......
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Sanders v. State
...for respondent. OVERTON, Justice. This is a petition to review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, reported at 387 So.2d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), holding that a law enforcement officer has no duty to advise a silent arrestee of alternatives to his vehicle's impoundment. This......