Sanders v. State
| Decision Date | 30 July 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 59728,59728 |
| Citation | 403 So.2d 973 |
| Parties | Paul A. SANDERS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Peter M. de Manio, Sarasota, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and G. P. Waldbart and David T. Weisbrod, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.
This is a petition to review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, reported at 387 So.2d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), holding that a law enforcement officer has no duty to advise a silent arrestee of alternatives to his vehicle's impoundment. This holding is in accord with previous Second District decisions in State v. Miller, 369 So.2d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), and State v. Dearden, 347 So.2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), and in conflict with the decisions of the Fourth District in Session v. State, 353 So.2d 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Jones v. State, 345 So.2d 809 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); State v. Jenkins, 319 So.2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
We recently resolved this conflict in Miller v. State, 403 So.2d 1307 (Fla.1981), in which we held:
(1) the purpose of an inventory search is a caretaking function exclusively for (a) protection of the owner's property, (b) protection of the police from claims and disputes over lost or stolen property which has been impounded, and (c) protection of the police from danger; (2) an inventory search is not conducted in order to discover evidence of a crime, and any suggestion that standard police procedure for an inventory search is actually a pretext for an investigative search will require the search to meet traditional probable cause standards or be invalidated; (3) there must be a threshold inquiry by the trial court to determine that the impoundment was for the above purposes and was reasonable and necessary under the circumstances; and (4) when the owner or possessor of the vehicle is present, the arresting officers must advise him or her that the motor vehicle will be impounded unless the owner or possessor can provide a reasonable alternative to impoundment; however, consultation with the owner or possessor is not required in circumstances where the vehicle is unattended, its owner is not reasonably available, or its owner or possessor is mentally incapacitated.
The Miller holding requires the officers to advise a present, silent arrestee that his car will be impounded unless he can provide a reasonable alternative to impoundment. Our holding does not mandate that an arrestee must be advised of all available options to impoundment; such a per se rule would be unworkable because of changing conditions and circumstances. However, the extent of the consultation with an arrestee is a factor for the trial judge to consider in determining whether the impoundment was reasonable and necessary.
In the instant case Sanders was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and was upon his own admission very intoxicated when arrested. Severe intoxication and other mental incapacity were specifically mentioned in Miller as examples of situations in which, if impoundment of a vehicle was necessary, consultation with the arrestee might be either impossible or inappropriate. The trial judge in considering a motion to suppress took Sanders' condition into consideration in determining the necessity for impoundment. The written order of the trial judge expressed a finding that, although Sanders failed the sobriety test, he "was cooperative," responded to all requests of the officer promptly," and "was alert and coherent. " The trial court further found that Sanders stopped his car next to the curb immediately...
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U.S. v. Vite-Espinoza
...for the trial judge to consider in determining whether the impoundment was reasonable and necessary." Ibid. (quoting Sanders v. State, 403 So.2d 973, 974 (Fla.1981)). There is no recorded case holding impoundment reasonable and necessary under circumstances similar to the case at bar, where......
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...S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), had superseded our contrary holdings in Miller v. State, 403 So.2d 1307 (Fla.1981), and Sanders v. State, 403 So.2d 973 (Fla.1981). More than ten years have passed since the 1982 amendment to article I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution was adopted, a......
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...the fact that, to the extent of any inconsistency, Bertine has superseded Miller v. State, 403 So.2d 1307 (Fla.1981), and Sanders v. State, 403 So.2d 973 (Fla.1981). Under the analysis in Bertine, we believe the Patrol is not compelled to provide an alternative to impoundment, as we held in......
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