State v. Sandmoen

• Decision Date: 22 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. C8-85-2369,C8-85-2369
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kelly SANDMOEN, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 419

390 N.W.2d 419

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kelly SANDMOEN, Appellant.

No. C8-85-2369.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

July 22, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A signed petition to plead guilty is prima facie evidence of a valid waiver of counsel for purposes of a subsequent DWI offense and, when unrebutted, prevents collateral attack on the prior conviction on 2. The trial court did not err in using appellant's prior DWI conviction for driving with blood alcohol exceeding .10%, entered pursuant to a valid waiver of counsel, to convert a subsequent DWI offense into a gross misdemeanor when the prior record contained a signed petition to plead guilty, a signed statement of rights, a notice of revocation and a traffic citation which both listed a breathalyzer result of .13% and thus established an adequate factual basis for the plea.

grounds that the waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.

3. The appellant cannot be deemed to have waived his right to a jury trial, even though his counsel informed the court, in his presence, that the matter would proceed to a court trial on stipulated facts pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., John R. Hawkinson, Bovey City Atty., Grand Rapids, for respondent.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Mark F. Anderson, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Considered and decided by LESLIE, P.J., and FOLEY and WOZNIAK, JJ., with oral argument waived.

OPINION

FOLEY, Judge.

Kelly Lee Sandmoen appeals from a September 11, 1985 judgment of conviction for aggravated DWI following a court trial on stipulated facts. On appeal, he claims that the conviction is invalid and must be set aside since he did not waive his right to a jury trial as set out in Minn.R.Crim.P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(a). He also argues that his uncounseled 1982 guilty plea to a DWI charge was improperly considered as a basis for enhancing the current charge to a gross misdemeanor when documentation introduced by the prosecutor failed to establish a factual basis for the former plea. The State failed to file a brief or move this court for an extension of time and the matter has proceeded under Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 142.03. We reverse and remand for a jury trial.

FACTS

On June 30, 1985, appellant Kelly L. Sandmoen was arrested in the City of Bovey for drunk driving and was determined to have a blood alcohol level of .17%. Since Sandmoen had a prior conviction for DWI on April 26, 1982, the current incident was charged as a gross misdemeanor pursuant to the sentence enhancement provisions of Minn.Stat. Sec. 169.121, subd. 3(a) (1984). An omnibus hearing was held on July 15, 1985.

At the omnibus hearing, in response to Sandmoen's motion to dismiss the gross misdemeanor charge, the prosecutor introduced documents from the county court file in the 1982 offense which listed the crime as "DWI (over .10%)." This included a Petition to Plead Guilty and a Statement of Rights, both signed by Sandmoen, a notice of revocation, and a traffic citation signed by the arresting officer, but not signed by Sandmoen. Both the notice of revocation and the traffic citation included breathalyzer results of .13% and were admitted over defense objection.

The omnibus court concluded that the trial court in the earlier case had adequately discharged its obligation to ascertain a factual basis for the plea and ruled that the 1982 DWI conviction could be used to enhance the current charge into a gross misdemeanor. Sandmoen then entered a plea of not guilty. On September 11, 1985, Sandmoen's counsel, in his presence, informed the trial court that the matter would proceed to a court trial on stipulated facts prepared by the prosecutor. Sandmoen's sole objection to the stipulation concerned inclusion of a certified copy of his driving record and his temporary license. The trial court sustained these objections, but adopted the stipulation in all other respects.

On the record, the trial court found [T]here is sufficient factual basis to warrant the conviction of the defendant, he is guilty of the offense of driving while under the influence, aggravated by reason of subsequent conviction contrary to Minnesota Statutes 169.121, Subd. 1(a) and Subd. 3(a).

Prior to sentencing, defense counsel noted that Sandmoen was a recent graduate of Homes, Inc., a support and educational facility designed to help individuals with mental disabilities work into the mainstream. He further noted Sandmoen was currently employed with the Sheltered Workshop in Hibbing, Minnesota. The trial court sentenced Sandmoen to a six-month jail sentence and ordered him to pay fines totalling $850. Five months of the six-month jail sentence were suspended for two years, during which time Sandmoen was placed on supervised probation.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court properly determine that appellant's prior uncounseled DWI plea, entered by petition, could be used to enhance a current DWI charge into a gross misdemeanor when the record of the prior proceeding, as a whole, established an adequate factual basis for the plea?

2. Is a gross misdemeanor conviction entered following a court trial on stipulated facts valid when the defendant did not personally waive his right to trial by jury?

ANALYSIS

1. We note from the outset that appellant does not collaterally attack the prior DWI conviction on constitutional grounds by contending that his waiver of counsel was invalid. Indeed, in State v. Clark, 361 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), we held that a signed petition to plead guilty was prima facie evidence of a valid waiver of counsel. As such, the present case is to be distinguished from a class of cases represented by State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn.1983), and State v. Medenwaldt, 341 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), where a prior DWI conviction could not be used to enhance a subsequent DWI offense into a gross misdemeanor absent a valid waiver of counsel on the record. Instead, we turn our attention to appellant's claim that the factual basis for the former plea is insufficient and thus, an inappropriate basis for enhancing the current charge to a gross misdemeanor under Minn.Stat. Sec. 169.121, subd. 3(a).

Minimal standards for on-the-record questioning of a defendant before a misdemeanor plea is accepted are set out in Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.02. These standards are incorporated into Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.03, which provides alternate methods of accepting a misdemeanor plea: through group warnings under subdivision 1 or by written petition under subdivision 2. In the present case, the latter alternative was used. Stated in full, Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.03, subd. 2 provides:

Petition to Plead Guilty. The defendant or his attorney may file with the court a petition to plead guilty as provided for in the Appendix B to Rule 15 signed by the defendant indicating that he is pleading guilty to the specified misdemeanor offense with the understanding and knowledge required of defendants personally entering a guilty plea under Rule 15.02.

The guilty plea form contained within Appendix B to Rule 15 provides in pertinent part:

[Name], defendant in the above entitled action respectfully represents and states as follows:

* * *

2. That he hereby pleads guilty to the offense of (name of offense) in violation of (statute or ordinance);

3. That he is pleading guilty because he committed the following acts: (state sufficient facts to establish a factual basis for the plea);

In the present case, similar inquiries were answered as follows:

Kelly Lee Sandmoen, defendant in the above-entitled matter, respectfully represents and states as follows:

* * * 3. That he understands that he is charged with DWI (over 0.10%) in violation of M.S.A. 169.121.

4. That he pleads GUILTY to the offense as stated above because he committed the following acts: set forth above.

Appellant claims that our holding in State v. Stewart, 360 N.W.2d 463 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), compels a similar result here. We disagree. In Stewart, the defendant was given his constitutional rights in a group advisory. As further required by Rule 15.03, subd. 1, the trial court conducted interrogation of the defendant on the record, but failed to elicit any details underlying the charge including location and date of the DWI offense and results of the defendant's blood alcohol test. Id. at 465. ¹

Noting that the combination of group advisories and uncounseled guilty pleas required "even closer scrutiny" than pleas entered with benefit of counsel, the Stewart court held that inquiry into the factual basis for the plea was inadequate and prevented enhancement of the pending DWI into a gross misdemeanor. Id. at 461; see also State v. Grunewald, 378 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Minn.Ct.App.1985) (individual on the record questioning required after defendant signs a "statement of rights" form did not establish a factual basis for the plea and failed to adequately inform defendant of his rights as listed in Rule 15.02, subds. 5, 6, and 7); accord State v. Hanson, 360 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Minn.Ct.App.1985) (the closest scrutiny is required when the defendant is given a group advisory and enters his plea without benefit of counsel).

In the present case, appellant was not given a group advisory, but instead signed a petition and a statement of rights. This creates a presumption that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to counsel, a point appellant does not rebut. See Clark, 361 N.W.2d at 107. It necessarily follows that the "closest scrutiny" found in Stewart and Hanson is not dictated under the present facts. This does not, in any way, imply that only cursory attention need be paid to inquiries contained within a petition to plead guilty. Rule 15.03, subd. 2 clearly requires that a petition incorporate the elements of Rule 15.02, including a sufficient factual basis for the plea.

Stewart is distinguishable from the present case because the...