State v. Sanford

• Decision Date: 11 February 1946
• Docket Number: No. 39329.,No. 39330.,39329.,39330.
• Parties: STATE v. SANFORD. STATE v. ELLIS.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

193 S.W.2d 37

STATE v. SANFORD.

STATE v. ELLIS.

No. 39329.

No. 39330.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

February 11, 1946.

Rehearing Denied March 11, 1946.

Concurring and dissenting opinions.

For majority opinions, see 193 S.W.2d 35, 31.

HYDE, Judge (concurring).

The real question in this case is not whether the officers of the Missouri State Highway Patrol complied with Sections 4346 and 8360, R.S.1939, Mo.R.S.A. The sole question is whether or not the confessions of these defendants were voluntary in fact.

It is my view that we should adhere to the standard of admissibility of confessions of whether or not the particular confession is voluntary in fact. That has always been the rule of this Court. State v. Menz, 341 Mo. 74, 106 S.W.2d 440 and cases therein cited. Likewise, as shown by these authorities, this is a jury question unless its involuntary character so conclusively appears that it must be held to be involuntary as a matter of law. McNabb v. United States, 319 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819, establishes no rule of constitutional law which requires us to change this standard. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 926, 88 L.Ed. 1192, the United States Supreme Court recognized the rule that the test is the voluntariness of the statement, by basing its decision (reversing the case because conviction was based on an inadmissible confession) upon its conclusion "that if Ashcraft made a confession it was not voluntary but compelled." In Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 64 S.Ct. 1208, 88 L.Ed. 1481, a second statement (after an admittedly inadmissible involuntary statement) was held to be voluntary and therefore admissible. If the confession is voluntary in fact, and is true, the defendants' rights are not violated by putting it in evidence. Some one must determine these fact issues and our system is to leave them to the jury, when they must be decided on conflicting evidence.

I do not see how there can be any question as to the voluntariness of Sanford's confession. He made it during the day he was arrested and well within the 20 hour period required by Section 4346, R.S.1939, Mo.R.S.A. He had corroborated it by showing the officers where the victim's purse had been left. He further corroborated it by making the same statements to others who were not officers and had no authority over him. See 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 819, page 1439. He did not testify at the trial. I do not think there is any substantial evidence to show that his confession was involuntary.

In the Ellis case, State v. Ellis, Mo.Sup., 193 S.W.2d 31, the questioned confession was later corroborated by an acknowledgment of his guilt to his mother. The dissenting opinion herein relies strongly on State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100, 32 A.L.R. 383, which was an illegal search and seizure case. It seems to me that there is a vast difference between the use of evidence taken by an illegal search and seizure and the use of a voluntary confession made during illegal detention. Of course, evidence taken by illegal search and seizure is an involuntary disclosure thereof on the part of the person from whom it is taken. It should unquestionably be in the same class with an involuntary confession. But a voluntary confession although made during illegal detention is still a voluntary disclosure.

Moreover, the officers who held Ellis were not acting illegally in taking him into custody. They had the right to arrest him and were charged with the duty of investigating this crime. They should have taken him before a magistrate as the statute directs so that formal charges against him could have been made. However, he knew why he was being held and so did members of his family who also knew where he was being held. Of course, failure to comply with Sections 4346 and 8360 could have a bearing on the voluntariness of a confession but (as the opinion of Douglas, J., points out) Ellis made no claim that it did in this case. He made a subsequent confession at another place, out of the presence of the Patrol Officers. The acts of which Ellis complained as affecting the voluntariness of his confession were submitted to the jury, but they did not believe that these acts were committed. See State v. Hawkins, Mo.Sup., 165 S.W. 2d 644. His testimony concerning them was not convincing. He identified none of the officers he knew with these acts, and could not say who did it. While there was sufficient evidence to have supported a jury verdict that his confession was involuntary, I do not think it was established as a matter of law.

I, therefore, concur in the opinions of DOUGLAS, J., in these cases.

All concur, except TIPTON, J., dissenting.

TIPTON, Judge (dissenting).

I am unable to agree with the majority opinions. They dispose of these cases as though they involve a mere technical violation of the statute by the Missouri State Highway Patrol, and in so doing fail to consider and give full import to certain undisputed and significant facts. Furthermore, the opinions fail to give meaning and force to the unambiguous language of the statute.

The statute, Section 8360, Mo.R.S.A., in unmistakably plain language, says: "Any person arrested by a member of the patrol shall forthwith be taken by such member before the court or magistrate having jurisdiction of the crime whereof such person so arrested is charged there to be dealt with according to law." So, in the plainest of language, we have a specific limitation on the arresting power of the officers of the Missouri State Highway Patrol.

"This directive is not something which the officer is free to comply with or ignore according as he may think the exigencies of the situation demand; it is a fundamental imperative designed to safeguard the individual in a free land against the arbitrary exercise of power." Runnels v. United States, 9 Cir., 138 F.2d 346, loc.cit. 347. As is well known, the underlying policy of the statute is directed against "the misuse of the law enforcement process." "It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime" and, it may be frankly added, to prevent "the third degree" and coerced confessions. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 614, 87 L.Ed. 819; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192. "They subjected the accused to the pressures of a procedure which is wholly incompatible with the vital but very restricted duties of the investigating and arresting officers of the Government and which tends to undermine the integrity of the criminal proceeding. * * * Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the over-zealous as well as the despotic. * * * Legislation such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important safeguard — not only in assuring protection for the innocent but also in securing conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a progressive and self-confident society. * * * It outlaws easy but self-defeating ways in which brutality is substituted for brains as an instrument of crime detection. A statute carrying such purposes is expressive of a general legislative policy to which courts should not be heedless when appropriate situations call for its application." McNabb v. United States, supra, 318 U.S. 332, loc.cit. 342, 343, 344, 63 S. Ct. loc.cit. 613, 87 L.Ed. 819. See also United States v. Haupt, 7 Cir., 136 F.2d 661.

In these cases had there been a mere technical violation of this statute by the Highway Patrol in its failure to "forthwith" take Sanford and Ellis before a court or magistrate with jurisdiction of the crime with which they were charged, it would be reasonable to argue that no more was involved than the technicality of a mere illegal arrest, and, therefore, their confessions given during the period of illegal detention would not be involuntary. That is all that was involved in State v. Raftery, 252 Mo. 72, 158 S.W. 585, State v. Hoskins, 327 Mo. 313, 36 S.W.2d 909, and State v. Mitchell, 339 Mo. 228, 96 S.W.2d 341. In principle, no more is involved in State v. Menz, 341 Mo. 74, 106 S.W.2d 440, in which it was held that the mere fact that one had been detained more than the statutory twenty hours did not, as a matter of law, constitute duress as to a confession given during that time. However, it should be noted that Menz was detained in custody at the county seat. His people knew where Menz was detained for his sister visited him the second day of his detention and subsequently he was visited by his father.

But in these cases there was not a mere failure to take Sanford and Ellis before a committing magistrate in the county of the crime; Sanford and Ellis were taken to another county. They were taken to the Highway Patrol's headquarters in Kirkwood and when they were not being subjected to examination or "work" (Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra) they were kept in the St. Charles jail.

Sanford and Ellis murdered Mrs. Santo on the 12th day of December, 1943. Sanford was taken into custody while at work at the quarry at Pacific on the 14th day of December, and was detained at Kirkwood and in the St. Charles jail until the 21st day of December. Ellis was arrested on the 14th day of December and detained until the 21st day of December. On that day they were taken before a proper committing magistrate at Union, the county seat of Franklin County. They waived preliminary hearings and were committed to the Franklin County jail where they remained until tried in March, 1944. The affidavit for an information was dated December 15th, three days after the murder.

Sanford was taken into custody about 11:30 on the morning of the 14th and immediately taken to Troop C head-quarters in Kirkwood where he was questioned by two troopers and a lieutenant. From 7 o'clock that night until 9:30 or 10...