State v. Santiago
| Decision Date | 25 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | AC 44780 |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DANIEL SANTIAGO |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Argued January 9, 2023
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of murder manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and assault in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury before Dewey, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and assault in the first degree; thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence; subsequently, the court Graham, J., granted the state's motion to dismiss the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, and the defendant appealed to this court thereafter, the trial court, Gold, J., granted the defendant's motion for sentence modification. Appeal dismissed.
James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, and Debra A. Ware, former senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Suarez, Clark and Seeley, Js.
The defendant, Daniel Santiago, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Graham, J., dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In the motion to correct, the defendant argued that he was serving the functional equivalent of a life sentence, despite being eligible for parole, and that, when his sentence was imposed, the sentencing court violated his rights by not taking into account his youth as a mitigating factor. The defendant claims that, in dismissing his motion, the court improperly (1) denied him the right to "an evidentiary hearing concerning the current state of science on the maturity, impulse control, and over receptiveness to peer pressure of [eighteen year olds], and the effect of science on Connecticut law" and (2) concluded that he did not present a colorable claim that he was entitled to relief under the Connecticut and United States constitutions. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
The following procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a (a), and assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1). On April 25, 2000, the court, Dewey, J., sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of sixty-five years of incarceration.[1]On July 25, 2000, the court granted the defendant's motion to correct the sentence, thereby reducing his total effective sentence by five years.[2]
The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to this court. This court agreed with the defendant that prosecutorial impropriety during cross-examination and closing argument had deprived him of a fair trial, reversed the judgment of conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Santiago, 73 Conn.App. 205, 230-231, 246, 807 A.2d 1048 (2002). Our Supreme Court granted the state's petition for certification to appeal. State v. Santiago, 262 Conn. 939, 815 A.2d 673 (2003). Thereafter, our Supreme Court reversed this court's judgment and remanded the case to this court with direction to consider a remaining claim that it had not considered on its merits. State v. Santiago, 269 Conn. 726, 763, 850 A.2d 199 (2004). In compliance with the remand order, this court considered the merits of the remaining claim and affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v. Santiago, 87 Conn.App. 754, 867 A.2d 138, cert, denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 45 (2005).[3]
On November 1,2019, pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22,[4] the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court's resolution of that motion is the subject of the present appeal. The defendant asserted that, at the time of sentencing, Judge Dewey had not considered "[his] youth or its attendant features as a mitigating factor" despite the fact that the underlying offenses occurred when he was eighteen years of age. The defendant argued that his total effective sentence of sixty years was, as a matter of law, "a life sentence under Connecticut law." The defendant argued that the court's sentence ran afoul of the principles announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), that pertain to the sentencing of juvenile offenders.[5] The defendant also argued that the sixty year sentence violated his "rights under the greater protections afforded by article first, §§8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution because it is a cruel and unusual punishment and violates [his] right to substantive and procedural due process" and that "[his] sentence is also illegal and imposed in an illegal manner under the greater protections afforded by article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution."
In the defendant's accompanying memorandum of law, he argued that, first, the court must consider whether, under the federal and state constitutions, the principles requiring sentencing courts to consider a juvenile offender's youth in mitigation against severe punishment should also be applied to individuals, like him, "who were eighteen [years old] at the time of the offense and still in the stage of development that would scientifically constitute 'adolescence.'" Essentially, he argued that the "brain science" that underlies the holdings in Miller and its progeny, as well as the enactment of General Statutes § 54-125a (f),[6] supports a determination that he "share [s] the lessened culpability that other adolescents have." Second, the defendant argued, the court must consider "whether [his] sixty year sentence of incarceration for a crime he committed when he was eighteen years old is subject to this broader application of these principles."
On May 6, 2020, the state filed a motion to dismiss the motion to correct and an accompanying memorandum of law. The state argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the defendant was eligible for parole and (2) there was no support under the federal or state constitutions for the defendant's belief that a court, sentencing a defendant who committed an offense at eighteen years of age, was bound to consider the defendant's youth as a mitigating factor. The defendant filed an objection to the state's motion to dismiss. The defendant argued therein that (1) his parole eligibility did not undermine his arguments and (2) the due process provision of the state constitution compels a conclusion that the principles of Miller should be extended to persons who were eighteen at the time of the offense of which they stood convicted. Thereafter, the state filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of its motion to dismiss.
The defendant filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his objection to the motion to dismiss.
On April 15, 2021, following a hearing, the court, Graham, J., granted the state's motion to dismiss the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the defendant failed to raise a colorable claim under Practice Book § 43-22 because, in consideration of the undisputed relevant facts in the record, he was not entitled, under either the federal or state constitutions, to have the sentencing court consider his youth as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing. The court stated: Thereafter, the defendant filed the present appeal, in which he claims error in what he characterizes as the court "denying" him an evidentiary hearing in connection with the motion to dismiss, as well as the court's conclusion that he did not state a colorable claim for relief under the federal and state constitutions.
On January 3, 2022, after the defendant brought this appeal, he filed a motion for sentence modification pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-39.[7] In the memorandum of law in support of that motion, the defendant argued that his sixty year total effective sentence should be modified primarily because his efforts "to redeem himself . . . and to rehabilitate in prison have earned him a chance at a new sentence-one that can enable him to deepen his personal growth, and to do everything possible to right the wrongs of his adolescence." The defendant also argued that modification was warranted in light of the "sea change in legal and scientific thought" pertaining to juvenile offenders that had taken place since the time of his sentencing in 2000. In particular, the defendant relied on Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 467, and State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015) ( applying Miller), cert, denied, 577 U.S. 1202, 136 S.Ct. 1361, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016). On March 22, 2022, the court, Gold, J., held a hearing on the motion.
On July 19, 2022, the court granted the motion after finding good cause to reduce the sixty year sentence. The court stated ...
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