State v. Sargent, A19-1554
| Decision Date | 28 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | A19-1554 |
| Citation | 951 N.W.2d 121 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Carlos Ramone SARGENT, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and David M. Robbins, Special Assistant Public Defender, Meyer Njus Tanick, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
Appellant challenges his conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition. He contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the ammunition, which was found in appellant's clothing after he was arrested during a traffic stop for a pretrial-release violation and searched incident to arrest. Given the balance of the government and individual interests at stake and the totality of the circumstances, the police reasonably expanded the traffic stop to investigate appellant's suspected violation of a condition of pretrial release. We therefore affirm.
In May 2017, the state charged appellant Carlos Ramone Sargent with fifth-degree controlled-substance possession and driving while impaired. The district court ordered conditional bail, which included requirements that Sargent not use intoxicants and submit to random testing for intoxicants.1 Sargent posted the conditional bail and was released from custody pending further proceedings.
In November 2017, the Leech Lake Tribal Police arrested Sargent for violating his conditions of release. During a search incident to arrest, the police found three shotgun shells in Sargent's clothing. In January 2018, the state charged Sargent with unlawful possession of ammunition.2 Sargent moved to suppress the shotgun shells, and the district court held an evidentiary hearing on his motion.
At the motion hearing, the state presented evidence that on the evening of November 4, 2017, a Leech Lake Tribal Police Officer stopped a vehicle driven by E.H. because she had turned without signaling. E.H. had three passengers in her vehicle, including Sargent. The officer testified that he knew Sargent from "previous law enforcement contacts" and that Sargent had "a pretty good record." The officer testified that on October 25, 2017, he had investigated Sargent's involvement in an assault. At that time, the officer did "a warrant check and probation check" and learned that Sargent was on pretrial release.
The officer testified that he smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. The officer asked E.H. if she had been drinking, and she responded, "No." The officer asked the passengers, including Sargent, if they had been drinking. Sargent responded, "Yes." E.H. submitted to a preliminary breath test (PBT), which confirmed that she had not been drinking. After E.H. submitted to the PBT, the officer asked Sargent if he was on a "no-drink" condition, and Sargent responded, "Yes." Sargent agreed to submit to a PBT and provided a breath sample that indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.03.
The officer contacted dispatch to confirm the conditions of Sargent's pretrial release. Dispatch informed the officer that Sargent was required to refrain from alcohol consumption and to submit to random testing. Sargent gave the officer the name of his supervising agent. The officer was unable to contact Sargent's supervising agent, but the officer contacted another agent of the department responsible for supervising Sargent's pretrial release. That agent requested that Sargent be arrested for drinking alcohol in violation of his pretrial-release conditions. The police arrested Sargent, searched him, and found shotgun shells in his clothing.
In support of his motion to suppress, Sargent argued that the initial traffic stop was pretextual and that the police unreasonably expanded the traffic stop to investigate his pretrial-release status. He also argued that his random-testing condition was unconstitutional and therefore did not provide a basis for the PBT, which he deemed a warrantless search.
The district court denied Sargent's motion to suppress. The court concluded that there was a valid basis for the stop and that Sargent's random-testing condition provided a valid basis for the PBT. The district court further concluded that, even if reasonable, articulable suspicion was necessary to exercise the random-testing condition, the odor of alcohol emanating from E.H.’s vehicle established such suspicion. Sargent requested reconsideration. The district court reconsidered the issue, but the court once again refused to suppress the evidence, reasoning that the ammunition was discovered during a valid search incident to arrest.
Sargent waived his trial rights and stipulated to the prosecution's case under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain review of the district court's pretrial ruling. The district court found Sargent guilty and sentenced him to serve 60 months in prison. Sargent appeals.
Did the district court err by denying Sargent's motion to suppress?
"When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence." State v. Harris , 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Ortega , 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). In reviewing the district court's factual findings, this court defers to the district court's credibility determinations. State v. Miller , 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003).
Sargent challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. Sargent first argues that the officer unreasonably expanded the traffic stop to investigate his pretrial-release status. He next argues that his random-testing condition was unconstitutional. Sargent agrees that this court need not address his second argument if we conclude that the officer reasonably expanded the traffic stop to investigate his suspected pretrial-release violation.3 We therefore begin our analysis with that issue.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution protect "against unreasonable searches and seizures." Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall under an established exception. State v. Othoudt , 482 N.W.2d 218, 221-22 (Minn. 1992) (citing Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ). Evidence seized in violation of the United States or Minnesota Constitutions must be suppressed. Terry , 392 U.S. at 12-13, 88 S. Ct. at 1875 ; State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).
Under Terry , a police officer may temporarily detain an individual based on reasonable, articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. Diede , 795 N.W.2d at 842-43. In State v. Askerooth , the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted "the principles and framework of Terry for evaluating the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated." 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004). In doing so, the supreme court interpreted the Minnesota Constitution as affording greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the United States Constitution.4 Id.
When assessing the validity of an investigative seizure under Terry , a court considers two issues: whether the seizure was justified at its inception, and whether the actions of the police during the seizure were "reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place." Id. at 364.
The second Terry prong constrains the scope and methods of a search or seizure. An initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in its intensity or scope. Thus, each incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible. An intrusion not closely related to the initial justification for the search or seizure is invalid under article I, section 10 unless there is independent probable cause or reasonableness to justify that particular intrusion.
Id. (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).
"In essence, Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution requires that each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness , as defined in Terry . " Id. at 365 (emphasis added). "[A]n extension of the duration of a stop beyond the time necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stop is unreasonable." Id. at 371.
We first consider whether the traffic stop was justified at its inception. "Ordinarily, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle." State v. George , 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). In this case, the officer testified that he stopped E.H.’s vehicle because she failed to signal a turn. Sargent's principal brief suggests that the initial stop was invalid, stating that the vehicle "was ostensibly stopped for a minor traffic violation" but "[t]he video evidence in the record ... is inconclusive and the vehicle driver offered testimony disputing the officers’ accounts." But the district court found the officer's testimony credible, and we defer to that credibility determination. See Miller , 659 N.W.2d at 279. Thus, E.H.’s failure to signal a turn justified the traffic stop at its...
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State v. Sargent
...in prison.Sargent appealed the district court's denial of his suppression motion and the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Sargent, 951 N.W.2d 121, 134 (Minn. App. 2020). In a precedential opinion, the court of appeals determined that the officer's expansion of the traffic stop to investi......