State v. Sasai
| Decision Date | 29 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | SCWC-15-0000865 |
| Citation | 429 P.3d 1214 |
| Parties | STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Matthew Sean SASAI, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee, and State of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Brent N. Tanaka, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Antoinette Lilley and James S. Tabe (John M. Tonaki and Audrey L. Stanley, Honolulu, with them on the briefs) for petitioners.
Brian R. Vincent (Keith M. Kaneshiro, Honolulu, with him on the briefs) for respondent.
In this consolidated appeal, Matthew Sean Sasai and Brent N. Tanaka ("Sasai" and "Tanaka," respectively; collectively, "Petitioners") assert that their due process and equal protection rights were violated when they were each charged with one count of Prostitution under Hawaii Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 712-1200(1)(b) (2014). When Petitioners were charged, HRS § 712-1200(1)(b) provided that "[a] person commits the offense of prostitution if the person ... [p]ays, agrees to pay, or offers to pay a fee to another to engage in sexual conduct," and HRS § 712-1200(1)(a) provided that "[a] person commits the offense of prostitution if the person ... [e]ngages in, or agrees or offers to engage in, sexual conduct with another person for a fee[.]" In their motions to dismiss, Petitioners argued that HRS §§ 712-1200(1)(a) and (1)(b) prohibited the same conduct, but subsection (1)(b) carried a harsher penalty because it made them ineligible for a deferred acceptance of a guilty or no contest plea ("DAG/DANC plea") under HRS § 853-4(a)(13)(V) (2014). They argued that pursuant to State v. Modica, 58 Haw. 249, 567 P.2d 420 (1977), where two crimes prohibit the same conduct, it would violate their due process and equal protection rights to convict them of the crime carrying the harsher penalty. The District Court of the First Circuit ("district court")1 agreed and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order ("FOF/COL and Order") on October 6, 2015, granting Petitioners’ motions to dismiss based on Modica and dismissing the charges with prejudice.
On appeal, a majority of the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") vacated the district court’s rulings in a Summary Disposition Order ("SDO"), determining that HRS § 712-1200(1)(a) applied only to sellers of sexual conduct while subsection (1)(b) pertained only to purchasers. The ICA majority concluded that subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) therefore prohibited different conduct, and that the district court erred in finding a Modica violation. Judge Ginoza2 dissented, agreeing with the district court that a person charged under HRS § 712-1200(1)(b) could be charged under HRS § 712-1200(1)(a), and that subsection (1)(b) carried a harsher penalty by virtue of ineligibility for a DAG/DANC plea.
On certiorari, Petitioners assert the ICA majority erred in vacating the district court’s order granting dismissal. We agree, and we therefore vacate the ICA’s SDO and Judgment on Appeal. Because the district court did not provide reasons for its dismissal with prejudice, however, we remand these cases to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On September 10, 2014, Sasai was charged with one count of Prostitution, in violation of HRS § 712-1200(1)(b).3 Tanaka was charged with the same offense on December 18, 2014.4
On May 15, 2015, Tanaka filed his Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Defendant’s Right to Due Process and Equal Protection of the Laws ("Tanaka Combined Motion"). On June 9, 2015, Sasai filed his Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Defendant’s Right to Due Process and Equal Protection of the Laws ("Sasai Modica Motion").5
In their respective motions, Petitioners requested their charges be dismissed, arguing that being charged under HRS § 712-1200(1)(b) violated their due process and equal protection rights under the United States and Hawai‘i constitutions because HRS § 712-1200(1)(b) carried a harsher punishment, but contained "the exact same elements" as HRS § 712-1200(1)(a). They noted that this court, in Modica, ruled that a felony conviction would violate the defendant’s rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws "where the same act committed under the same circumstances is punishable either as a felony or as a misdemeanor, under either of two statutory provisions, and the elements of proof essential to either conviction are exactly the same[.]"
58 Haw. at 251, 567 P.2d at 422 (citations omitted). Petitioners argued "the Modica rule applies to any situation where the elements of two different crimes regardless of their classification are the same, but the statutory penalties are different."
Petitioners urged the district court to analyze "the elements of the charges based on the particular facts of the case[,]" as this court had done in State v. Hoang, 86 Hawai‘i 48, 947 P.2d 360 (1997), and the ICA had done in State v. Hatori, 92 Hawai‘i 217, 990 P.2d 115 (App. 1999). They contended that both HRS §§ 712-1200(1)(a) and (1)(b) required "the ‘same act’ of entering into an agreement for sexual conduct for a fee, which implicitly involves agreement for payment," and therefore that act was punishable "under either HRS § 712-1200(1)(a) and HRS § 712-1200(1)(b) ‘precisely because the elements of proof essential to either conviction are exactly the same.’ " This conclusion was supported, Petitioners contended, by the legislative history of HRS § 712-1200.
At the time Petitioners were charged, both HRS § 712-1200(1)(a) and (1)(b) were petty misdemeanors punishable by a mandatory $500 fine and up to thirty days in jail, but convictions under subsection (1)(b) were not eligible for deferred acceptance of guilty or no contest plea under HRS § 853-4(13)(V) (2014). Because the punishment for subsection (1)(b) was more severe, that is, violators of subsection (1)(a) could seek a deferred plea but violators of (1)(b) could not, Petitioners asserted that their respective charges should be dismissed as a violation of their due process and equal protection rights under Modica.
In its memoranda in opposition to Petitioners’ respective motions, the State submitted, based on its interpretation of HRS § 712-1200, that subsection (1)(a) should be read to apply only to "those persons offering sex for a fee," whereas subsection (1)(b) should be read to apply to "those persons who offer a fee for sex. ..." The State urged the district court to read the statute this way "to give proper meaning to all portions of § 712-1200," and avoid rendering subsection (1)(b) a "nullity." Further, the State argued the legislative history of the statute made clear that subsection (1)(b) was intended to apply to the patrons of prostitutes.
The State contended that HRS §§ 712-1200(1)(a) and (1)(b) did not have the same elements and did not prohibit the same act because "subsection (1)(a) applies to those who offer sex for money, whereas subsection (1)(b) applies to those [who] offer money for sex." The State asserted "[t]he acts ... reside on opposite sides of the transaction or agreement and cannot, therefore, be the same act." Additionally, the State argued the statutory penalties for violating subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) were the same, and asserted that a deferral is a "non-penalty" because "[w]hether or not a deferral is an option is not the punishment itself but is a delayed dismissal given certain conditions."
The district court held a two-day consolidated hearing on the motions to dismiss. Petitioners called three witnesses and the district court accepted several stipulations.6 On July 21, 2015, the district court granted the Petitioners’ motions, based on Modica, and dismissed their respective charges with prejudice.7
On October 6, 2015, the district court filed its written FOF/COL and Order.8 Based on the testimony of former Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Klemen Urbanc ("Urbanc"), the district court found that before the 2011 amendment to HRS § 712-1200(1), Factual stipulations, entered into by the parties and the district court on June 26, 2015, further explained how HRS § 712-1200 changed over time:
The district court concluded that only a purchaser of sexual conduct "can properly be charged under HRS § 712-1200(1)(b)" but that "all persons charged with prostitution—whether [purchasers of sexual conduct] or [sellers...
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