State v. Sauceda
| Decision Date | 06 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-36606,A-1-CA-36606 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT R. SAUCEDA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Emily Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General
for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Will O'Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
{1} Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Defendant challenges the district court's order denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during his traffic stop. He contends: (1) the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion; (2) the deputy lacked sufficient basis for a protective frisk; (3) the officer exceeded the permissible scope of a protective frisk; and (4) the record and findings do not support application of the inevitable discovery rule. Defendant also challenges the district court's order denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of failure to stop or yield. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
{2} "The district court's denial of efendant's motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of fact and law." State v. Almanzar, 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183. "This Court reviews factual matters with deference to the district court's findings if substantial evidence exists to support them, and it reviews the district court's application of the law de novo." Id.
{3} An officer may lawfully stop a vehicle to investigate a traffic violation where the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver is breaking or has broken a traffic law. State v. Goodman, 2017-NMCA-010, ¶ 6, 389 P.3d 311. In the present case, Deputy Mosley testified that he observed Defendant fail to come to a complete stop at a stop sign and fail to use a turn signal when he turned left at an intersection, which could have affected surrounding traffic. These actions constitute violations of the Traffic Code. See NMSA 1978, § 66-7-345(C) (2003) (); NMSA 1978, § 66-7-325(A) (1978) (). Deputy Mosley conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle Defendant was driving.
{4} Defendant argues that his traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion because the recording of his stop on Deputy Mosley's dashcam, conflicts with Deputy Mosely's testimony regarding his estimated distance from the intersection where Defendant made a left-hand turn such that the dashcam recording cannot "clearly establish whether [his] turn signal was [on]" or whether he came to a stop or merely rolled through.
{5} To convince this Court of the conflict, Defendant printed in his brief: (1) a fuzzy, black-and-white, nighttime screen capture of the first frame of the dashcam video; (2) a daytime image of, purportedly, the identical location on the street, using a "Google Maps Measure Distance Tool"; and (3) a satellite, street-view image. Defendant asks us to take judicial notice of the geographical facts and distances depicted in the images, and contends that Deputy Mosley underestimated his distance from Defendant's vehicle by at least approximately 150 yards. Judicial notice is reserved for facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute. Rule 11-201(B)(2) NMRA.
{6} Defendant's argument asks us to reweigh the evidence and discredit the officer's testimony with documentary evidence. It is for the fact-finder, however, to resolve any conflict in the evidence and to determine where the weight and credibility lie. State v. Salas, 1999-NMCA-099, ¶ 13, 127 N.M. 686, 986 P.2d 482. In addition, this Court will not form a superior assessment of the circumstances than the district court based on the images printed in Defendant's brief, either in fact or by law. In point of fact, there isno indication these images and Defendant's calculation were presented to the district court for its assessment. Additionally, the fuzzy screen shot Defendant printed bears little resemblance to the dashcam video or circumstances seen and experienced in real time, where vehicles move and their distance narrows. Thus, we decline to take judicial notice of the facts the images purport to demonstrate. Further, we will not independently reweigh the documentary and testimonial evidence on appeal. See State v. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 14, 410 P.3d 186. Where both a dashcam video and officer testimony are presented, as it was here and in Martinez, the Supreme Court instructs that we must avoid evaluating documentary evidence in isolation and review the totality of the circumstances, deferring to findings supported by the evidence, including the testimony, and indulging in all reasonable presumptions in support of the district court's ruling. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.
{7} The district court in the current case found that Deputy Mosley observed Defendant failing to use his turn signal and failing to come to a complete stop. This finding is supported by the officer's testimony. And whether Defendant properly stopped at the intersection is, like in Martinez, neither conclusively established nor "squarely contradict[ed]" by the documentary evidence. See id. ¶ 17 (). In addition, as the State points out, the dashcam video appears to show the lights on Defendant's vehicle remained constant throughout the turn, indicating Defendant's turn signal was not engaged. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling, we hold the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's determination that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant for violating the traffic laws. See id. ¶ 18.
{8} After asking for and receiving Defendant's driver's license and proof of insurance, Deputy Mosely told Defendant that he could smell a faint odor of alcohol coming out of the vehicle and inquired if Defendant or his passenger had been drinking alcohol. Defendant responded that he had not been drinking alcohol. Deputy Mosely waked back to his patrol vehicle to run Defendant's license. While doing so, Deputy Mosely learned that Defendant had "some violent felony charges on his record." Deputy Mosely walked back to Defendant's vehicle where he and Defendant briefly discussed the turning signals on Defendant's vehicle. Deputy Mosely then asked Defendant for his driver's license and to speak with him outside of the vehicle. As Defendant opened his door to step out of his vehicle, Deputy Mosely asked Defendant if he had any weapons to which Defendant responded "No." Deputy Mosely then asked Defendant if he was sure he hadn't been drinking because as they were talking he could smell an odor of alcohol coming from Defendant's breath.
{9} The district court ruled that Deputy Mosley had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop into a DWI investigation based on the "faint smell of alcoholwhen Deputy Mosley first encountered Defendant" and the distinct smell of alcohol on Defendant's breath when Defendant turned directly toward Deputy Mosley as he was returning Defendant's documents. This evidence is not disputed and was sufficient to provide Deputy Mosley with a reasonable basis for expanding the stop in order to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion that Defendant had been driving while intoxicated. See State v. Walters, 1997-NMCA-013, ¶¶ 6, 26, 123 N.M. 88, 934 P.2d 282 ().
{10} Defendant next contends that Deputy Mosley lacked a sufficient basis to ask him if he was in possession of weapons and to frisk him because Deputy Mosley did not point to any specific, particularized facts that he was armed and dangerous. Defendant emphasizes that Deputy Mosley's testimony and the dashcam video show that he gave the deputy no reasonable basis to be concerned for his safety.
{11} The standard for determining whether an individual poses a threat to an officer is an objective one and is based on the totality of the circumstances, not just a defendant's demeanor. State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 25, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861 (); State v. Gutierrez, 2008-NMCA-015, ¶ 14, 143 N.M. 522, 177 P.3d 1096 (explaining that the determination of whether there was reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was armed and dangerous is "an objective standard that takes into account the totality of the circumstances and all information available to the officer" at that moment (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The inquiry asks State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 23, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19 (). On appeal, we assess...
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