State v. Schlemme, 64668

• Decision Date: 18 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 64668,64668
• Citation: 301 N.W.2d 721
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Duane George SCHLEMME, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 721

301 N.W.2d 721

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Duane George SCHLEMME, Appellant.

No. 64668.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 18, 1981.

Thomas F. Peckosh, Maquoketa, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Ms. Merle Wilna Fleming, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael Kane, Jackson County Atty., for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, McGIVERIN, LARSON, and SCHULTZ, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

Defendant, Duane George Schlemme, appeals from his conviction of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (OMVUI) in violation of section 321.281, The Code 1979. Defendant had been arrested by a state trooper and then processed under the implied consent provisions of chapter 321B, The Code, by a second trooper. The sole issue presented is whether the failure of the second trooper to rearrest defendant caused the results of a blood test taken pursuant to those provisions to be inadmissible evidence. We hold that the evidence was admissible and affirm the trial court.

A state trooper stationed in Dubuque County while on a routine patrol met a pickup truck that appeared to be speeding. After turning around, the trooper followed the pickup and clocked it at seventy-five miles per hour. He stopped the pickup in rural Jackson County and determined that the driver, defendant Schlemme, had been consuming alcoholic beverages. He then gave defendant a breathalyzer test and arrested him for OMVUI. The trooper then radioed a second trooper, who was working in Jackson County, and asked the trooper to process the defendant. The second trooper responded to this request and took custody of the defendant at Zwingle. After transporting defendant to Maquoketa, the second trooper requested defendant to submit to a blood test under the implied consent provisions contained in chapter 321B, The Code. The second trooper did not rearrest defendant.

Defendant consented to the blood test, was charged by trial information with OMVUI, and pleaded not guilty. At trial defendant objected to the introduction of the results of the blood test, alleging that a proper foundation had not been laid. Defendant asserted that section 321B.3 requires that the defendant be arrested by the same officer who requests the blood test. Despite his objection, testimony was taken and exhibits were received concerning the procedures and the results of the blood test. Before sentencing, defendant moved for a new trial, stating that the results of the blood test were prejudicial and should not have been admitted into evidence. This motion was overruled.

Determination of the issue involved in this appeal centers on the interpretation to be accorded the portion of section 321B.3 which provides:

The withdrawal of ... body substances, and the test or tests thereof, shall be administered at the written request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and only after the peace officer has placed such person under arrest for the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.

(emphasis added). No issue has been presented concerning whether or not reasonable grounds existed for the arrest or concerning the validity of any other procedures.

Defendant does not question the qualifications of either state trooper to request the test. Further, he does not question our holding in Schmoldt v. Stokes, 275 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Iowa 1979), that an original arresting officer need not make the request for the test; a subsequent qualified officer may make a valid request after rearresting the individual. However, in Schmoldt we expressly left open the question "whether the second officer may, in demanding a test, rely on the arrest by the original officer." Id. We now must make this determination.

The State has the burden of proof to supply foundational facts for the admission of results of tests conducted pursuant to chapter 321B. Defendant argues that the statute requires that a test must be requested by an arresting officer, and that the second trooper's failure to arrest defendant rendered the State incapable of establishing a foundational fact necessary for admission of the test results.

The State claims that the statute is ambiguous and reasonable minds could differ as to its interpretation. It insists that a reasonable interpretation of the statute would allow a second qualified peace officer to demand a test without rearresting the defendant. The State therefore maintains the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the results of the blood test taken from the defendant.

Statutory construction is properly invoked when a statute contains such ambiguities or obscurities that reasonable minds may disagree or be uncertain as to their meaning. Janson v. Fulton, 162 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Iowa 1968). Even though statutory words have an ordinary and commonly understood meaning, if adherence to the strict letter of the law will lead to injustice, absurdity, or contradictory provisions, we will look for another meaning. See City of Fort Dodge v. Iowa Public Employment Relations Board, 275 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Iowa 1979). Our ultimate goal in interpreting statutes is to determine legislative intent. In this endeavor we are aided by certain principles of statutory construction. We may consider the language used in the statute, the objects sought to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, and place a reasonable construction on the statute which will best effectuate its purpose rather than one which will defeat it. Crow v. Shaeffer, 199 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1972). We must examine both the language used and the purpose for which the legislation was enacted and consider all parts together without giving undue importance to one single or isolated portion. Wilson v. Iowa City, 165 N.W.2d 813, 822 (Iowa 1969).

In applying these principles it is initially necessary to determine the general purpose of chapter 321B. The legislature, in enacting the provision, stated "that the provisions of this chapter are necessary in order to control alcoholic beverages and aid the enforcement of laws prohibiting operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage." § 321B.1, The Code. We have frequently stated that the general purpose of the implied consent law is "to reduce the holocaust on our highways part of which is due to the driver who imbibes too freely of intoxicating liquor." State v. Hitchens, 294 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Iowa 1980); Krueger v. Fulton, 169 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Iowa 1969); Severson v. Sueppel, 260 Iowa 1169, 1174, 152 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967).

Specific procedural requirements are contained in sections 321B.3 and 321B.4. Among these requirements are: that arrest be made by a qualified peace officer; that the peace officer must have reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person was driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage; that a written request be made by the peace...