State v. Schraps
| Citation | 106 N.W. 106,97 Minn. 62 |
| Decision Date | 05 January 1906 |
| Docket Number | 14,651 - (220) |
| Parties | STATE v. CHARLES R. SCHRAPS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the municipal court of Minneapolis, Waite, J., whereby he was convicted of the offense of selling spirituous liquor without a license. Reversed.
Act Unconstitutional.
Chapter 101, p. 107, Laws 1901, "An act limiting the number of licenses to be issued for the sale of malt or spirituous liquors in places bordering on the patrol limits in all cities of the state of Minnesota, now or hereafter having over fifty thousand inhabitants," is unconstitutional being in violation of Const. art. 4, § 36 (Laws 1899, p vi), in that it does not apply equally to all the cities of the class.
A. B. Jackson, for appellant.
We contend (1) that the act of 1901 is "special and local" and not "general," because it attempts to legislate for a limited number of cities, in reality for but one, viz., such cities of fifty thousand as have also a "patrol limit," and we think such fictitious "classification" is arbitrary and not germane to the subject of legislation. It may be added that the term "patrol limit" is indefinite and uncertain. Local custom may give it a meaning in one community which it might not have in another, and as it has no general signification the classification based on this term, as a factor, cannot ensure uniformity of operation on all members of any known class.
(2) That because the act is special and local in its necessary operation and effect, it is prohibited by the several clauses of Const. (Minn.) art. 4, § 33.
(3) That even if the act could be construed as general and not special or local, under the approved canons of construction and of permissible classification -- which does not seem possible -- it must still be held inapplicable to the city of Minneapolis, because such application would over-ride, amend, revise and modify important provisions in the charter, which have never been repealed, and as to which no repeal by implication can be presumed.
In considering the decisions of our state it is, however, of prime necessity to bear in mind the historical sequence of the several constitutional amendments. Between the amendment of 1882 and that of November, 1892, the prohibition of "special or private laws" applied only to the eleven specified topics, and special legislation as to cities and other municipal corporations was expressly allowed. Section 34 of the 1882 amendment required the uniform operation "throughout the state," of all general laws on any of the eleven topics as to which "special or private" legislation was prohibited by section 33.
The amendment of 1892 extended the prohibition of special legislation to the affairs of counties, cities, villages, townships, ward or school districts, expressly forbade the passage of "local or special laws" creating offices in such municipal divisions, prescribing the powers and duties of officers of the same, or fixing their compensation or mode of election or appointment; forbade the granting, amending, revising, extending or explaining of any corporate charters; and made the following significant change in the last clause of section 33, viz.: (1882 amendment) "But the legislature may repeal any existing special law relating to the foregoing subdivisions." (1892 amendment) "The legislature may repeal any existing 'special or local' law, but shall not amend, extend or modify any of the same." The application of section 34 requiring "uniformity of operation" became thus enlarged and extended to laws on all the new topics as to which "local or special" laws were now prohibited.
Next came the Home Rule Charter amendments of November 1896 and 1898, only important here because of the clause which permits the legislature "to provide general laws relating to affairs of cities, the application of which may be limited to cities of" either of four classes on a basis of arbitrary classification by population alone, (1) over fifty thousand, (2) from twenty thousand to fifty thousand, (3) from ten thousand to twenty thousand, (4) of ten thousand or less, with the important stipulation and condition that such general laws "shall apply equally to all cities of either class." We have thus had three distinct constitutional periods since November, 1882:
1. November, 1882, to November, 1892, during which "local," "private" or "special" laws could be passed regulating nearly all the affairs of cities, and of counties, except changing county seats laying out or vacating roads, etc.
2. November, 1892, to November, 1896, during which local or special laws regulating the affairs of cities, counties, and villages, amending charters, etc., were prohibited, but general laws on these subjects "operating uniformly throughout the state", were permitted, and repeals, but not amendments or modifications, of existing special or local laws were permitted.
3. November, 1896, to the present time, during which the prohibition against passing any new local or special laws on any of these subjects, and against the amendment or modification of existing special or local laws has continued, but during which, general laws, based on one of the four prescribed classifications by population, have been permitted, if such general laws "apply equally to all such cities of either class."
We append a list of thirty-three decisions in this state, in their chronological order, comprising all pertinent cases bearing on the constitutional questions raised on this appeal. Eighteen of these turn mainly on the question of permissible or arbitrary classification, and of these, nine hold the classification to be arbitrary and the law special, viz.: Nos. 1, 4, 14, 18, 19, 20, 25, 28 and 29; and nine sustain the classification as reasonable and germane, making the law general, viz.: Nos. 3, 12, 13, 21, 24, 30, 31 and 33.
1. Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264 (1887); 2. State v. Spaude, 37 Minn. 322 (1887); 3. McCormick v. Village of West Duluth, 47 Minn. 272 (1891); 4. State v. Sheriff of Ramsey County, 48 Minn. 236 (1892); 5. State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 548 (1893) (1894); 6. Alexander v. City of Duluth, 57 Minn. 47 (1894); 7. State v. District Court of St. Louis County, 61 Minn. 542 (1895); 8. State v. Sullivan, 62 Minn. 283 (1895); 9. State v. Eagan, 64 Minn. 331 (1896); 10. State v. Copeland, 66 Minn. 315 (1896); 11. Bowe v. City of St. Paul, 70 Minn. 341 (1897); 12. State v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126 (1898); 13. Spencer v. Griffith, 74 Minn. 55 (1898); 14. State v. Ritt, 76 Minn. 531 (1899); 15. Alexander v. City of Duluth, 77 Minn. 445 (1899); 16. State v. Johnson, 77 Minn. 453 (1899); 17. State v. Minor, 79 Minn. 201 (1900); 18. Murray v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Ramsey County, 81 Minn. 359 (1900); 19. Duluth Banking Co. v. Koon, 81 Minn. 486 (1900); 20. State v. Walker, 83 Minn. 295 (1901); 21. State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437 (1902); 22. State v. Johnson, 86 Minn. 121 (1902); 23. State v. Ames, 87 Minn. 23 (1902); 24. State v. Stoffels, 89 Minn. 205 (1903); 25. Hetland v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Norman County, 89 Minn. 492 (1903); 26. Kaiser v. Campbell, 90 Minn. 375 (1903); 27. Le Tourneau v. Hugo, 90 Minn. 420 (1903); 28. State v. Justus, 90 Minn. 474 (1903); 29. Thomas v. City of St. Cloud, 90 Minn. 477 (1903); 30. State v. Ames, 91 Minn. 365 (1904); 31. Stees v. Bergmeier, 91 Minn. 513 (1904); 32. State v. Gunn, 92 Minn. 436 (1904); 33. State v. Rogers, 93 Minn. 55 (1904).
Frank Healy, City Attorney, A. C. Finney, Assistant City Attorney, and John H. Steele, for respondent.
Appellant has no constitutional right to urge the unconstitutionality of this act. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91. No citizen has any individual or property rights in relation to the sale of intoxicating liquors by retail. It is a matter entirely within the police power of the state. And the state may prohibit it entirely, limit it, and control it as it sees fit. Cantini v. Tillman, 54 F. 969; Crowley v. Christensen, supra.
Appellant was charged with unlawfully selling spirituous liquors in the city of Minneapolis without first having obtained a license so to do. At the trial appellant justified the sale by claiming to be duly licensed by the city authorities, and offered in evidence a license authorizing him to sell and dispose of intoxicating liquors at his place of business, Nos. 32 and 34 Sixth Street South. The license was objected to by the state upon the ground that it was void under chapter 101, p. 107, Laws 1901. The objection was sustained, appellant convicted, and the constitutionality of that act is the question for consideration upon this appeal.
An act limiting the number of licenses to be issued for the sale of malt or spirituous liquors in places bordering on the patrol limits in all cities of the state of Minnesota, now or hereafter having over fifty thousand inhabitants.
Section 1. That in the cities of this state, now or hereafter having over fifty thousand inhabitants it shall be unlawful to issue licenses for the sale of malt or spirituous liquors for more than five places on one side of any block within the patrol limit of said city which fronts on said patrol limit, and all licenses issued in excess of said number shall be null and void.
In the case of Alexander v. City of Duluth, 77 Minn. 445 80 N.W. 623, followed in State v. Ames, 87 Minn. 23, 91 N.W. 18, and Le Tourneau v. Hugo, 90 Minn. 420, 97 N.W. 115, it was held that the purpose of the amendment (section 36, art. 4, Const. [Laws 1899, p. vi]) was to enable the legislature to make population a basis of classification, although there might not be any natural relation between the subject-matter of the proposed law and the number of people in the...
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