State v. Scott
| Citation | 619 N.W.2d 371 |
| Decision Date | 16 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-0012.,99-0012. |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Roosevelt SCOTT, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and John P. Messina, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and James J. Katcher, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
Roosevelt Scott was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver as a habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(1)(c)(2) and 902.8 (1997); a tax stamp violation as a habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code sections 453B.1, 453B.12, and 902.8; and keeping a vehicle for using controlled substances, in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.402(1)(e) and 124.401(2)(a). The court of appeals affirmed the possession and drug tax stamp violations but reversed the conviction for keeping a vehicle for possessing or selling controlled substances. Both Scott and the State sought further review, which we granted. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals in part and vacate it in part, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand.
On August 4, 1998, at approximately 11:50 p.m., state trooper David Earl was driving behind Roosevelt Scott's car near Sioux City. He noticed the car's license validation sticker was partially obscured by a license plate frame. When the trooper pulled alongside the car, he noticed the windows were excessively tinted and Scott was not wearing a seat belt. He pulled the car over and informed Scott why he had stopped him. He asked Scott to leave the vehicle and accompany him to the patrol car while having the passenger, Annabell Sustaita, remain in Scott's vehicle. As they walked to the patrol car, the trooper noticed a utility knife in the rear pocket of Scott's pants, which he perceived as a potential "lethal cutting device." The trooper took the knife from Scott's pocket. In doing so, he noticed an object appearing to be a digital scale beside the utility knife in Scott's pocket. He took that out too. The trooper then patted Scott down for weapons. He found no weapons, but he did find large rolls of cash in Scott's front pockets totaling over $6000. The trooper took Scott to the patrol car. There, he removed the scale from its leather pouch, looked at it, and noticed it measured in grams instead of ounces, an indication to him it was used for drug dealing. He also noticed the weighing surface smelled like marijuana, and he found a white powder residue on the scale. The trooper asked Scott what was in Scott's vehicle and whether he would find anything. Scott told him he would not. The trooper then issued a citation for failure to properly display a validation sticker and requested permission to search the car. Scott refused. The trooper went to the passenger side of Scott's vehicle and asked Sustaita to get out. He patted her down, but found no weapons or illegal substances on her. He then proceeded to search the vehicle, finding a large black purse underneath the passenger seat. Sustaita identified it as hers. With Sustaita's permission, the trooper searched the purse and found two plastic bags containing cocaine.
Scott and Sustaita were handcuffed. A Sioux City police officer, who had come with a narcotics dog, rolled up the car's windows in order to contain any narcotics scent for the dog. As the officer was rolling up a window, his knee struck a flashlight between the seats. The mirrored portion of the flashlight fell off, revealing a large quantity of cocaine. In addition to the drugs, $6400 in cash, the utility knife, and the digital scale, the officers also seized a cellular telephone and three boxes of .44 caliber ammunition from the car's trunk.
Scott and Sustaita were charged with two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and two counts of drug tax stamp violations. Scott was also charged with keeping a vehicle for possessing or selling controlled substances. The case against Sustaita was eventually severed for separate trial and is not directly involved on this appeal.
On September 30, 1998, Scott filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the "warrantless search of [Scott's] vehicle by Iowa State trooper David Earl." An evidentiary hearing was held on October 28, 1998, and the district court denied Scott's motion on the basis the search was legal as a search incident to citation, based on State v. Meyer, 543 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Iowa 1996) ().
The matter proceeded to trial. At the close of the State's case and again at the close of all evidence, Scott unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict and judgment of acquittal. The jury found Scott guilty of one count of possessing cocaine with intent to deliver, a failure to affix drug tax stamps and keeping a vehicle for possessing or selling controlled substances. Scott filed a motion in arrest of judgment and a motion for new trial. The new trial motion again raised the search issue, pointing out that since the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, the statute on which Meyer was based was held unconstitutional as applied. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998)
(). The court denied the motion for new trial, and sentence was entered.
The issues raised by the appeal are (1) whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of the acquittal of Sustaita, Scott's passenger, in a separate trial; (2) the legality of the searches; and (3) whether Scott received ineffective assistance of counsel on the charge of keeping a vehicle for possessing or selling controlled substances.
Sustaita was tried separately from Scott and acquitted. The State called her as a witness in Scott's trial. She testified that the drugs in the car, including those in her purse, were apparently put there by Scott because they were not hers. She was then cross-examined by Scott's lawyer, who attempted to cast doubt on her testimony that the drugs were Scott's. The gist of the cross-examination was to show that Sustaita was not being truthful. Apparently in an attempt to bolster Sustaita's credibility, the State conducted this redirect examination of her:
Scott complains that his case boiled down to his word against Sustaita's, and evidence of her acquittal could have impermissibly influenced the jury by informing it that the jury in Sustaita's case had believed her version of the events. The State responds in three ways: (1) Scott failed to preserve error by a proper objection; (2) the admission of the evidence was not error; and (3) even if it were error, it was not prejudicial.
The State contends the defendant's objection, that the outcome of Sustaita's trial was "irrelevant," was insufficient to preserve error; the objection should have been that the testimony was offered "for an impermissible purpose." The State contends the evidence of Sustaita's acquittal was offered only on the issue of her credibility. The relevancy objection, according to the State, was an insufficient objection to a question challenging credibility of a witness.
Generally evidence of another's conviction or acquittal is inadmissible.
Evidence of acquittal of one jointly indicted with accused is not admissible on behalf of accused as tending to establish that he also is innocent. Likewise, it is not competent on the trial of one charged with a crime to show that another, separately charged with the same offense, has been acquitted.
23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 996, at 261 (1989) (footnote omitted); see also State v. Carter, 847 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Mo.Ct.App. 1993)
(); Adams v. State, 531 S.W.2d 626, 627-28 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) ().
If the issue is, as the State argues, one of credibility, it is suggested by one authority that a relevancy objection is not sufficient:
Although evidence inadmissible under [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 404(a) [character evidence] has sometimes been thought of as "irrelevant," that objection would probably lack sufficient specificity in many cases. It would therefore be better to object to the evidence on the ground that it is "improper proof of character," citing Rule 404 or 405 as the case may be.
22 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure § 5269, at 630-31 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
On the other hand, a case specifically addressing the issue raised in this case held that a codefendant's guilt or innocence is "not relevant" on the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence, suggesting a relevancy objection would be sufficient. See State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 410, 844 P.2d 566, 577 (1992)
.
Iowa has adopted a broad view of relevancy, which includes...
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