State v. Scott
| Decision Date | 24 September 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 37248,37248 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jerry Paul SCOTT, Appellant. |
Comfort, Dolack & Hansler, Patrick C. Comfort, Tacoma, for appellant.
John G. McCutcheon, Pros. Atty., James M. Healy, Jr., Deputy, Tacoma, for respondent.
The sole issue on this appeal concerns the sufficiency of the information under which the defendant was charged and convicted of the crime of unlawfully taking an automobile without the owner's permission. In pertinent part, the information read as follows:
'That the said Jerry Paul Scott * * * did * * * wilfully take and drive away that certain 1950 Oldsmobile two-door sedan * * * or that said defendant did voluntarily ride in or upon said automobile with knowledge of the fact that the same was unlawfully taken * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)
The defendant objects to the use of the word 'or' in the charge, contending that the information, which as a matter of fact was phrased substantially in the language of the statute RCW 9.54.020, improperly charged two crimes in the alternative in one count. In other words, it is contended that the charge of taking and driving or riding amounted to a charge of crimes 'a' or 'b.' This contention, however, overlooks the fact that the defendant was not charged with alternative crimes, but with the single crime of taking an automobile without permission, which could be committed either by actually taking the automobile or by riding in it, knowing it to have been unlawfully taken. Using counsel's terms, the defendant was not charged with crime 'a' or crime 'b,' but with doing acts 'a' or 'b,' either of which constituted a crime.
Where, by statute, several acts can constitute a single crime, it is permissible and proper to charge one crime in one count and the commission of the crime by alternative acts. State v. Morse (1951), 38 Wash.2d 927, 234 P.2d 478. This court has consistently permitted informations under the automobile larceny statute to charge the single crime by means for alternative acts. See State v. McCaskey (1959), 55 Wash.2d 329, 347 P.2d 895.
Defendant further contends that the information, as worded, failed to provide him with a concise and understandable statement of the charges against him. But the charge of a single crime by alternative acts was clearly spelled out, and any defense available to the defendant could have been asserted and would have applied as to either act. We do not think any confusion could...
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