State v. Scott

• Decision Date: 10 May 2018
• Docket Number: No. 94020-7,94020-7
• Citation: 416 P.3d 1182,190 Wash.2d 586
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jai’Mar Eli SCOTT, Petitioner.

190 Wash.2d 586

416 P.3d 1182

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Jai’Mar Eli SCOTT, Petitioner.

No. 94020-7

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued September 12, 2017

Filed May 10, 2018

Jeffrey Erwin Ellis, Law Office of Alsept & Ellis, 621 SW Morrison St. Ste. 1025, Portland, OR, 97205-3813, Robert S. Chang, Melissa R. Lee, Seattle University School of Law, 901 12th Ave., Korematsu Center For Law & Equality, Seattle, WA, 98122-4411 for Petitioner.

Ann Marie Summers, King County Prosecutor's Office, Prosecuting Attorney King County, King Coounty Pros./App. Unit Supervisor, W554 King County Courthouse, 516 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA, 98104-2362 for Respondent.

Robert S. Chang, Melissa R. Lee, Seattle University School of Law, 901 12th Ave., Korematsu Center For Law & Equality, Seattle, WA, 98122-4411 for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality.

Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Dorsey Whitney LLP, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 6100, Seattle, WA, 98104-7043, Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, Vanessa Torres Hernandez, ACLU of Washington, 901 5th Ave. Ste. 630, Seattle, WA, 98164-2008 for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Columbia Legal Services, Juvenile Law Center, National Juvenile Defender Center, TeamChild, Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Washington Defender Association.

MADSEN, J.

¶ 1 This case addresses the adequacy of the parole remedy available under ROW 9.94A.730, the Miller¹ "fix" statute. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed. 2d 599 (2016), we hold that RCW 9.94A.730 ’s parole provision is an adequate remedy for a Miller violation, rendering unnecessary the resentencing of a defendant who long ago received a de facto life sentence as a juvenile.

FACTS

¶ 2 Jai’Mar Scott was convicted by a jury in 1990 of first degree premeditated murder for killing his neighbor, a 78-year-old-woman who suffered from Alzheimer’s disease. See State v. Scott, 72 Wash. App. 207, 210, 866 P.2d 1258 (1993), aff’d sub nom. State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388, 894 P.2d 1308 (1995). Scott was 17 years old when he committed the murder. The juvenile court declined jurisdiction, and Scott was tried, convicted, and sentenced as an adult.

¶ 3 At sentencing, the parties agreed that the standard range was 240 to 320 months, with 240 months being the mandatory minimum sentence that could be imposed. The State requested an exceptional sentence above the standard range. The defense requested the low end of the standard range. The trial court sentenced Scott to an exceptional sentence of 900 months based on four independent findings: (1) that Scott’s conduct constituted deliberate cruelty, (2) that his conduct was an abuse of trust, (3) that the crime involved multiple injuries, and (4) that the victim was particularly vulnerable.

¶ 4 On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the 900-month sentence imposed was not clearly excessive because the "aggravating factors are both numerous and individually and collectively egregious." Id. at 222, 866 P.2d 1258. The Court of Appeals also rejected Scott’s assertion that his exceptional sentence was improper in light of his youth at the time of the crime. This court affirmed in Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d at 399, 894 P.2d 1308, which held that the sentencing court had properly relied on "four horrid aggravating factors" in imposing the 900-month sentence.

¶ 5 As Scott served his sentence, the law of juvenile sentencing changed dramatically, and in 2012 the Supreme Court decided Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, which held that a sentence imposed on a juvenile of mandatory life without parole violates the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Following Miller, this court, in State v. O’Dell, 183 Wash.2d 680, 696, 358 P.3d 359 (2015), held that a trial court must be allowed to consider youth as a mitigating factor when imposing a sentence on a person who was barely 18 years old at the time of his crime. Two months later, Division One held, in State v. Ronquillo, 190 Wash. App. 765, 774-77, 361 P.3d 779 (2015), that Miller applied to juveniles receiving aggregate sentences that resulted in the equivalent of life without parole, that is, de facto life sentences.²

¶ 6 In May 2016, Scott filed a motion for relief from judgment requesting a new sentencing hearing. The State asked the superior court to transfer the untimely motion to the Court of Appeals for consideration as a personal restraint petition (PRP) pursuant to CrR 7.8. The court denied the State’s motion and granted Scott’s motion for relief from judgment. The State appealed.

¶ 7 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of a new sentencing hearing, finding, "The constitutional violation identified in the Miller line of cases is the failure to allow a juvenile offender the opportunity for release when his or her crime was the result of youthful traits." State v. Scott, 196 Wash. App. 961, 971, 385 P.3d 783 (2016). The Court of Appeals concluded, "In Montgomery, the Supreme Court expressly approved of statutes that provide the opportunity for parole as remedies for a Miller violation." Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that due to the enactment of "Washington’s Miller fix statute," RCW 9.94A.730,³ "Scott is no longer serving a sentence that is the equivalent of life without parole. As such, Miller is not a significant change in law that is material to his sentence." Id. at 972, 385 P.3d 783. Scott sought review, which this court granted. State v. Scott, 188 Wash.2d 1001, 393 P.3d 362 (2017).

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

¶ 8 Constitutional interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. MacDonald, 183 Wash.2d 1, 8, 346 P.3d 748 (2015). Questions of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. State v. Bunker, 169 Wash.2d 571, 577, 238 P.3d 487 (2010).

¶ 9 A collateral attack on a sentence generally must be brought within one year after the judgment and sentence become final. RCW 10.73.090(1), (2). A collateral attack⁴ filed more than one year after the underlying judgment will not be considered time barred by RCW 10.73.090 when it is based on a retroactively applicable "significant change in the law, whether substantive or procedural, which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order entered." RCW 10.73.100(6). Here, there is no dispute that Miller constituted a retroactively applicable, significant change in the law. See Scott , 196 Wash. App. at 965, 385 P.3d 783. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that RCW 10.73.100(6) did not apply because Miller was not "material" to Scott’s unconstitutional sentence and thus, Scott’s motion for resentencing was time barred. Id. at 972, 385 P.3d 783.

¶ 10 This court has previously explained:

While litigants have a duty to raise available arguments in a timely fashion and may later be procedurally penalized for failing to do so, ... they should not be faulted for having omitted arguments that were essentially unavailable at the time, as occurred here. We hold that where an intervening opinion has effectively overturned a prior appellate decision that was originally determinative of a material issue, the intervening opinion constitutes a "significant change in the law" for purposes of exemption from procedural bars.

In re Pers. Restraint of Greening, 141 Wash.2d 687, 697, 9 P.3d 206 (2000) (footnote omitted). Further, in In re Personal Restraint of Thomas, 180 Wash.2d 951, 953, 330 P.3d 158 (2014), we dismissed a PRP as mixed, but acknowledged, "We recognize that Thomas’s claim premised on Miller may not be time barred; if we agreed with Thomas that the rule in Miller applies retroactively, then that claim satisfies the exception to the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.100(6) and we could reach its merits."

¶ 11 The Supreme Court has recently declared in Montgomery that Miller applies retroactively. Nevertheless, as discussed infra, Montgomery also identifies an adequate remedy for a Miller violation in the form of providing a parole opportunity for juvenile defendants. 136 S.Ct. at 736. Consequently, because an adequate remedy is available to Scott, this court cannot grant him the collateral relief (via a PRP) that he seeks. See RAP 16.4(d) ("The appellate court will only grant relief by a personal restraint petition if other remedies which may be available to petitioner are inadequate under the circumstances."). Accordingly, we hold that the collateral relief Scott seeks (i.e., resentencing) is unavailable because he has an adequate remedy, which is to seek parole under RCW 9.94A.730.

¶ 12 Scott and amici⁵ contend that in light of the Miller violation here, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing and an individualized consideration of youth. We reject the contentions that resentencing is warranted.

¶ 13 In Miller, the Supreme Court observed, "The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment ‘guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.’ " 567 U.S. at 469, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed. 2d 1 (2005) ). Accordingly, justice requires that " ‘punishment for crime should be [appropriately] graduated and proportioned’ to both the offender and the offense." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183 ). In other words, " ‘[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.’ " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed. 2d 825 (2010) ). And that concept is viewed "less through a historical prism than according to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ " Id. at 469-70, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed. 2d 251 (1976) ). The Court in Miller built on its prior ...