State v. Seagle
| Decision Date | 16 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. COA12–1267.,COA12–1267. |
| Citation | 748 S.E.2d 775 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Frank Gene SEAGLE, Defendant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal by defendant from order entered 26 March 2012 by Judge Robert C. Ervin in Lincoln County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 March 2013.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Jill A. Bryan, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Michael E. Casterline, for defendant-appellant.
Frank Gene Seagle (“defendant”), having been convicted of first degree sexual offense with a child and taking indecent liberties with a child, appeals the trial court's pretrial order denying his motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers. After careful review, we affirm.
The State's evidence tended to establish the following facts at trial: Prior to 2008, defendant and April Shuford (“Shuford”) were good friends. When Shuford lost her home in the winter of 2008, she and her two daughters—D.B. (“Dana”) and A.H. (“Amy”) 1—began living with defendant in his mobile home in Lincolnton, North Carolina. Two weeks later, Shuford's fiancé, Jason Bradley (“Bradley”), also moved into defendant's home. The home had two bedrooms—defendant slept in one and Shuford and Bradley shared the other. Dana and her older sister slept on a sleeper sofa in the living room.
One night, while Dana and Amy were asleep in their bed, defendant got into bed next to Dana, reached underneath her underwear, and touched her “private”—meaning her vagina—with two of his fingers. When Dana moved, defendant stopped, got up without saying anything, and went back to his bedroom.
In August 2009, approximately a week before Dana's fifth birthday, Shuford took Dana and Amy to the pediatrician for a “well-child visit,” which included a genital examination. During Dana's genital exam, the doctor found evidence consistent with digital penetration of her vagina. After the exam, Dana told her mother that defendant had touched her “private area” with his hand.
Shuford contacted the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office and Detective Seth Bailey (“Detective Bailey”) began an investigation. Detective Bailey went to defendant's home on 27 August 2009 to take pictures of the living arrangements in the mobile home. Although Detective Bailey did not ask defendant about the alleged sexual abuse at that time, he did ask defendant to come down to the sheriff's office the next day for questioning. Defendant met Detective Bailey at his office on 28 August 2009 and the two men talked for 30 to 40 minutes. During the interview, which was not recorded, defendant denied having any sexual contact with Dana. At the end of the interview, defendant left Detective Bailey's office and went home.
On 13 September 2009, Shuford and Bradley went to defendant's home to pick up some of her belongings. Defendant was at home and asked to speak with Shuford privately. In response to questioning by Shuford, defendant admitted to her that he had touched Dana.
On 16 September 2009, Detective Bailey contacted defendant through his parents and requested that defendant come to the sheriff's office on 17 September 2009 for a polygraph test. Defendant's father drove defendant to the sheriff's office the following day. Detective Bailey escorted defendant to the polygraph room where—along with Detective Hal Kluttz (“Detective Kluttz”)—the two detectives questioned defendant for approximately one hour. During the interview, which was recorded, defendant initially denied inappropriately touching Dana. Eventually, however, defendant told the detectives that he had, in fact, digitally penetrated Dana's vagina. Defendant also provided a written statement in which he admitted to “put[ting] [his] finger inside [Dana's] vagina.” Defendant left the sheriff's office after the interview and was arrested the next day.
Defendant was charged with first degree sexual offense with a child and taking indecent liberties with a child. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to Detectives Bailey and Kluttz, arguing that the statements were obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). After conducting an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order on 26 March 2012 in which the court determined that defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated and that, therefore, the statements were admissible. At trial, over defendant's objections, the trial court admitted into evidence the videotape of defendant's interview with the detectives on 17 September 2009 as well as a copy of defendant's written statement.
The jury found defendant guilty of both charges. The trial court, with respect to the first degree sex offense conviction, sentenced defendant to a presumptive range term of 300 to 369 months imprisonment, with a pretrial confinement credit of 881 days. On the charge of taking indecent liberties with a child, the court sentenced defendant to a consecutive term of 16 to 20 months imprisonment, suspended the sentence, and placed defendant on 60 months supervised probation. The court further ordered defendant to register as a sex offender upon his release. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to Detectives Bailey and Kluttz because, defendant argues, the statement was not voluntary.2 It is well established that, in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the scope of review ordinarily consists of determining whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the court's findings, in turn, support its conclusions of law regarding the admissibility of the challenged evidence. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982).
However, where—as here—the trial court's factual findings are not challenged on appeal, they are binding on the reviewing court, and the only question is whether those findings support the trial court's conclusions of law. State v. Carter, 212 N.C.App. 516, ––––, 711 S.E.2d 515, 520,appeal dismissed and disc. review denied,365 N.C. 351, 718 S.E.2d 147 (2011). The determination of “[w]hether a confession is voluntary is a question of law and is fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 579–80, 422 S.E.2d 730, 738 (1992).
It is fundamental that “[v]oluntary confessions are admissible in evidence against the party making them; involuntary confessions are not.” State v. Livingston, 202 N.C. 809, 810, 164 S.E. 337, 338 (1932). A confession is voluntary “[i]f, looking to the totality of the circumstances, the confession is ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker [.]’ “ State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862 (1973)).
Our Supreme Court has set out several non-exclusive factors to be considered in assessing whether a statement is voluntary: (1) the length of the interrogation; (2) the defendant's age and mental condition; (3) whether the defendant had been deprived of food or sleep; (4) whether the defendant was in custody; (5) whether the defendant was deceived; (6) whether the defendant was held incommunicado; (7) whether threats of violence were made against the defendant; (8) whether promises were made to obtain the confession; (9) whether the defendant's Miranda rights were violated; and (10) the defendant's familiarity with the criminal justice system. State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 458, 573 S.E.2d 870, 880–81 (2002); State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 45, 530 S .E.2d 281, 288 (2000), cert. denied,531 U.S. 1114, 148 L.Ed.2d 775 (2001). Because “voluntariness is determined in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession[,]” the presence or absence of one or more of these factors in isolation is not determinative. State v. Barlow, 330 N.C. 133, 140–41, 409 S .E.2d 906, 911 (1991).
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his statement was voluntary because Detectives Bailey and Kluttz “subverted” defendant's Miranda rights. Yet elsewhere in his brief, defendant admits that the detectives did not “run afoul of Miranda [ ] because they did not conduct a custodial interrogation ....“ As defendant concedes that he was not in custody or deprived of his freedom of movement in any significant way during the 17 September 2009 interview, the detectives were not required to advise defendant of his Miranda rights. See In re W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 247, 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (2009) ().
Defendant next argues that the detectives created a coercive environment during the questioning, pointing to the facts that the room in which he was questioned was “cramped,” the door to the room was closed during the interview, the detectives positioned themselves between him and the door, and Detective Kluttz touched him several times during the course of the questioning. Defendant's reliance on these isolated factors as being determinative of involuntariness, however, ignores the rule that the question of whether a statement is voluntary is determined by considering all of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. State v. Schneider, 306 N.C. 351, 355, 293 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1982).
In addressing the totality of the circumstances, here, the trial court's uncontested findings show that (1) defendant voluntarily came to the sheriff's office; (2) Detectives Bailey and Kluttz were not in uniform and did not display any weapons during the interview; (3) the detectives...
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