State v. Seagraves

• Decision Date: 12 February 1992
• Citation: 837 S.W.2d 615
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. William Therrell SEAGRAVES, Appellant.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 615

837 S.W.2d 615

STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. William Therrell SEAGRAVES, Appellant.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee,

at Jackson.

Feb. 12, 1992.

Permission for Leave to Appeal Denied May 4, 1992.

Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. & Reporter, Joel W. Perry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Robert "Gus" Radford, Dist. Atty. Gen., Huntingdon, John W. Overton, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Savannah, Eleanor Cahill, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Huntingdon, for appellee.

W. Jeffery Fagan, Asst. Public Defender, Camden, for appellant.

OPINION

JONES, Judge.

The appellant, William Therrell Seagraves, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter by a jury of his peers. Since the crime was committed prior to July 1, 1982, the jury sentenced the appellant to serve not more than five (5) years in the Department of Correction.

The appellant has presented three issues for review. He contends that the evidence contained in the record is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support his conviction, ¹ the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground the indictment charged an incorrect statute, ² and the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal following the State's case-in-chief. ³ These issues are devoid of merit.

The record reflects that the appellant was tried for the offense of second degree murder. As previously stated, the jury convicted the appellant of involuntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense. The record reflects that the statute of limitations had expired before the prosecution for this offense was commenced. Consequently, the determinative question is whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction of this offense. Since this issue was not raised by the parties, it is appropriate for this Court to determine whether it may consider the issue sua sponte. If this question is answered in the affirmative, this Court must further determine whether the appellant's failure to raise this issue prior to trial, include the issue in his motion for a new trial, or present this issue for review in this Court constituted a waiver of the issue.

I.

While appellate review is generally limited to the issues presented for review, the appellate courts of this State are empowered to consider issues which have not been presented for review. Tenn.R.App.P. 13(b); Tenn.R.Crim.P. 52(b). See State v. Goins, 705 S.W.2d 648 (Tenn.1986); State v. Maynard, 629 S.W.2d 911 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981); State v. Harless, 607 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn.Crim.App.1980). ⁴

Rule 13(b), Tenn.R.App.P., mandates that appellate courts determine whether the trial court and the appellate court have subject-matter jurisdiction of the matter in controversy. The rule states in part: "The appellate court shall also consider whether the trial and appellate court have jurisdiction over the subject matter, whether or not presented for review...." In Scales v. Winston, 760 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Tenn.App.1988), the Court of Appeals observed: "It is the duty of any court to determine the question of its jurisdiction on its own motion if the issue is not raised by either of the parties, inasmuch as any judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity. Ward v. Lovell, 21 Tenn.App. 560, 113 S.W.2d 759 (1937)." In County of Shelby v. City of Memphis, 211 Tenn. 410, 411, 365 S.W.2d 291, 292 (1963), our Supreme Court sua sponte reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the appeal because the Court found that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction.

Rule 13(b), Tenn.R.App.P., also provides that an appellate court "may in its discretion consider other issues in order, among other reasons: (1) to prevent needless litigation, (2) to prevent injury to the interests of the public, and (3) to prevent prejudice to the judicial process." In addition, Rule 52(b), Tenn.R.Crim.P., provides that this Court may notice plain error "at any time, even though not raised in the motion for a new trial or assigned as error on appeal ... where necessary to do substantial justice." See State v. Ogle, 666 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn.1984); Veach v. State, 491 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn.1973); Herron v. State, 3 Tenn.Crim.App. 39, 456 S.W.2d 873 (1970).

In summary, this Court is required by law to determine whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction of the offense in question. The word "shall", when used in a statute or rule, is the equivalent of the word "must." Home Telegraph Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Nashville, 118 Tenn. 1, 14, 101 S.W. 770, 773 (1907). Furthermore, the issue in question is plain error on the face of the record; and the resolution of this issue is necessary to do substantial justice. Finally, this is the type of issue an appellate court should consider in the exercise of its discretion.

II.

The failure to raise a defense, objection or request prior to trial may result in the waiver of an issue. Tenn.R.Crim.P. 12(e). However, there are exceptions to this harsh rule. The question of whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction may be noticed at any time during the pendency of the proceedings. Tenn.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2). See Scales v. Winston, 760 S.W.2d at 953 ("[t]he issue of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised in any court at anytime"). In State v. Stillwell, 175 N.J.Super. 244, 418 A.2d 267, 271 (1980), and People v. Zamora, 18 Cal.3d 538, 547, 134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75 (1976), it was specifically held that this issue "is not waived by the failure to raise it at the pleading stage." Moreover, in Veach v. State, 491 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tenn.1973), our Supreme Court said "a constitutional question may be raised at any time." A conviction for a time barred crime clearly violates the constitutional rights of an accused.

This Court concludes that the failure of the appellant to raise this issue prior to trial did not constitute a waiver of the issue. ⁵

III.

The failure to include an issue in the motion for a new trial may result in the waiver of the issue. Tenn.R.App.P. 3(e) provides in part: "[I]n all cases tried by a jury, no issue presented for review shall be predicated upon error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, jury instructions granted or refused, misconduct of jurors, parties or counsel, or other action committed or occurring during the trial of the case, or other ground upon which a new trial is sought, unless the same was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise such issues will be treated as waived." (Emphasis added). As the rule states, the only issues waived are those which will result in the granting of a new trial. Accordingly, this Court has held that the failure to include an issue which will result in the dismissal of a conviction in the motion for a new trial does not result in the waiver of the issue. See State v. Dodson, 780 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tenn.Crim.App.1989) (sufficiency of the evidence); State v. Davis, 748 S.W.2d 206, 207 (Tenn.Crim.App.1987) (sufficiency of indictment and sufficiency of evidence); State v. Durham, 614 S.W.2d 815, 816 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981) (sufficiency of the evidence). A favorable resolution of this issue will result in the dismissal of the prosecution against the appellant.

This Court is of the opinion that the issue in controversy was not waived by the failure of the appellant to include the issue in his motion for a new trial.

IV.

While confined to the Henderson County Jail, the appellant told law enforcement officers that he wanted to confess to a crime that had been "bothering him for a long time." The appellant told the officers that he had suffocated his infant son, William Therrell Seagraves, Jr., on the 10th day of November, 1968. The appellant subsequently denied that he killed his infant son.

On November 7, 1988, an arrest warrant was issued for the appellant by the General Sessions Court of Carroll County. The warrant charged the appellant with the offense of murder in the second degree. The ground for the issuance of the warrant was the appellant's admission that he had killed his infant son in 1968. The Carroll County Grand Jury subsequently indicted the appellant for the offense of murder in the second degree.

When the appellant is alleged to have committed the offense in question, there was a two (2) year statute of limitations for prosecuting the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The applicable statute, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-202 (1975), later codified as Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2-101(b) (1982), provided in part:

Prosecutions for any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary when the punishment is expressly limited to five (5) years or less, shall be commenced within two (2) years next after the commission of the offense....

The punishment for involuntary manslaughter was "confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than five (5) years." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2411 (1975), later codified as Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-223 (1982). In addition, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2703 (1975), later codified as Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-20-103 (1982), provided:

Whenever the minimum punishment is imprisonment in the penitentiary for one (1) year, but in the opinion of the jury the offense merits a lesser punishment, the jury may punish by confinement in the county jail or workhouse for any period less than twelve (12) months except as otherwise provided.

As can be seen, the statute of limitations applicable to the offense of involuntary manslaughter expired approximately eighteen (18) years prior to the commencement of the prosecution against the appellant. Moreover, the State did not allege or make an effort to establish that the statute of limitations had been tolled based upon the appellant's conduct following the commission of the alleged offense. See State v. Davidson, 816 S.W.2d 316 (Tenn.1991); State v. Tidwell, 775 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn.Crim.App.1989).

V.

It is an elementary principle of law that...