State v. Sedler

• Citation: 401 Mont. 437,473 P.3d 406,2020 MT 248
• Decision Date: 02 October 2020
• Docket Number: DA 18-0476
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Jesse David SEDLER, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

401 Mont. 437

473 P.3d 406

2020 MT 248

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Jesse David SEDLER, Defendant and Appellant.

DA 18-0476

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: August 5, 2020

Decided: October 2, 2020

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Madison L. Mattioli, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Marcia Boris, Lincoln County Attorney, Libby, Montana

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Defendant and Appellant Jesse David Sedler (Sedler) appeals from the Judgment and Sentence entered on June 22, 2018, by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, and challenges the constitutionality of the petition process set forth in § 46-23-506(2)(a) and (3)(a), MCA, for an offender to be relieved of the requirement to register as a violent offender.

¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

Whether the petition requirement set forth in § 46-23-506(3)(a), MCA, applicable to violent offenders required to register for a ten-year period, unfairly extends the maximum time a violent offender must be on the registry such that it violates substantive due process rights and is facially unconstitutional.

¶3 We reverse and remand to the district court to vacate Sedler's conviction and dismiss the failure to register charge against him with prejudice.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 In September 2002, Sedler was convicted of assault with a weapon for allegedly hitting his neighbor with a stick. Due to his mental health problems, he was sentenced to ten years in Department of Health and Human Services (DPHHS) custody. In February 2004, Sedler's DPHHS sentence was amended to a suspended sentence, and he was released. Prior to release, Sedler registered as a violent offender. He then remained offense free and maintained his registration on the violent offender registry (VOR) until 2015. In November 2016—fourteen years after his original conviction—Sedler's neighbor, a deputy sheriff, reported Sedler to be non-compliant with the VOR. In March 2017, Sedler was charged with failure to register as a violent offender under § 46-23-504 and -507, MCA. The charges were refiled in June 2017 after the prosecutor agreed they should be severed from two pending charges related to a separate incident. Sedler signed a plea agreement on April 6, 2018. On that same day, he filed a petition with the District Court to relieve him of the duty to register. The State responded that it had no legal basis on which to oppose the petition. The court granted the petition on April 11, 2018. On April 17, 2018, Sedler reluctantly entered an Alford plea to the failing to register as a violent offender charge, asserting that a jury could find him guilty of the offense due to "a technical bias against me that we can't overcome with the way things are going." On June 18, 2018, sixteen years after his initial conviction and nearly two years after his neighbor reported him non-compliant with the VOR, Sedler was sentenced to a five-year commitment to the Department of Corrections, all suspended, for the failure to register offense. The severed charges were dismissed with prejudice. On August 13, 2018, Sedler filed a pro se appeal. This Court appointed Sedler counsel. Sedler challenges the constitutionality of being sentenced for a failure to register offense, asserting the petitioning process applicable to all § 46-23-506(2)(a), MCA, offenders—those required to register for ten years—is facially invalid, violates substantive due process rights, and is unconstitutional.¹

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 With respect to questions of constitutional law, this Court's review is plenary, and we examine the district court's interpretation of the law for correctness. See State v. Egdorf , 2003 MT 264, ¶ 12, 317 Mont. 436, 77 P.3d 517 ; State v. Bedwell , 1999 MT 206, ¶ 4, 295 Mont. 476, 985 P.2d 150 ; In re S.L.M. , 287 Mont. 23, 32, 951 P.2d 1365, 1370 (1997). "In reviewing constitutional challenges to legislative enactments, the constitutionality of a legislative enactment is prima facie presumed, and every intendment in its favor will be made unless its unconstitutionality appears beyond a reasonable doubt." Egdorf , ¶ 12 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt and, if any doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of the statute. Egdorf , ¶ 12 ; State v. Price , 2002 MT 229, ¶¶ 27-28, 311 Mont. 439, 57 P.3d 42.

DISCUSSION

¶6 Whether the petition requirement set forth in § 46-23-506(3)(a), MCA, applicable to violent offenders required to register for a ten-year period, unfairly extends the maximum time a violent offender must be on the registry such that it violates substantive due process rights and is facially unconstitutional.

¶7 Section 46-23-506, MCA, prescribes the period of time a violent offender must register. Under this statute, a violent offender is required to register either for a period of ten years or for life—depending on whether the offender has been convicted of a registration violation or a felony during the ten-year period post-release from confinement or, if no confinement, from sentencing. If the offender has not been convicted of a registration violation or felony during this ten-year period, the offender is required to register for ten years, after which she or he may petition to be relieved of the requirement. See § 46-23-506(2)(a), MCA. If an offender is convicted of a registration violation or felony during this ten-year period, the offender is required to register for life, but may petition to be relieved of the requirement. See § 46-23-506(2)(b), MCA. The petition process associated with offenders required to register for ten years is ministerial and vastly different than the judicial determination requiring discretionary considerations that applies to offenders required to register for life. See § 46-23-506(3), MCA.

¶8 Here, Sedler was charged with failing to register as a violent offender two years after the maximum time he was required to be on the VOR pursuant to § 46-23-506(2)(a), MCA, (1997).² Sedler asserts the petitioning process to be relieved of the requirement to register as a violent offender for an offender with a ten-year registration requirement as provided for in § 46-23-506(2)(a) and (3)(a), MCA (2005)— added to the statute in 2005 and applied to him in this case—is arbitrary and capricious, facially invalid, violates substantive due process rights, and is thus unconstitutional. Although Sedler could have been clearer in his briefing, it appears he is asserting a facial challenge to the statutory petition process set forth in § 46-23-506(3)(a), MCA, which requires an offender required to register for ten years post-release from confinement or, if no confinement, post-sentencing, to file a petition to be relieved of the requirement to register.³ Sedler asserts we should undertake plain error review as the petition process contained in § 46-23-506(2)(a) and (3)(a), MCA, is facially invalid or void and failing to review it will result in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Sedler asserts the legislative history of § 46-23-506, MCA, explains how the process to be removed from the requirement to register as a violent offender has turned into an arbitrary and capricious requirement. Further, Sedler asserts the petition process violates substantive due process as it is not reasonably related to the goal of the VOR nor does it promote community safety.

¶9 The State asserts that as Sedler pleaded guilty and received the benefit of a plea bargain, he waived his right to appeal and that Sedler has failed to meet his burden of establishing that failure to exercise plain error review would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the fundamental fairness of the trial process, or compromise the integrity of the judicial proceedings. The State further asserts that even if this Court undertakes plain error review, Sedler has failed to establish the petition process is unconstitutional as it is reasonably related to the "goal of promoting public safety by providing the public with accurate information about offenders who pose a greater risk to the public."

¶10 Generally, an appellate court does not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Akers , 2017 MT 311, ¶ 10, 389 Mont. 531, 408 P.3d 142 ; State v. Favel , 2015 MT 336, ¶ 13, 381 Mont. 472, 362 P.3d 1126. Plain error review is an exception to this general rule where we may consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Akers , ¶ 10 ; Favel , ¶ 13. Courts invoke plain error review to correct error not objected to at the lower court level but that affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. Akers , ¶ 10 ; State v. Finley , 276 Mont. 126, 134, 915 P.2d 208, 213 (1996). To reverse a decision for plain error, the appellant must: (1) demonstrate that the claimed error implicates a fundamental right; and (2) firmly convince this Court that a failure to review the claimed error would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process. Akers , ¶ 10 ; Favel , ¶ 23.

¶11 As noted by Sedler, we have exercised plain error review where illegal plea provisions are at issue, such that participation in plea negotiations and failing to object to the conviction itself does not necessarily foreclose review of illegal provisions of the sentence or conviction. See State v. Langley , No. DA 17-0730, Order (Mont. Nov. 12, 2019); State v Hansen , 2017 MT 280, 389 Mont. 299, 405 P.3d 625. "A defendant's facial constitutional challenge is based on the defendant's allegation that the statute upon which his sentence was based is unconstitutional—i.e. his sentence is...