State v. Seenes

• Decision Date: 11 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 30409.,30409.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Richard A. SEENES, Defendant Below, Appellant.

572 S.E.2d 876

212 W.Va. 353

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Richard A. SEENES, Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 30409.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted September 4, 2002.

Decided October 11, 2002.

Heather Ireland Molessa, Law Office of Heather Ireland Molessa, West Union, West Virginia, Attorney for Appellant.

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Heather D. Foster, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Richard A. Seenes, appellant/defendant below (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Seenes"), entered a conditional plea of guilty to four counts of breaking and entering in the Circuit Court of Doddridge County, West Virginia. Under his conditional plea, he reserved the right to appeal the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss the charges against him under Articles III(a) and V(c) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, W. Va.Code § 62-14-1 (2000).¹ After reviewing the briefs, the pertinent authorities, and hearing oral argument, we reverse the circuit court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Seenes was indicted on February 14, 2000, by the Doddridge County Grand Jury for five felony counts of breaking and entering in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-3-12 (2000), and one misdemeanor count of destruction of personal property in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-3-30 (2000). The specific conduct for which Mr. Seenes was indicted involved his breaking into several storage units by destroying a number of locks and/or hasps, and absconding with a number of goods from these storage sheds collectively valued in excess of $7,000.00.

Shortly thereafter, however, criminal proceedings against Mr. Seenes in the State of Ohio resulted in him being convicted and sentenced to four years and six months of imprisonment in that state. Consequently, Mr. Seenes was incarcerated in the Belmont Correctional Institution (hereinafter referred to as "BCI") in St. Clairsville, Ohio. Thereafter, on May 2, 2000, the Doddridge County Prosecuting Attorney apparently filed a detainer with BCI against Mr. Seenes. BCI's warden then advised Mr. Seenes in writing of the pending West Virginia indictment.

Mr. Seenes subsequently caused to be delivered to the Doddridge County Circuit Court and the Doddridge County Prosecuting Attorney his request for a final disposition of the indictment. Both the State and Mr. Seenes agree that the Doddridge County Prosecuting Attorney received Mr. Seenes' request for disposition on June 6, 2000.

On October 5, 2000, the circuit court directed that Mr. Seenes be taken into the custody of the West Virginia authorities. The court then arraigned Mr. Seenes on October 11, 2000. During the course of the arraignment proceedings, the circuit court noted that Mr. Seenes was serving a prison sentence in Ohio, and also appointed counsel for him. With appointed counsel present at the arraignment, Mr. Seenes pled not guilty to all counts in the indictment. The State then informed the circuit court that it desired a trial. In reply, the circuit court advised that jury selection would commence on January 2, 2001, thus indicating that the trial would likely be held sometime in January. A pre-trial conference was set for December 29. Also during the arraignment, the prosecuting attorney indicated that Mr. Seenes was ineligible for bail as he was "incarcerated in the penitentiary in Ohio." For this reason, the circuit court refused bail specifically citing the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter referred to as "the IAD"). Furthermore, when the prosecuting attorney indicated to the court that he believed a plea agreement would be reached, the court set the anticipated plea hearing for October 31, 2000.² Sometime after arraignment, though, the circuit court was informed that plea negotiations had been terminated and that the October 31 hearing date would not be needed.³

On December 7, 2000, Mr. Seenes filed a motion to dismiss the indictment claiming that the failure to try him by December 3 (180 days after the prosecuting attorney received Mr. Seenes' request for final disposition on June 6) violated the IAD and mandated dismissal of the indictment with prejudice. The circuit court heard argument on the motion on December 29, 2001, which was the date originally set for the pre-trial conference. At the hearing on the motion, the circuit court reserved ruling until it could review the arraignment transcript. The court then denied the motion from the bench on January 8, 2001. The circuit court ruled that Mr. Seenes' did not object to the trial date and that the setting of the plea hearing tolled the IAD's time frame. Subsequently, on that same day, Mr. Seenes entered a conditional plea of guilty to the first four counts of the indictment (four counts of breaking and entering), and was sentenced to one to ten year terms on each count.⁴ The conditional guilty plea specifically reserved his right to seek appellate review of the denial of his motion to dismiss. It is from this order that Mr. Seenes now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case involves the IAD, a statute we have previously addressed on several occasions. See State v. Gamble, 211 W.Va. 125, 128, 563 S.E.2d 790, 793 (2001)

("We have been asked to interpret the state's obligations under the IAD on several occasions[.]"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1935, 152 L.Ed.2d 840 (2002). The IAD is statutory law. We have long recognized that, "[i]nterpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review." Syl. pt. 1, Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep't, 195 W.Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995). Thus, we will apply a de novo standard of review to the issues herein presented. Accord State v. Somerlot, 209 W.Va. 125, 128, 544 S.E.2d 52, 55 (2000). We are also cognizant that the IAD is an interstate compact, State ex rel. Maynard v. Bronson, 167 W.Va. 35, 38, 277 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1981), to which West Virginia is "`a party by statutory enactment.'" Somerlot, 209 W.Va. at 128,

544 S.E.2d at 55 (quoting State ex rel. Modie v. Hill, 191 W.Va. 100, 102, 443 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1994)).⁵ Furthermore, as federal law, the IAD is subject to "`federal construction.'" Id.

544 S.E.2d at 55 (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 3403, 87 L.Ed.2d 516, 520 (1985)).

III. DISCUSSION

Article III(a) of the IAD provides, in pertinent part:

Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment... on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment ...: Provided, That for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.

In addition, Article V(c) of the IAD provides, in pertinent part:

[I]n the event that an action on the indictment... on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III... hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment ... has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.

It is also worth noting that, under its own terms, the IAD is to be given a liberal construction to effect its purposes. Art. IX ("This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.").

Mr. Seenes contends that the 180-day provision of Article III of the IAD was triggered on June 6, 2000, when he caused to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney his written notice for final disposition of charges.⁶ Consequently, Mr. Seenes argues, he should have been brought to trial prior to the conclusion of the 180-day period on December 3, 2000. Because he was not tried within that time frame, Mr. Seenes asserts that he is entitled to dismissal of the indictment. He also contends that his counsel was under no obligation to object to the trial date as it is the State's responsibility to ensure compliance with the 180-day rule. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that Mr. Seenes' lawyer was responsible for ensuring compliance with the rule, his lawyer's failure to object in this case should not constitute a waiver as Mr. Seenes' lawyer was appointed during the course of his arraignment and, therefore, had not had an opportunity to meet with Mr. Seenes and to acquire information regarding the 180-day time frame.

The State responds that the failure of Mr. Seenes' counsel to object at the October 11 hearing constitutes a waiver of his rights under Articles III(a) and V(c) of the IAD. The State further argues that even assuming Mr. Seenes' counsel was unaware of the IAD prior to the arraignment proceedings on October 11, the discussions between the circuit court, Mr. Seenes, his counsel, and the State on that date should have alerted Mr. Seenes' counsel that the IAD was implicated in this case. Consequently, he should not be able to benefit from remaining silent on the trial schedule.

As Mr. Seenes correctly states, Article III(a)'s 180-day time frame commenced when his request for final disposition was actually delivered to the circuit court and the prosecuting attorney. Syl. pt. 2, State v. Somerlot, 209 W.Va. 125, 544 S.E.2d 52 (2000). See also Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1091, 122 L.Ed.2d 406, 416 (1993)

("We hold that the 180-day...