State v. Sessions

• Decision Date: 06 May 1911
• Docket Number: 17,564,17,570
• Citation: 115 P. 641,84 Kan. 856
• Parties: THE STATE OF KANSAS, ex rel. John S. Dawson, as Attorney-general, etc., Plaintiff, v. CHARLES H. SESSIONS, as Secretary of State, etc., Defendant
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

115 P. 641

84 Kan. 856

THE STATE OF KANSAS, ex rel. John S. Dawson, as Attorney-general, etc., Plaintiff, v. CHARLES H. SESSIONS, as Secretary of State, etc., Defendant

Nos. 17,564, 17,570

Supreme Court of Kansas

May 6, 1911

Decided January, 1911.

Original proceedings in mandamus. Opinion filed. May 6, 1911. Writ denied.

Writ denied.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTION--Rules for Interpreting. A constitution must be interpreted liberally to carry into effect the principles of government which it embodies. It deals broadly with general subjects, and its language should not be interpreted in any narrow, refined or subtle sense, but should be held to mean what the words imply to the common understanding of men.

2. CONSTITUTION--Veto--Time within which It May Be Exercised. The words "if any bill shall not be returned within three days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to the governor" contained in section 14 of article 2 of the constitution, relating to the veto power, would indicate to persons of common understanding that the governor should have three full working days to consider and act upon a bill.

3. TIME--Computation. The general rule (where the rule of the code does not apply) to include the day on which an act is done in computing time from or after an act or event is not inflexible. When not expressly declared to be inclusive or exclusive the words "after," "from," "subsequent," and the like, are susceptible of different significations, and are used in different senses, having an inclusive or exclusive meaning according to the subject matter, context, and the purpose to be accomplished.

4. GOVERNOR--Time for Action on Bills--Three Days Excluding Day of Presentation. Considering the policy of the constitution with respect to the enactment of laws and the probable understanding of the language in question by the people in adopting it, it is held that the three days limited for the action of the governor upon bills should be computed by excluding the day on which they are presented to him.

5. LAWS--When Complete. A law is not complete until it has been finally acted upon by the two houses of the legislature and by the governor, although the action of the latter may be only negative, as when he permits a bill to become a law by failing to return it within the prescribed time.

6. LEGISLATURE--Recall of Bills--Governor Has Full Period on Second Presentation. Where the governor, at the request of the legislature or of either house thereof, has returned a bill before acting upon it, and the bill is again presented to him for his approval or rejection, he has the full period of three days thereafter to consider and act upon it.

John S. Dawson, attorney-general, for the plaintiff; S. M. Brewster, of counsel.

J. L. Hunt, J. W. Gleed, and D. E. Palmer, for the defendant:

OPINION

BENSON, J.:

The plaintiff asks for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to publish six certain bills passed by the legislature at the session of 1911, which it is alleged are public statutes. Five of the bills, having been duly passed by the senate and house, enrolled and certified, were presented to the governor on March 13. The legislature adjourned on March 15, at 6 o'clock, P. M., and on that day the governor sent the bills without his signature to the secretary of state with a communication stating that they had been received only two days before the final adjournment of the legislature, and not being signed by him did not become laws, referring to section 14 of article 2 of the constitution, which provides:

"If any bill shall not be returned within three days (Sunday excepted) after it shall have been presented to the governor, it shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the legislature, by its adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not become a law."

The contention of the attorney-general is that the period of three days referred to in the above provision is to be computed by including the day on which the bill was presented to the governor, and that the time expired on the day he sent the bills to the secretary, that is to say, that the 13th, 14th and 15th days of March should be counted, thus making up the constitutional period, and that as the bills were not returned to the house within that time they became laws under the provision above quoted. The rule for the computation of time in certain cases, as announced by this court, is that when the computation is to be made from an act done, or from the time of an act, the day on which the act is done is to be included, but when the computation is from a date or the day of a date the day of the date is excluded. (Coal Co. v. Barber, 47 Kan. 29, 27 P. 114; Kansas City v. Gibson, 66 Kan. 501, 72 P. 222.) This distinction does not prevail in all the states, but the general rule need not be reconsidered here. The clause in question must be interpreted as it was intended when the constitution was adopted. The meaning of a constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and afterward when the courts are called upon to interpret it they can not assume that it bears any different meaning. (Black, Inter. of Laws, § 9; 1 Story on the Const., 5th ed., § 427.) The rules for the computation of time declared by this court in the cases referred to having been announced long after the adoption of the constitution, are not necessarily controlling upon the question now presented. The federal constitution and the constitutions of several of the states containing provisions similar to the one quoted above were before the convention that framed our constitution; and the constitution of the United States was referred to in the debates as a model for this clause. (Proceedings and Debates of the Kan. Const. Conv. pp. 53-55.) It may be fairly presumed that any judicial interpretations previously given to like constitutional provisions were known to and considered by the members of the convention, and that the language used was employed in the sense in which it had been thus judicially interpreted. In Price v. Whitman, 8 Cal. 412, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Burnett, in the year 1857, construing this provision of the constitution of California, it was said:

"On the third day of April, 1856, a bill, which had duly passed both branches of the legislature, was presented to the governor. The governor returned the bill to the senate, in which it originated, with his objections, and the veto was concurred in by that body. The journal of the senate shows that the bill was returned on the fifteenth of the same month. . . . The third day of April being Friday, there were two Sundays intervening between the third and fifteenth. . . . The seventh section of the fourth article of the constitution provides that if any bill presented to the governor, 'shall not be returned within ten days after it shall have been presented to him (Sundays excepted), the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the legislature, by adjournment, prevent such return.' . . . The two intervening Sundays not being counted, the only question is, whether the return on the fifteenth was within the ten days allowed by the constitution; and the answer to this question will depend upon whether the first and last days be both counted. If both are included, then the bill was not returned in due time, but if either be excluded, the bill did not become a law by lapse of time. . . . It would be impracticable to lay down any rule in advance, applicable to every case that may arise. When the entire validity of an instrument or a title must fail, and the true intention of the parties be defeated unless the first day be included, then it should be done.

"But when a certain time for deliberation is given, the exclusive rule should be adopted. It was doubtless the intention of the framers of the constitution, not only to fix a definite time within which the governor should return the bill, but also to allow him ten full days for deliberation. If this were not so, Sundays would not have been excluded. And as a fraction of a day can not be counted, by excluding the first and counting the last day, the full time will be in general allowed the executive. This rule substantially allows the governor the same time as if it were computed from the exact moment the bill was presented, to the exact time when returned. It is a rule more in consonance with the reason of the case, and the fair intent of the constitution. It also accords with the rule in civil practice in our courts. Under all the circumstances, we think it the most satisfactory." (pp. 414, 415, 417.)

Similar clauses in the constitutions of several other states existing at the time of the adoption of the Kansas constitution have been construed since in the same way as in California. ( The People, etc., v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9; Corwin v. Comptroller General, 6 S.C. 390; Beaudean v. The City of Cape Girardeau, 71 Mo. 392; Hyde v. White, 24 Tex. 137; State ex rel. State Pharmaceutical Association et al. v. Secretary of State, 52 La. Ann. 936.) The same interpretation has been given to like clauses in constitutions adopted since our own. ( Capito v. Topping, 65 W.Va. 587, 64 S.E. 845; Computation of Time, 9 Colo. 632; Carter v. Henry, 87 Miss. 411, 39 So. 690.) In The People, etc., v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9, the matter was thoroughly considered. The provision there considered was:

"If any bill shall not be returned by the governor within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he signed it, unless the general assembly shall, by their adjournment, prevent its return." (p. 134.)

The court held that the day on which the bill was presented should be...