State v. Shackford
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-1215,18-1215 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Tavish Coleon SHACKFORD, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellant Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Olu Salami, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
A jury found Tavish Shackford guilty of two crimes. The second crime was a "forcible felony," which made Shackford ineligible to post bond and remain free until his sentence began. Iowa Code §§ 702.11(1), 811.1(1) (2015). With no opportunity to bond out after the trial, as he'd been able to do before the trial, Shackford was taken into custody and confined to the county jail for eighty-four days until his sentencing. Under Iowa law, the sheriff or the county may file "a reimbursement claim" for jail fees against a defendant who has been "convicted of a criminal offense." Iowa Code § 356.7(1), (2). The sheriff followed that procedure in this case. The sheriff did not opt to have the jail fees included in restitution, as the pre-2020 version of section 356.7 permitted, but instead to have "the force and effect of a [civil] judgment for purposes of enforcement." Id. § 356.7(3).
But Shackford appealed the convictions, and the court of appeals reversed his forcible felony conviction for insufficient evidence. Shackford went back to the district court for resentencing on the lone remaining conviction. The district court revised Shackford's prison sentence, but didn't do anything about the jail fees that resulted only from the dismissed conviction. Shackford appealed his sentence, primarily arguing he shouldn't have to pay the fees attributable to the dismissed charge. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. We granted further review.
The State initially charged Shackford with willful injury causing serious injury, Iowa Code section 708.4(1), a class "C" felony (count I), and intimidation with a dangerous weapon, section 708.6, also a class "C" felony (count II). The State later added a dangerous weapon enhancement under section 902.7. When first arrested, Shackford spent two days in the county jail before being released on bond until his trial.
At the January 2017 trial, as to count I, the jury found him guilty of a lesser included offense to the willful injury charge, entering a verdict under section 708.4(2) (a class "D" felony) instead of section 708.4(1). As to count II, the jury found him guilty of the charged crime, intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent. The verdict under count II meant Shackford had committed a "forcible felony" under section 702.11(1), making him ineligible for continued release on bond until his sentencing under section 811.1(1). So to the county jail he went until his sentencing.
In April 2017, the district court sentenced Shackford to an indeterminate five-year term of incarceration under count I and to a concurrent indeterminate ten-year term of incarceration under count II, but with a required five-year term before he would be eligible for parole because of the weapons enhancement under count II. See Iowa Code § 902.7. The district court imposed, but then suspended, a $1000 fine on each count and found him lacking a reasonable ability to pay fees for his appointed attorney. The district court also ordered as to each count I and count II, "Court costs are taxed to Defendant." No amount was stated in the order.
Shackford filed a notice of appeal contesting his convictions. He was transferred from the county jail to a state prison shortly after his sentencing. He'd spent eighty-four nights in the county jail.
We transferred his appeal to the court of appeals. In the interim, in June, the county sheriff filed in the district court two claims for reimbursement for Shackford's two stints in the county jail. The first one, for fees totaling $135, assessed fees for the two days Shackford spent in jail after his initial arrest before he bonded out pretrial. The second order, for fees totaling $4935, assessed the eighty-four days he spent in jail posttrial when he was ineligible to bond out because of the forcible felony guilty verdict on count II. The district court entered separate orders in the criminal case approving each reimbursement claim.
Nearly a year later, in April 2018, the court of appeals reversed Shackford's conviction as to count II for insufficient evidence. It remanded to the district court for dismissal of count II and ordered resentencing on the sole surviving conviction, count I.
At Shackford's June 2018 resentencing on count I, the district court sentenced him to an indeterminate five-year term of incarceration. It imposed, but then suspended, a $750 fine. It again found him lacking a reasonable ability to pay fees for his appointed attorney. As before, the district court order stated, "Court costs are taxed to Defendant," but the order didn't disclose a cost amount. The order didn't specifically address the fate of the jail fees. The clerk's financial docket report, issued a month later, still showed the $4935 in posttrial jail fees.
Shackford appealed again. He contended the district court erred in holding him responsible for the posttrial jail fees given that he was ultimately acquitted on the forcible felony that was the basis for his posttrial detention. Shackford also urged on appeal that the fees and costs—including the jail fees—were components of restitution, thus requiring the district court to determine whether Shackford had a reasonable ability to pay them before they could be assessed.
The court of appeals found that Shackford was entitled to a reasonable-ability-to-pay hearing on the court costs, but not on the jail fees, because the jail fees were not awarded as part of restitution. See State v. Gross , 935 N.W.2d 695, 705 (Iowa 2019). The court of appeals also found that the $4935 in posttrial jail fees were properly assessed against Shackford. The court reasoned that even though Shackford was ultimately acquitted of count II, he stood "convicted" of that count at the time those jail fees were assessed. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. We granted Shackford's application for further review.
When we grant further review, we have discretion to let the court of appeals decision stand on specific issues. State v. Doolin , 942 N.W.2d 500, 506-07 (Iowa 2020). We do so as to the reasonable-ability-to-pay issue. We will thus focus on the issue of whether Shackford can be assessed posttrial jail fees when he was acquitted of the offense that was the only basis for his posttrial detention.
Before we get to the merits, we must deal with a question of jurisdiction. Shackford contends the appellate determination that there was insufficient evidence on count II and his subsequent resentencing should also result in the elimination of the jail fees attributable to count II. The State (and the dissent) contend that we have no jurisdiction to address those jail fees because they were the equivalent of a civil judgment and thus not part of Shackford's ongoing criminal appeal and criminal resentencing.
It is true that the clerk entered the order imposing the $4935 in jail fees under section 356.7 after his initial convictions before count II had been dismissed. Under section 356.7(3), once the court approves a claim for fees and costs against the defendant, the sheriff or municipality "may choose to enforce the claim in the manner provided in chapter 626" and the claim "shall have the force and effect of a judgment for purposes of enforcement." Iowa Code § 356.7(3). Can we undo the district court's reimbursement claim order in this appeal of Shackford's criminal sentence? The State argues we can't because the claim for reimbursement under section 356.7 created what amounts to a collateral civil judgment distinct from the sentence. This makes it unlike a restitution order under chapter 910, argues the State, and thus not subject to challenge in Shackford's current appeal of his criminal sentence.
As we've previously indicated, the jail fee award created in this case under the pre-2020 version of section 356.7 is something of a hybrid curiosity. See Gross , 935 N.W.2d at 704–05. It is both quasi-criminal and quasi-civil. See id. It's born of a criminal prosecution, and is available only if the state secures a conviction. See Iowa Code § 356.7(1), (2). However, when (as in this case) the sheriff doesn't elect to include the jail fee award in restitution, it isn't covered by chapter 910. Instead, it "ha[s] the force and effect of a judgment for purposes of enforcement." Id. § 356.7(3). Yet, at the same time, it doesn't appear in a separate civil docket; rather, it remains part of the criminal case.
Moreover, nothing in pre-2020 section 356.7 indicates that the jail fee award is untethered from the underlying convictions. See id. § 356.7. To the contrary, section 356.7(1) expresses, twice, the notion that reimbursement claims are permitted only when a prisoner "has been convicted of a criminal offense." And the jail fee award (when no separate civil action has been filed) occurs within the criminal case, not in some other civil case.1
In our view, this means that when the entire criminal judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing, as occurred here, the district court has jurisdiction over jail fees—along with the rest of that criminal case. Obviously, the district court cannot exceed its mandate from the appellate court. See State v. Pearson , 876 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Iowa 2016). So the district...
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