State v. Sharrow
| Decision Date | 25 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2016-261,2016-261 |
| Citation | 2017 VT 25 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | State of Vermont v. Christopher A. Sharrow |
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
On Appeal from Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Criminal Division
David Tartter, Deputy State's Attorney, Department of State's Attorneys and Sheriffs, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Rebecca Turner and Kelly Green, Appellate Defenders, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
¶ 1. This case comes before the Court on interlocutory appeal. The sole issue is whether, under 13 V.S.A. § 4814, the State may compel a defendant to submit to a competency evaluation conducted by a mental health expert of the State's choosing, following a court-ordered competency evaluation by a neutral mental health expert.1 We hold that the State may not compel such an evaluation, and we therefore reverse.
¶ 2. The relevant facts are not in dispute. The State charged defendant with second-degree murder in July 2013. While defendant was incarcerated pretrial, his counsel requested a competency hearing. The court ordered an evaluation and, pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 4814, the Department of Mental Health selected a neutral expert to conduct the evaluation. The neutral expert conducted a competency evaluation on February 15, 2015, but defense counsel was not present when the doctor conducted the examination and counsel moved for a reevaluation. Again, the court ordered an evaluation and the Department selected a second expert. The second expert requested access to the first expert's report and later requested a neuropsychological consult. The Department declined to provide funding for a neuropsychological examination, and the expert, who maintained that such an examination was necessary to complete the competency evaluation, suggested that the court reassign the evaluation to another doctor. On February 12, 2016, the court granted that request and the Department subsequently appointed another expert to conduct the competency evaluation. The third court-appointed expert, Dr. Weker, concluded that "defendant is not mentally competent to stand trial for the alleged offense." The parties received a copy of that report on May 23, 2016.
¶ 3. In the meantime, defense counsel engaged an expert, Dr. Wilmuth, to perform a competency evaluation, which Dr. Wilmuth completed on April 24, 2015. Defendant did not attempt to introduce the results of Dr. Wilmuth's report. Nevertheless, after receiving Dr. Weker's report, the State retained its own expert, Dr. Linder, and at a status conference on June 20, 2016, requested that Dr. Linder be given access to defendant in order to conduct a fifth competency evaluation. Defendant objected to the State's request, arguing that "[t]he [c]ourt has no legal authority to order [defendant] to submit to a psychiatric evaluation arranged by the State." In a written order dated July 18, 2016, the court granted the State's motion and ordered defendant to submit to a competency evaluation conducted by the State's expert. In response, defendant filed this interlocutory appeal.
¶ 4. The appeal presents one issue: whether 13 V.S.A. § 4814 gives the court the authority to order a defendant to submit to a competency evaluation conducted by an expert retained by the prosecution, in addition to a court-ordered competency evaluation conducted by a neutral expert selected by the Department of Mental Health. This is a pure question of law and we therefore review it de novo. See State v. Beauregard, 2003 VT 3, ¶ 4, 175 Vt. 472, 820 A.2d 183.
¶ 5. Our analysis begins with the language of the statute. "Our primary objective in construing a statute is to effectuate the Legislature's intent." Wesco, Inc. v. Sorrell, 2004 VT 102, ¶ 14, 177 Vt. 287, 865 A.2d 350. If a statute's language is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, "we accept the statute's plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further." Id.
¶ 6. 13 V.S.A. § 4814(a)(4) provides:
Any court before which a criminal prosecution is pending may order the Department of Mental Health to have the defendant examined by a psychiatrist at any time before, during or after trial, and before final judgment . . . when the Court believes that there is doubt as to the defendant's mental competency to be tried for the alleged offense.
Additionally, § 4814(b) gives the trial court the authority to order a competency evaluation on its own motion, on a motion filed by the State, on a motion filed by the defendant, or on a motion filed by another party acting on behalf of the defendant. Sections 4815 and 4816 outline the process by which a competency evaluation must be conducted and limit the scope of permissible uses of a report prepared in accordance with these sections. Specifically, § 4816(d) prohibits the State from admitting into evidence any statement made by a defendant during a competency evaluation "in any criminal proceeding for the purpose of proving the commission of a criminal offense or for the purpose of impeaching testimony" of the defendant. Section 4816(f) also explains that the court's decision to introduce a competency report "shall not preclude either partyor the [c]ourt from calling the psychiatrist who wrote the report as a witness or from calling witnesses or introducing other relevant evidence."
¶ 7. The language of the statute is clear on its face. When the court has doubt as to a defendant's competency, the court has the authority to "order the Department of Mental Health to have the defendant examined by a psychiatrist." 13 V.S.A. § 4814(a). Although the State is correct that "[n]othing in the statute contemplates that the only expert witness [at the competency hearing] be a court-appointed expert," the statute does not grant the court the authority to require a defendant to submit to a competency evaluation by any other doctor.2 Additionally, although the State argues that to prohibit it from conducting its own competency evaluation would undermine the Legislature's intent that the competency hearing "be conducted in a manner which permits both parties meaningfully to challenge the evidence of the other," the statute provides a mechanism—"calling witnesses or introducing other relevant evidence"—by which the State may challenge or rebut the conclusions of a court-appointed, neutral expert. See id. § 4816(f).
¶ 8. This construction of the statute is also consistent with the discovery provisions in the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rules establish reciprocal discovery rights between a defendant and the prosecution. See V.R.Cr.P. 16, 16.1. Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1(a)(1)(I) specifically allows the prosecution to conduct "a reasonable mental health examination by apsychiatrist or other expert" when a defendant raises an insanity defense or otherwise wishes to offer expert testimony relating to a mental condition bearing on guilt. See id.; V.R.Cr.P. 12.1(a). Neither this rule, nor any other one, authorizes the State to conduct an examination for purposes of competency to stand trial.
¶ 9. Moreover, our conclusion that the court lacks the authority to order a defendant to submit to a competency evaluation conducted by an expert retained by the State is consistent with underlying constitutional principles. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), established that when an indigent defendant is charged with a crime, and where the defendant's "mental condition" is "relevant to his [or her] criminal culpability and to the punishment he [or she] might suffer," due process requires that the State provide funding for "a mental health professional capable of performing a certain role: 'conduct[ing] an appropriate examination and assist[ing] in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.' " McWilliams v. Dunn, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 1790, 1794 (2017) (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 80, 83). Thus, where—as is the case here—an indigent defendant's mental health is at issue, "due process requires that the State provide the defendant with the assistance of an independent psychiatrist." Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 12 (1995). Additionally, in the context of a competency hearing, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 364 (1996) (quotation omitted). In short, a defendant whose competency has been called into question has a constitutionally based right to hire, with state funding, a defense-retained mental health expert to assist in his or her defense in order to guard against the possibility of an erroneous determination of competency.
¶ 10. However, "[b]y comparison to the defendant's interest, the injury to the State of the opposite error—a conclusion that the defendant is incompetent when he [or she] is malingering—is modest." Id. at 365. That is in part because the primary harms that such an error imposes on the State are the financial burden and the frustration of the Id. However, "the error is subject to correction in a subsequent proceeding and the State may detain the incompetent defendant for the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a...
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State v. Boyajian
...to hire its own expert to evaluate a defendant after the defendant had undergone a court-ordered competency evaluation under § 4814. 2017 VT 25, ¶ 4, 205 Vt. 300, 175 A.3d 504. In determining that the statute did not entitle the State to its own evaluation, we explained that the State's int......
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State v. Boyajian
...to hire its own expert to evaluate a defendant after the defendant had undergone a court-ordered competency evaluation under § 4814. 2017 VT 25, ¶ 4, 205 300, 175 A.3d 504. In determining that the statute did not entitle the State to its own evaluation, we explained that the State's interes......
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...it was questionable whether it had the discretion to order a second evaluation. In support, the court noted the decision in State v. Sharrow, 2017 VT 25, ¶ 13, 205 Vt. 300, 175 A.3d 504, which held that a court does not have authority to order a competency evaluation by a State expert where......