State v. Shattuck

• Decision Date: 07 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 21895-6-I,21895-6-I
• Citation: 776 P.2d 1001,55 Wn.App. 131
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Randall SHATTUCK, Appellant.

Page 131

55 Wn.App. 131

776 P.2d 1001

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Randall SHATTUCK, Appellant.

No. 21895-6-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 1.

Aug. 7, 1989.

Ann Ryan, Associated Counsel for Accused, Seattle, for Randall Shattuck.

Norm Maleng, Pros. Atty., and Jeffrey Smith, Donald J. Raz, Deputy Pros. Attys., Seattle, for State of Wash.

COLEMAN, Chief Judge.

Randall Shattuck seeks discretionary review of the superior court's decision affirming a judgment and sentence for driving while intoxicated entered in Bellevue district court. Shattuck complains that the trial court erred in finding that he had waived the right to raise any factual issues in defense of his prosecution on stipulated evidence. We affirm.

Shattuck was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated on October 27, 1984. Shattuck petitioned for a deferred prosecution pursuant to RCW ch. 10.05, under which a defendant can receive treatment for a substance abuse problem in lieu of prosecution. Shattuck agreed that, should his deferred prosecution be revoked, the police report of his arrest would be admissible in his trial:

In the event that the court revokes the defendant's deferred status, the defendant shall have his guilty [sic ] or innocence determined by the court upon the basis of the police report herein; the contents of which defendant by signature, hereby stipulates to.

Shattuck's deferred prosecution was revoked in September 1986. At the guilt or innocence hearing held on October 21, 1986, Shattuck argued that the evidence in the police report was insufficient to support conviction, that he had been denied access to counsel after his arrest, and that he was denied the opportunity to secure a blood test. The court ruled that the police report contained sufficient evidence to support Shattuck's guilt and that appellant, by stipulating to deferred prosecution, had waived the right to raise new defenses. The court also found that the denial of counsel was of constitutional magnitude and could be raised. The court held a fact-finding hearing on November 3, 1986 and concluded that Shattuck's constitutional right to counsel had not been abrogated. Shattuck appealed his conviction to the superior court, which affirmed his conviction, holding that Shattuck had waived all defenses to the deferred prosecution, including the claim of denial of access to counsel. This court granted Shattuck's motion for discretionary review.

We first address whether appellant waived his right to raise defenses to his prosecution for driving while intoxicated by stipulating to a deferred prosecution.

Appellant argues that the stipulation he signed in order to receive a deferred prosecution pertains only to the admissibility of the arresting officer's police report. The State argues that the stipulation waives any subsequent procedural or legal defenses a defendant may try to assert once the deferred prosecution is revoked and a hearing on guilt is held. We agree with the State.

Under the plain language of the stipulation he signed, appellant agreed to have his "guilt determined by the court on the basis of the police report herein." This was a knowing and intelligent waiver of all subsequent factual, legal, or procedural issues the appellant might raise. See, State v. Bennett, 42 Wash.App. 125, 128-29, 708 P.2d 1232 (1985), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1004 (1986) .

Moreover, under RCW ch. 10.05, the deferred prosecution statute, in return for receiving deferred prosecutions, defendants waive the right to raise defenses should the deferral be revoked. Petitioner argues that stipulated trials are not stipulations to guilt and that defendants are entitled to certain procedural safeguards in stipulated trials. In State v. Johnson, 104 Wash.2d 338, 705 P.2d 773 (1985) and State v. Wood, 45 Wash.App. 299, 725 P.2d 435 (1986), criminal defendants agreed to trials on stipulated facts. In both cases, the defendants did not stipulate to guilt, which was to be determined by the finder of fact, but only stipulated that, if called, the State's witnesses would testify in conformity with the police reports. Johnson, 104 Wash.2d at 342, 705 P.2d 773; Wood, 45 Wash.App. at 311, 725 P.2d 435. Neither of the stipulations in those cases was pursuant to specific statutory authorization or involved deferred prosecution. Johnson, 104 Wash.2d at 342-43, 705 P.2d 773; Wood, 45 Wash.App. at 311, 725 P.2d 435.

The stipulation in the instant case was different from those in Johnson and Wood, having been executed as a requirement of the deferred prosecution statute, which provides:

Before entry of an order deferring prosecution, a petitioner shall be advised of his rights as an accused and execute, as a condition of receiving treatment, a statement that contains: (a) An acknowledgement of his rights; (b) a stipulation to the admissibility of the facts contained in the written police report; and (c) an acknowledgement that the statement will be entered and used to support a finding of guilty if the court finds cause to revoke the order granting deferred prosecution....

RCW 10.05.020(2)(b) leaves open the possibility that a defendant might bring in other evidence at a trial after the deferred prosecution order is revoked. RCW 10.05.020(2)(c), however, precludes other evidence at later proceedings. That subsection provides that the police report stipulated to will be "used to support a finding of guilty if the court finds cause to revoke the order granting deferred prosecution." RCW 10.05.020(2)(c). We construe that language to mean that the finder of fact is to assess the defendant's guilt solely on the basis of the stipulated police report and find the defendant guilty if the evidence therein supports conviction.

A deferred prosecution is not available to a defendant "who sincerely believes that he is innocent of the charges ..." RCW 10.05.020(2). One apparent intent behind this prohibition is to avoid litigating guilt later after memories have faded and witnesses have become unavailable. Indeed, the...