State v. Shaver, 071019 IDCCA, 45867
| Opinion Judge | BRAILSFORD, JUDGE. |
| Party Name | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JACOB ADAM SHAVER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Attorney | Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Andrea W. Reynolds argued. Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued. |
| Judge Panel | Judge HUSKEY and Judge, LORELLO CONCUR. |
| Case Date | July 10, 2019 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Boundary County. Hon. Barbara Buchanan, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance and possession of paraphernalia, affirmed.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Andrea W. Reynolds argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
BRAILSFORD, JUDGE.
Jacob Adam Shaver appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1), and possession of paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A. Late one night, Shaver was parked at a boat launch with his girlfriend (K.K.) when two police officers approached them. At the time, Shaver was thirty years old, and K.K. was seventeen years old. As a result of Shaver's contact with the officers, a search ensued in which methamphetamine and paraphernalia were discovered. Shaver moved to suppress this evidence and asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At 1:10 a.m. on April 23, 2017, Officers Langan and Lopez were on patrol when they observed a Nissan truck parked in a boat launch parking area. No other vehicles were present. The officers pulled into the parking area and parked the patrol vehicle about 20 to 25 feet away from the truck. The patrol vehicle's overhead lights were not activated, but its spotlight, which was pointing toward the truck, was turned on for officer safety. The patrol vehicle did not obstruct the truck from going forward or backward, and there was plenty of room for the truck to exit the parking area.
Both officers approached the truck. Officer Langan made the initial contact with the driver, Shaver. Meanwhile, Officer Lopez approached K.K. on the passenger's side. Both of the truck's occupants appeared to be asleep. Officer Langan testified that "once [he] walked up and made contact with the occupants of the [truck, he] could see [K.K.] appeared to be quite young" and that Shaver was an adult. Officer Langan asked Shaver what he was doing, and Shaver responded that he was with his girlfriend; they were celebrating their anniversary; and they had fallen asleep. Officer Langan testified he had concerns about an adult male and what appeared to be a minor child celebrating a "romantic anniversary."
Officer Langan asked Shaver if he had identification, which Shaver provided. Officer Lopez retrieved K.K.'s identification, glanced at it and then handed it to Officer Langan, who ran the identifications through dispatch to conduct a warrants check and to verify identities. Officer Langan testified that, through this check, he received information that Shaver was thirty years old and K.K. was seventeen. Officer Langan conveyed this information to Officer Lopez.
Officer Lopez testified that, at that point, he asked K.K. to exit the truck and began asking her questions about her relationship with Shaver. K.K. stated she and Shaver had been "together" for approximately two years, and Officer Lopez noticed K.K. became extremely nervous and started shaking. Officer Lopez then asked Shaver if he had sexual intercourse with K.K. Shaver responded he did not feel comfortable answering that question. When Officer Lopez asked Shaver if he had sexual intercourse at the boat launch that night, Shaver responded he had not.
Officer Lopez asked for permission to search the truck for evidence of sexual activity, and Shaver responded, "I give you consent to search my vehicle." During this search, Officer Lopez located a bag containing several small ziplock baggies, which he believed were consistent with drug use. He also observed a bag on the dashboard directly in front of the driver's steering wheel. The bag was unzipped and contained a water bong or pipe. When Officer Lopez asked Shaver what the item was, Shaver responded Officer Lopez did not have permission to search the bag.
Shaver was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and with possession of paraphernalia. He moved to suppress the drugs and the paraphernalia. The district court denied Shaver's motion, finding that the officers' initial contact was consensual; "once [the officers] learned of the ages of Shaver and [K.K.] during the consensual contact, [they] had reasonable suspicion to detain them further for investigation"; the search of the truck was consensual; and Shaver revoked his consent but only after Officer Lopez had already seen the water bong or pipe in plain view in the unzipped bag.
Shaver pled guilty to reduced charges of possession of methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia, but he preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Although Shaver raised numerous issues before the district court, on appeal Shaver asserts only that he was unlawfully seized when Officer Langan retained Shaver's driver's license to run a warrants check.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
Evidence sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion is "less than that necessary to establish probable cause" but requires "more than a mere hunch." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). Reasonable suspicion "does not require a belief that any specific criminal activity is afoot to justify an investigative detention"; instead, "all that is required is a showing of objective and specific articulable facts giving reason to believe that the individual has been or is about to be involved in some criminal activity." State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 615, 329 P.3d 391, 397 (Ct. App. 2014). In addition, innocent acts, when considered together, can be sufficiently suspicious so as to justify an investigative detention. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989); State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 925, 367 P.3d 1231, 1237 (Ct. App. 2016).
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Shaver's only challenge focuses on when he was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Shaver contends he was seized "when Officer Langan retained [Shaver's] driver's license to run a warrants check." In contrast, Shaver characterizes the district court as ruling that he was not seized until after Officer Langan completed the warrants check. Specifically, Shaver argues: The district court concluded Mr. Shaver was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until after the warrants check, and the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at that point. The district court glossed over the critical point in this encounter--the point when Officer Langan retained Mr. Shaver's license to run a warrants check. It was at this point that the encounter transformed from a consensual encounter into a seizure.
(Emphasis added.)
Shaver's argument misconstrues the district court's ruling. The district court did not conclude that Officer Langan seized Shaver only after running a warrants check. Rather, a careful reading of the order demonstrates that the district court's analysis focused on when reasonable...
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