State v. Shawn P.
| Decision Date | 21 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | 60037-6,Nos. 59585-2,s. 59585-2 |
| Citation | 122 Wn.2d 553,859 P.2d 1220 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. SHAWN P., Petitioner. STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. DAVID W., Petitioner. STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. DANIEL W., Petitioner. En Banc |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Ronald D. Ness & Associates, Jeffrey J. Jahns, Port Orchard, for petitioner Shawn P.
J. Scott Bougher, Silverdale, for petitioners David W. and Daniel W.
David W., pro se.
John W. Ladenburg, Pierce County Prosecutor, Chris Quinn-Brintnall, Sr. Appellate Deputy, John M. Neeb, Deputy, Tacoma, C. Danny Clem, Kitsap County Prosecutor, Pamela B. Loginsky, Deputy, Port Orchard, for respondent.
The issue in these three consolidated appeals is whether the mandatory revocation of driving privileges, which is imposed upon minor teenagers who are convicted of consuming or possessing alcohol, violates the equal protection guaranties of our state and federal constitutions. We hold the revocation provisions in Washington's "abuse and lose" statutes 1 constitutionally sound.
Juvenile offender Shawn P. was found guilty of violating the law prohibiting minors from consuming alcohol. 2 He was 16 years old at the time of the offense and 17 when the disposition order was entered in juvenile court. Juvenile offender David W. was found guilty of violating the minor in possession of alcohol statute 3 when he was 15 years old. Juvenile offender Daniel W. was 15 at the time of the offense and 16 when he pleaded guilty to a charge of violating the minor in possession of alcohol law. 4
As a consequence of the determination of guilt in each case, the trial courts were required to notify the Department of Licensing of the determination 5 and the Department was then required to revoke all driving privileges of each of the juveniles for 1 year or until the juvenile reached the age of 17, whichever was later. 6 In each of these cases, revocation was stayed pending the outcome of the appeals. 7
Each of the juvenile offenders challenges the revocation law on equal protection grounds. Shawn P. argues that the "class" of persons affected by the challenged legislation includes all persons prohibited from possessing or consuming alcohol. The class, to his view, thus consists of all persons under the age of 21 years. Because the revocation provisions of the legislation do not apply to those who are between the ages of 18 and 21, Shawn P. contends the law discriminates within the class and thus violates the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals disagreed and upheld the constitutionality of the law and the finding of guilt in State v. Preston, 66 Wash.App. 494, 832 P.2d 513, review granted, 120 Wash.2d 1012, 844 P.2d 437 (1992). We granted Shawn P.'s petition for review on the constitutional issue.
David W. and Daniel W., whose appeals were consolidated below, argue that the challenged classification violates the equal protection guaranties of both the state and federal constitutions because it treats minor teenagers more harshly than both the 18-to 21-year-old group and the 12 years and under group. Again, the Court of Appeals disagreed and upheld the constitutionality of the law in State v. Weese, 67 Wash.App. 259, 834 P.2d 1099 (1992), review granted, 121 Wash.2d 1001, 848 P.2d 1263 (1993). David W. and Daniel W. then petitioned for review on the constitutional issue. We granted the petition and consolidated the appeals with that of Shawn P.
One issue is presented in this court for review.
Does the mandatory revocation of driving privileges, which is applicable only to minor teenagers (those 13 and older, but under 18) who are convicted of consuming or possessing alcohol, violate the equal protection guaranties of the state and federal constitutions?
CONCLUSION. We hold that the mandatory revocation of driving privileges, which applies only to minor teenagers who are determined to have violated the minor possessing/consuming alcohol law, is rationally related to the legitimate state objectives of promoting highway safety and deterring illegal drinking by teenagers and thus does not violate constitutional equal protection guaranties.
The challenged legislation, 8 which was enacted in 1988, 9 amended a number of existing statutes. 10 The legislation provides in pertinent part:
If a juvenile thirteen years of age or older [and under the age of 18] is found by juvenile court to have committed an offense that is a violation of chapter 66.44, 69.41, 69.50, or 69.52 RCW, the court shall notify the department of licensing within twenty-four hours after entry of the judgment.
The statutes referred to within the above-quoted section prohibit the possession, consumption or acquisition of liquor, 12 except in limited circumstances, by any person under the age of 21, 13 and prohibit the possession, distribution and manufacture of certain drugs. 14 It is only the law relating to alcoholic beverages that is at issue in the consolidated cases before us.
Thus, under the statutory provision quoted above, if a juvenile, aged 13 to 18, is found guilty of violating RCW 66.44.270(2)(a) (), the court must notify the Department of Licensing. RCW 46.20.265 then requires the Department to revoke the juvenile's driving privilege. That statute provides:
(1) In addition to any other authority to revoke driving privileges under this chapter, the department [of licensing] shall revoke all driving privileges of a juvenile when the department receives notice from a court pursuant to RCW 13.40.265, 66.44.365, 69.41.065, 69.50.420, 69.52.070, or asubstantially similar municipal ordinance adopted by a local legislative authority, or from a diversion unit pursuant to RCW 13.40.265. The revocation shall be imposed without hearing.
(2) The driving privileges of the juvenile revoked under subsection (1) of this section shall be revoked in the following manner:
(a) Upon receipt of the first notice, the department shall impose a revocation for one year, or until the juvenile reaches seventeen years of age, whichever is longer.
(b) Upon receipt of a second or subsequent notice, the department shall impose a revocation for two years or until the juvenile reaches eighteen years of age, whichever is longer.
While the legislation refers to "juveniles", 16 it is clear that for purposes of the revocation provisions, the term is limited to juveniles who are 13 years of age or older and under age 18.
The legislation thus carves out a "class" of minor teenagers, aged 13 through 17, and imposes an additional penalty upon them. 17
The juvenile offenders claim the law violates equal protection guaranties because there is no rational basis for treating minor teenagers different from (1) older individuals who are prohibited from consuming or possessing alcohol and (2) younger individuals who might commit the same crime.
We have held that the right to equal protection under the law guaranteed by the U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1 and by the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Const. art. 1, § 12 are substantially identical. 18 Both require that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law be similarly treated. 19
The threshold question in any equal protection analysis is which standard of judicial review applies. 20 One of three standards will be applied, depending on the nature of the interest affected or on the characteristics of the class created by the legislation. 21 The first standard of review, strict scrutiny, applies when the allegedly discriminatory classification affects a suspect class or threatens a fundamental right. 22 A second standard of review, intermediate or heightened scrutiny, has been applied by this court and the United States Supreme Court in limited circumstances where strict scrutiny is not mandated, but where important rights or semi-suspect classifications are affected. 23 The third standard of review requires minimal scrutiny and is referred to as the rational relationship or rational basis test. 24 The statutory classification involved here does not involve a suspect or semi-suspect class 25 and does not threaten a fundamental right. 26 The parties correctly concede that the rational relationship test is the standard against which the legislative classification here challenged should be measured.
The rational relationship test is the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 27 Under this test, the legislative classification will be upheld unless it rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of legitimate state objectives. 28 The burden of proving the legislative classification unconstitutional is upon the party challenging the legislation. 29 That party has the heavy burden of overcoming a presumption that the statute is constitutional. 30 We generally will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it appears unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 31
The juveniles challenging the legislative classification in the present case do not meet their heavy burden.
The juveniles must do more than question the wisdom of the legislative classification; they must show conclusively that the classification is purely arbitrary. 32
The purpose of this legislation is stated in the following legislative finding:
The legislature finds that many persons under the age of eighteen unlawfully use intoxicating liquor and controlled substances. The use of these substances by juveniles can cause serious damage to their physical, mental, and emotional well-being, and in some instances results in life-long disabilities.
The legislature also finds that juveniles who unlawfully use alcohol and controlled substances frequently operate motor vehicles while under the influence of and impaired by alcohol...
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