State v. Shay
Decision Date | 21 April 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 594, No. 554., No. 23 |
Citation | 94 P.3d 8,136 N.M. 8,2004 NMCA 77 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leon Joseph SHAY, Defendant-Appellant. State of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Edward Vonbehren, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Elizabeth Blaisdell, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, Arthur W. Pepin, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee in No. 23,594.
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Arthur W. Pepin, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee in No. 23,554.
John B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellants Leon Joseph Shay in No. 23,594 and James Edward Vonbehren in No. 23,554.
Certiorari Granted, No. 28,670, June 10, 2004.
{1} In separate appeals, Defendants Leon Joseph Shay and James Vonbehren appeal their sentences as habitual offenders. We address both appeals together in this opinion because both Shay and Vonbehren argue that the amendment to NMSA 1978, § 31-18-17 (2002), which had an effective date of July 1, 2002, should apply to their cases. The 2002 amendment to Section 31-18-17 changes the prior statute by prohibiting the use of a conviction more than ten years old in enhancing sentences for habitual offenders. We determine that the legislature intended Section 31-18-17 to apply as amended to cases when the sentence for the underlying crime is imposed after July 1, 2002. We reverse the habitual offender sentences and remand for re-sentencing in both cases.
{2} The habitual offender statute provides for the enhancement of a sentence based on a defendant's prior felony convictions. See § 31-18-17 (2002). Prior to the 2002 amendment, the imposition of this enhancement was mandatory in all cases in which there was a prior felony conviction, regardless of the date of the conviction. See NMSA 1978, § 31-18-17 (1993). In 2002, the legislature amended Section 31-18-17 to allow the district court some discretion in imposing the habitual enhancement to cases in which there is one prior felony conviction. Section 31-18-17(A) (2002). It also redefined "prior felony conviction" to mean:
Section 31-18-17(D) (2002) (alteration in original). This new definition excludes prior felonies when the sentence and any period of probation or parole in the prior felony was completed ten or more years before the current conviction. Id.
{3} Shay was indicted on December 7, 2001 on charges of having committed felony residential burglary and misdemeanor larceny on November 15, 2001. On August 26, 2002, he pleaded guilty to these crimes, resulting in his conviction. The State filed a supplemental information on October 21, 2002, charging Shay with being a habitual offender based on three prior felony convictions in 1997, 1990, and 1985. Shay admitted that he was convicted of these felonies. The district court held a sentencing hearing on October 21, 2002, and on October 22, 2002, entered its judgment and sentence. It enhanced Shay's sentence for the residential burglary offense by eight years under Section 31-18-17 as it read prior to the 2002 amendment. In doing so, the district court used all three prior felony convictions to enhance Defendant's sentence, including the 1985 felony conviction.
{4} Vonbehren was indicted on October 11, 2001 for felony shoplifting. He was convicted following a jury trial on July 3, 2002. The State filed a supplemental information on July 8, 2002, charging Vonbehren as a habitual offender due to four prior felony convictions in 1989, 1988, 1983, and 1981. After Vonbehren admitted to the four prior felonies, he filed a motion requesting the court to determine that the habitual offender statute was no longer applicable to three of the felonies because of the amendment to Section 31-18-17. The district court denied Vonbehren's motion, and on October 15, 2002, sentenced Vonbehren as a habitual offender, enhancing his sentence based on all four prior felony convictions.
{5} The State argues that Shay waived the issue of the applicability of the 2002 amendment by pleading guilty to the charges against him, agreeing in writing to an eight-year habitual offender enhancement of his sentence, and failing to reserve the issue for appeal. The State argues that, even if the sentence is unlawful, Shay's remedy is limited to bringing actions under Rules 5-801 or 5-802 NMRA 2004. Shay counters that the issue was argued at the plea and sentencing hearings and that he was never informed that he was waiving his right to appeal the enhancement. He asserts that all parties, including the district court, knew he would appeal the enhancement. The transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearings confirm this assertion.
882 P.2d at 5 ( ). Because the issue involves an illegal sentence, which is a jurisdictional issue, we address the merits.
74 P.3d 1064 ( ). All of these changes indicate a legislative intent to reduce the enhancements required by Section 31-18-17.
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