State v. Shegrud, 84-2222-CR

• Decision Date: 24 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-2222-CR,84-2222-CR
• Citation: 389 N.W.2d 7,131 Wis.2d 133
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Dennis SHEGRUD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 7

389 N.W.2d 7

131 Wis.2d 133

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Dennis SHEGRUD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 84-2222-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued April 30, 1986.

Opinion Filed June 24, 1986.

David J. Becker, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for plaintiff-respondent-petitioner; Bronson C. LaFollette, Atty. Gen., on brief.

Jack E. Schairer, Asst. State Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.

CALLOW, Justice.

The state seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, 127 Wis.2d 561, 378 N.W.2d 296, which reversed an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee county, Judge Gary A. Gerlach, denying Dennis Shegrud's postconviction motion to withdraw his plea and vacate his conviction. In light of our decision in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and our analysis of the facts of this case, we reverse the court of appeals' decision and hold that Shegrud entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.

In September 1982, Shegrud was charged with armed robbery, contrary to sec. 943.32(1)(b) and (2), Stats. At his arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty. He subsequently changed his plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.

Pursuant to sec. 971.16(1) & (2), Stats., the court committed the defendant to the Winnebago Mental Health Institute for examination. Based upon a report received from Dr. Kurt Hoehne of Winnebago, the court found Shegrud incompetent to stand trial and suspended the proceedings. Several months later, however, after Dr. Hoehne reexamined Shegrud and prepared another report indicating that Shegrud was competent to stand trial, the case was scheduled for trial.

At the beginning of the trial, Shegrud's counsel informed the court that Shegrud wished to stipulate to the facts in the complaint and waive the first phase of the trial. In essence, Shegrud wished to withdraw his plea of not guilty, while preserving his plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. By retaining only his plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, Shegrud effectively was admitting, as a matter of law, that but for lack of mental capacity he committed all the essential elements of the offense charged. See sec. 971.06(1)(d), Stats. ¹

Even though sec. 971.08, Stats., requires that a court personally address a defendant to determine whether a defendant is entering a plea voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge only for guilty pleas and no contest pleas, the court conducted such an inquiry with Shegrud. During a long colloquy with Shegrud, the court had the complaint read to Shegrud and then discussed with Shegrud the nature of the crime with which he was charged and the nature of the constitutional rights which he was waiving. The court then accepted as knowing and voluntary Shegrud's decision to refrain from contesting the facts and to waive the first phase of the trial.

Because Shegrud waived the jury, the second phase of the trial, focusing on whether Shegrud was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, was tried to the court. After hearing Shegrud's testimony and the testimony of two doctors, the court concluded that Shegrud had failed to satisfy his burden of proving that he was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Accordingly, the court found Shegrud guilty of armed robbery in violation of sec. 943.32(1)(b) & (2), Stats. The court sentenced Shegrud to an indeterminate term of ten years.

Shegrud brought a postconviction motion asserting several grounds in support of his request that his conviction be vacated. The court denied the motion, rejecting each of Shegrud's arguments.

Shegrud appealed to the court of appeals from the order denying postconviction relief. The court of appeals, rejecting all but one of Shegrud's arguments, concluded that the court's discussion with Shegrud regarding the nature of the charge did not meet the constitutional due process standards elucidated in State v. Cecchini, 124 Wis.2d 200, 368 N.W.2d 830 (1985). Accordingly, the court of appeals held that Shegrud must be permitted to withdraw his plea and plead anew.

The state filed a petition for review. We granted the petition to consider this case in conjunction with State v. Bangert, supra, and State v. Carter, 131 Wis.2d 69, 389 N.W.2d 1 (1986).

A plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect closely parallels a plea of no contest. A defendant making a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect admits, as a matter of law, that but for lack of mental capacity he or she committed all the essential elements of the offense charged. See sec. 971.06(1)(d), Stats. As with a plea of no contest, a defendant entering a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect waives several constitutional rights. The due process clause of the U.S. Constitution requires a defendant's waiver of constitutional rights be knowing and voluntary. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712 n. 5, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). As we note in State v. Bangert, supra, however, the Constitution does not require that the court personally inquire into the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge. 131 Wis.2d at 259 - 261, 389 N.W.2d at 20.

Nevertheless, under sec. 971.08(1), Stats., the legislature requires that prior to accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, a court must address the defendant personally and determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment if convicted. On its face, sec. 971.08(1) does not apply to defendants entering pleas of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. As a function of our superintending and administrative authority over the circuit courts, see Wis. Const. art. VII, sec. 3, however, we hold that a court faced with a defendant entering a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect must address the defendant personally to determine whether the defendant is entering the plea voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge. We further hold that the procedures delineated in Bangert shall apply in cases in which a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.

A court's determination that a defendant may not withdraw a plea as a matter of right because it was entered knowingly and voluntarily, in conformity with constitutional and statutory requirements, presents a question of law which an appellate court may review without deference to the circuit court. State v. Cecchini, 124 Wis.2d at 206, 368 N.W.2d 830. Contrary to our statement in Cecchini, however, a reviewing court may look beyond the plea hearing transcript in reviewing a circuit court's determination that a defendant is not entitled to withdraw a guilty plea. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 274, 389 N.W.2d at 26.

In State v. Minniecheske, 127 Wis.2d 234, 242-43, 378 N.W.2d 283 (1985) (quoting Cecchini, 124 Wis.2d at 212, 368 N.W.2d 830), we stated that " 'a defendant cannot make a truly voluntary or intelligent admission that he or she committed the offense charged unless he or she is aware of its essential elements and their relationship to the facts of the particular case.' " Accordingly, we have imposed on the courts a duty to inform a defendant of the nature of the offense with which the defendant is charged and a duty to ascertain that the defendant understands the nature of the charge and its relationship to the facts of the defendant's case. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 267, 389 N.W.2d at 23. We have acknowledged, however, that a court may satisfy these duties through a variety of methods. Id. at 268, 389 N.W.2d at 23-24.

The record reveals that the following colloquy occurred at the beginning of the trial in this case:

"MR. CIMPL: My client would like to stipulate to the facts in the complaint and wishes the first phase of the trial and get right on with the second phase of the trial. He is also willing to waive the jury. I want the record to reflect that it is my advice that he not stipulate to the facts and that he not waive the jury.

"We have discussed this matter thoroughly. I'm convinced, Your Honor, he knows what he is doing. Don't get me wrong on that, but--and these are his decisions, and I suppose he's entitled to them. Is that correct, Dennis?

"THE DEFENDANT: Ya.

"THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shegrud, is it your wish to agree to the facts set forth in the complaint in this case as being true and correct?

"THE DEFENDANT: True and correct.

"THE COURT: I'm sorry. I can't hear you.

"THE DEFENDANT: I wish to just go no contest on the first part.

"THE COURT: You don't contest those facts, is that right?

"THE DEFENDANT: I'm not saying they're right. I'm not saying they're wrong. I'm just saying I don't want to contest it.

"...

"THE COURT: And Mr. Cimpl advised you that in his opinion you should not plead no contest to these facts but--and he's also indicated you shouldn't waive the jury, but it is your desire to do so anyway, is that correct?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: All right. You understand a jury consists of 12 people who would decide your guilt or innocence on the facts in this case? Do you understand that?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: It is still your desire to waive the jury, is that right?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: You want the Court to decide the second and third phases of this trial, that is, whether or not you are not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and whether or not if I determine that you are--whether or not you should be committed because of the fact that you are dangerous to yourself or others?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: You want the Court to decide those issues, is that right?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir."

After learning that Shegrud had not read the complaint, the court had Shegrud's counsel read the complaint to him. The complaint contained both a...