State v. Sheldon

• Decision Date: 17 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 28974.,28974.
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Robert SHELDON, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

88 P.3d 1220

139 Idaho 980

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Robert SHELDON, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 28974.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

December 17, 2003.

Review Denied May 6, 2004.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Michael A. Henderson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant.

Michael A. Henderson argued. Westberg, McCabe & Collins, Boise, for respondent. Thomas J. McCabe argued.

LANSING, Chief Judge.

In this appeal the State seeks reversal of a district court order suppressing evidence found during an automobile search and a subsequent order dismissing the case. The State contends that the district court erred in concluding that the police officers had unlawfully extended the scope of a traffic stop by questioning the driver on matters unrelated to the stop. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the State's evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress. At approximately 3 a.m., Officers Breck Orton and Tim Kukla of the Boise Police Department observed a vehicle exit an alley running between Russett and Post streets. Because the car emerged from the alley without stopping before entering the street, the officers initiated a traffic stop. Earlier that evening, the officers had seen the same vehicle parked at a house on Russett Street. The officers were interested in that house because they had information about drug use there. Officer Orton immediately radioed Officer Jeff Stiles about this vehicle stop and its location because Stiles had information concerning the people who resided in the Russett Street house.

Officer Orton noted that the vehicle's driver, John Robert Sheldon, appeared nervous and that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Sheldon produced his driver's license and registration but did not have proof of insurance. Orton returned to his patrol car to run checks on Sheldon's license and registration and to write a citation charging Sheldon for having no proof of insurance. While in his patrol car, Orton received a radio call from Officer Stiles, who was patrolling nearby, warning Orton that Sheldon had been known to carry weapons and that he was associated with people who carry weapons. Stiles also said that he would be coming to assist. Stiles arrived shortly thereafter, before Orton had finished writing the citation. Orton then stopped filling out the citation, and he and Stiles talked briefly about the possibility of weapons and intoxication. Orton returned to Sheldon's vehicle and asked him to exit the vehicle so a horizontal gaze nystagmus test could be conducted to determine whether Sheldon was driving under the influence of alcohol. Before administering the test, Orton patted down Sheldon for weapons, finding only a pocket knife. The nystagmus test disclosed no signs that Sheldon was under the influence of alcohol.

After the test was completed, Officer Orton had a brief conversation with Sheldon, and then Officer Stiles engaged Sheldon in a conversation regarding Sheldon's vehicle, which Stiles recognized as one that had previously belonged to a man named Gibson, a known drug offender. After querying Sheldon about where he obtained the vehicle, Stiles asked if Sheldon had any weapons in the vehicle. Sheldon responded that he did not. Stiles then requested permission to search the car for weapons, and Sheldon consented. During the search, Officer Stiles discovered a pair of brass knuckles, a nylon and fiberglass knife, and an expandable baton. Sheldon was thereupon arrested for possession of concealed weapons.

After the arrest, the officers conducted another search of the vehicle incident to the arrest. In this search they discovered approximately 615 grams of methamphetamine under the backseat of the vehicle. Sheldon was taken to the police station, where Officer Orton finished issuing the citation for no insurance and returned Sheldon's license and registration to him.

Sheldon was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a), and concealing a dangerous weapon, I.C. § 18-3302(9). Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the search of his vehicle, arguing that the questioning by Officer Stiles regarding the vehicle's ownership and the request to search the car were beyond the scope of the traffic stop and violated Sheldon's Fourth Amendment rights. The district court initially denied the motion. Later, however, when Sheldon filed a motion to reconsider the suppression issue based upon this Court's recent decision in State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 51 P.3d 461 (Ct.App.2002), the district court reversed itself and granted the motion to suppress. Thereafter, the district court dismissed the case on Sheldon's motion. The State now appeals the suppression and dismissal orders.

II. ANALYSIS

The review of an order suppressing evidence involves mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 826, 839 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Ct.App.1992); State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1008, 783 P.2d 874, 875 (Ct.App.1989). On appeal, we defer to the findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous, State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998); Zubizareta, 122 Idaho at 826, 839 P.2d at 1240, but we exercise free review in deciding whether, on those facts, constitutional requirements have been satisfied. Id. Here, the facts are undisputed and we are therefore presented solely with the question whether, on the evidence presented by the State at the suppression hearing, the extension of Sheldon's detention beyond the duration necessary to issue a traffic citation was constitutionally permissible.

A traffic stop is subject to the Fourth Amendment restraint against unreasonable seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Because a routine traffic stop is normally limited in scope and of short duration, it is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391. Under Terry, an investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. See also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)

; State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 302, 912 P.2d 664, 670 (Ct.App.1995). The justification for an investigative detention is evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances then known to the officer. Cortez;

449 U.S. at 418,

101 S.Ct. 690; State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992). The information available to the detaining officers must show a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18,

101 S.Ct. 690. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 264, 47 P.3d 763, 767 (Ct.App. 2001). To meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness, an investigative detention must not only be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, but also must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498-500,

103 S.Ct. 1319; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868; State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 659, 51 P.3d 1112, 1115 (Ct.App.2002).

The purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the stop is initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306 (Ct.App. 2000). As we stated in State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct.App. 1990):

[A]ny routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious circumstances which could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. The officer's observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may—and often do—give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further investigation by an officer.

Accordingly, the length and scope of the stop may be lawfully expanded if the detaining officer can "point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

The questioning conducted by Officer Stiles clearly went beyond the scope of the stop for a traffic violation and significantly extended the duration of the stop. Therefore, we must determine if Officer Stiles had reasonable suspicion to justify the extended detention. The State contends that facts known to the officers before Stiles began questioning Sheldon, when considered with the reasonable inferences that an experienced officer would draw, gave rise to reasonable suspicion to expand the stop for investigation into drug activity. Sheldon responds that, as to most of the officers' claimed information about Sheldon's alleged drug involvement, the State presented no evidence showing that the information came from reliable sources, and therefore it should not be considered. Sheldon also argues that even when such information is taken into account, the information held by the police did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that Sheldon was involved in any illegal drug...