State v. Shelley

• Citation: 15 A.3d 818,205 N.J. 320
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.Jason SHELLEY, Defendant–Respondent.
• Decision Date: 09 March 2011
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

205 N.J. 320

15 A.3d 818

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Jason SHELLEY, Defendant–Respondent.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Nov. 30, 2010.Decided March 9, 2011.

Leslie–Ann M. Justus, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Paula T. Dow, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney).Justice LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal we are called on to review the Appellate Division's vacation of defendant Jason Shelley's conviction for the third-degree offense of distributing cocaine within a school zone, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7 (establishing criminal penalty for selling or attempting to sell drugs within areas designated as school zones). Defendant admitted to selling cocaine to an undercover officer in the parking lot of a pub located within 1,000 feet of “The Goddard School for Early Childhood Development of North Brunswick,” a local franchise of a nationwide chain of licensed day care providers offering programs for children from infancy through age six. This particular Goddard School included a kindergarten class with ten full-time students enrolled. The question raised by this appeal is whether the presence of a kindergarten class converts this childcare center into an “elementary school” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7. Because the plain language and legislative history of our state's school-zone statute do not indicate that such enterprises as this Goddard School fall within its application, and because we must strictly construe the penal statute in issue, we affirm the Appellate Division judgment.

I.

The record reveals the following information about the childcare facility at the center of this appeal.

The Goddard School for Early Childhood Development of North Brunswick (“Goddard”) is part of a chain of childcare and development centers. Goddard is licensed by the State of New Jersey as a state childcare center and offers programs for children from six weeks to six years old. The North Brunswick location includes one full-day kindergarten program staffed by a state-certified teacher; however, it does not offer schooling above the kindergarten level. Ten kindergarten students were enrolled at Goddard when, on the evening of April 8, 2005, defendant sold cocaine to an undercover police officer while standing within 1,000 feet of Goddard's facility.

Defendant was arrested and indicted for third-degree distribution of cocaine near school property contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7.¹ He filed a motion to dismiss the charge on the basis that Goddard is not an elementary school for the purposes of the school-zone statute. The trial court denied the motion on March 30, 2007, finding that the presence of a kindergarten class on the premises was dispositive that Goddard was an elementary school for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7's application. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the disposition of his motion to dismiss. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to four years imprisonment with three years of parole ineligibility.

On defendant's appeal, the Appellate Division vacated the conviction in an unpublished opinion. Applying rules of statutory interpretation that call for a plain language understanding and strict construction of a penal statute, and invoking the doctrine of lenity where a penal statute is found to be ambiguous, the panel concluded that “the addition of a ten-student kindergarten to a pre-school child care center does not render the institution an ‘elementary school[ ]’ ” under the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7.

II.

When interpreting statutory language, the goal is to divine and effectuate the Legislature's intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005). In furtherance of that goal, we begin each such inquiry with the language of the statute, giving the terms used therein their ordinary and accepted meaning. Ibid. When the Legislature's chosen words lead to one clear and unambiguous result, the interpretive process comes to a close, without the need to consider extrinsic aids. State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 164, 923 A.2d 217 (2007) (citation omitted). We seek out extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, for assistance when statutory language yields “more than one plausible interpretation.” DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492–93, 874 A.2d 1039.

When interpreting penal statutes, the doctrines of strict construction and lenity also provide guidance. D.A., supra, 191 N.J. at 164, 923 A.2d 217. The doctrine of lenity, a corollary to the doctrine of strict construction, dictates that when ambiguities “cannot be resolved by either the statute's text or extrinsic aids,” a criminal statute must be interpreted in favor of the defendant. State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 482, 950 A.2d 879 (2008) (citations omitted).

The offense of distributing illicit drugs within a school zone is set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7, which makes it a third-degree crime to distribute, to dispense, or to possess with intent to distribute, a controlled dangerous substance

while on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property ...

Importantly, neither “school” nor “elementary” are explicitly defined by the terms of the statute. N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7. We turn then to consider whether the statute was intended to apply in the circumstances presented here.

III.

A.

In the absence of any legislative reference in N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7 to a specific definition of an elementary school, other sources indicate some common understanding of that term. A simple dictionary definition of “elementary school” describes “[t]he first six to eight years of formal education[, or] a school [usually] for the first six or eight grades.” Webster's II New College Dictionary 364 (1st ed. 1995). A “kindergarten” is “a program or class for four- to six-year-old children that is as an introduction to regular school.” Id. at 607. Thus, the dictionary definitions lead to a conclusion that an elementary school generally includes the first six to eight grades and may include a kindergarten program as an introduction to formal education. ² The parties point to various specialized educational provisions in State Department of Education regulations that make passing reference to elementary school or to kindergarten. See N.J.A.C. 6A:9–9.1(a) (concerning instructional certificates and specialized endorsements); N.J.A.C. 6A:9–2.1 (defining “nonpublic school” for purposes of professional licensure requirements). However, none definitively establish whether a kindergarten class, standing unconnected to other elementary grades, constitutes an “elementary school.”

Thus, it is unclear, judging the plain language alone, whether the Legislature intended that the provision of a kindergarten class in an otherwise private day care center was to be encompassed by N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7's reference to an elementary school. Because there exists some ambiguity in the application of the statute's words, resort may be had to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history and relevant canons of statutory construction, in our effort to divine with greater certainty the Legislature's intent. We turn, therefore, to the available legislative history on the statute.

B.

The school-zone statute was adopted in connection with the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986, see L. 1987, c. 101, § 1, to combat “the infiltration of illicit drugs and drug trafficking activity into school safety zones.” Official Commentary to the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (Laws 1987, Chapter 106), 9 Crim. Just. Q. 149, 157 (Fall 1987) [hereinafter Official Commentary ]; see also State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 370, 886 A.2d 643 (2005) (explaining intent of Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986 and Legislature's desire to protect children from “drug culture”). Inspired by federal law,³ N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7 was crafted to create a “drug ‘safety zone’ around schoolyards” to protect children from drug traffickers and to create drug-free environments conducive to educating students about “the dangers of drug use.” Official Commentary, supra, 9 Crim. Just. Q. at 157; see also State v. Gonzalez, 254 N.J.Super. 300, 305, 603 A.2d 516 (App.Div.1992) (“By enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7, the legislative design was ‘to afford special protection to children from the perils of drug trafficking [and] to ensure that all schools and [adjacent] areas ... are kept free from drug distribution activities.’ ” (citation omitted)). Because “children routinely congregate on school property and schoolyards” throughout the year, regardless of whether school is formally in session, the school-zone statute is intended to provide a “permanent, [twenty-four-hour] drug safety zone around schools[.]” Official Commentary, supra, 9 Crim. Just. Q. at 157. In furtherance of that goal, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7 imposes a term of mandatory imprisonment and parole ineligibility, subject to N.J.S.A. 2C:35–12, for defendants convicted of possession with intent to distribute or distribution of drugs within a designated school zone. Ibid.

The legislative history to the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7 provides a rich account of amendments that tailored the statute's reach. The thrust of those changes was a narrowing of the scope of the original bill's broad delineation of what constitutes a school zone. In its nascent form, the originally introduced bill would have required enhanced sentencing for drug offenses occurring “within 1,000 feet of the property surrounding any school in this State which provides instruction for children up to and including the age of 18 years.” S. 2449 [Official Copy Reprint], 202nd Leg. (N.J.1987) (emphasis added). The Senate Law, Public Safety and...