State v. Shelton

• Decision Date: 01 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-K-3070,92-K-3070
• Citation: 621 So.2d 769
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Mike SHELTON.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 769

621 So.2d 769

STATE of Louisiana v. Mike SHELTON.

No. 92-K-3070.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 1, 1993.

Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Valentin M. Solino, Jack Peebles, Asst. Dist. Attys., for applicant.

Sherry Watters, Richard B. Graves, New Orleans, for respondent.

KIMBALL, Justice. ^*

ISSUE

The issue presented herein is whether there was sufficient proof of a prior felony conviction under La.R.S. 15:529.1 where the State, at the habitual offender hearing, introduced a minute entry which stated the judge "gave the Defendant his rights" and a well-executed guilty plea/waiver of rights form, rather than introducing the actual transcript of the plea colloquy.

FACTS

On August 15, 1990, defendant Mike Shelton was found guilty of purse snatching under La.R.S. 14:65.1 and was sentenced to twenty years at hard labor. Thereafter, the State filed a bill of information pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1, the Habitual Offender Law, seeking to have defendant declared a second offender based on a March, 1989 conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966. After a hearing, the trial court found the defendant to be a second offender and resentenced him to forty years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant appealed to the fourth circuit court of appeal alleging, inter alia, the State failed to introduce sufficient proof at the habitual offender hearing that the guilty plea upon which the prior conviction was based was voluntary. The court of appeal agreed and reversed the trial court's finding that defendant was a second offender, concluding that the State's evidence of the prior conviction, which included a minute entry and a waiver of rights form, was insufficient to meet the State's burden of proving voluntariness of the guilty plea. ¹

The State sought a writ of certiorari from this court which was granted. ²

PRIOR JURISPRUDENCE

In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) the United States Supreme Court held on appeal of a criminal conviction that "[i]t was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." Rather, the trial court should "canvass[ ] the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence." ³ Concerning the record of such a guilty plea on appeal, the Court found that because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of several constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers, the prosecution was required to "spread on the record the prerequisites of a valid waiver" of these rights. Thus, the Court held that it could not presume a voluntary and knowing waiver of these three rights "from a silent record." To insure an adequate record on review, the Court stated a trial court would be "best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences." Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n. 7, 89 S.Ct. at 1713 n. 7 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196, 197-98 (1968)).

In an attempt to comply with Boykin, we held in State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 260 La. 90, 255 So.2d 85 (1971), a post-conviction proceeding, that a guilty plea will be considered knowingly and voluntarily made only if the accused was informed of and made an articulated waiver of his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination. ⁴

In State ex rel. LeBlanc v. Henderson, 261 La. 315, 259 So.2d 557 (1972), another post-conviction proceeding attacking a guilty plea, this court held that a determination of voluntariness of a guilty plea is not limited by Boykin to the verbatim entry made at the time of the plea but rather is determined from the entire record, which can include evidence taken at a "reconstruction" of the plea proceedings at a hearing when the plea is later attacked. ⁵ This court then decided to limit Jackson's requirement (that the defendant be informed of and specifically waive the three Boykin rights) to guilty pleas entered after December 8, 1971, the date the Jackson decision became final, rather than apply it to guilty pleas entered after June 2, 1969, the effective date of Boykin. ⁶

In State v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1155 (La.1979), the court was faced with deciding whether to extend its requirements in LeBlanc and Jackson to the determination of the validity of guilty pleas sought to be used at habitual offender hearings. In Lewis, the defendant objected to the use of his prior guilty plea taken February 16, 1970 because the proof put forth by the State, minutes from the taking of the guilty plea, did not affirmatively show a waiver of the right to confront his accusers. We held that reconstruction of the guilty plea at a later hearing, a procedure available under LeBlanc in a post-conviction attack on a guilty plea, was not available in a case involving the use of a plea of guilty in an habitual offender hearing because the latter proceeding usually takes place several years after the guilty plea was taken. "The more time that passes, the more difficult it will be to reconstruct the plea of guilty and make a reasonable accurate determination of its free and voluntary nature." Lewis, 367 So.2d at 1160. ⁷

In State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372 (La.1979), another case involving a collateral attack on a guilty plea sought to be introduced at an habitual offender hearing, this court placed several limitations on the broad scope of Lewis. Holden overruled Lewis to the extent that it could be held to apply to federal and non-Louisiana convictions based on guilty pleas sought to be used to enhance a defendant's sentence as an habitual offender. In those situations, the ultimate burden of proof was placed on the defendant challenging the plea.

[T]he state is required only to prove the conviction by a plea of guilty with representation by counsel. The defendant has the burden of proving that he did not waive his constitutional rights in making the plea, if the plea was taken subsequent to Boykin's requirement in this regard. Unless the colloquy at the time of the plea of guilty affirmatively shows substantial defect in this regard, the defendant will not be permitted to make any other collateral attack beyond the colloquy upon these otherwise-valid guilty pleas in the enhanced-punishment proceedings. ⁸

Lewis was also overruled to the extent that it applied to Louisiana convictions based on guilty pleas taken prior to December 8, 1971, the date of Jackson's finality. The same approach applicable to federal and non-Louisiana convictions was held by this court to apply to these guilty pleas.

As for guilty pleas taken in Louisiana subsequent to December 8, 1971 and which are later challenged in an habitual offender proceeding, "[u]pon objection by defense counsel that the guilty plea does not affirmatively show it was taken in compliance with Jackson and LeBlanc," the State will have the burden of showing the defendant was informed of and made a voluntary waiver of the three Boykin rights through use of a contemporaneous record of a Boykin examination.

This court's motivation in Holden for creating the various limitations on Lewis was its belief that the Boykin decision had merely "constitutionalized (and made applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment) the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11," Holden, 375 So.2d at 1374, and that the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979), had indicated that "a plea of guilty may not be considered invalid for purposes of collateral attack simply because of formal defect in the taking of the plea (i.e. a violation of Rule 11) ... in the absence of a showing of special prejudice to the defendant." Rather, "the accused has the affirmative burden of showing that he was in fact not advised, either by the court or through his counsel, of the particular consequences of his plea that were not touched upon in an otherwise sufficient colloquy." Holden, Id. Thus, for federal convictions and non-Louisiana convictions, we believed that Timmreck, insofar as it implicitly placed a limitation on Boykin's application, allowed us to take the ultimate burden of proof off of the state and place it instead on the defendant in a collateral attack of a guilty plea. We decided to retain Lewis, however, and to not further incorporate the implications of Timmreck, for Louisiana convictions based on guilty pleas taken after December 8, 1971, "[a]s a matter of state law, to enforce the state policies incorporated in the Jackson and LeBlanc decisions." Holden, 375 So.2d at 1375-76 (emphasis added). Thus, for these guilty pleas, we retained Lewis' fundamental requirement: that in a multiple offender hearing, the state must provide a contemporaneous record which shows the "accused was informed of and made a knowing waiver of his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination." Holden, Id. at 1375 (emphasis added). ⁹

In State v. Nelson, 379 So.2d 1072 (La.1980), this court explained the State's burden of proof in an habitual offender proceeding where the defendant has not objected to the predicate for the State's evidence that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. We stated that if the defendant does not object on this ground, the State, in order to establish the knowing and voluntary guilty...