State v. Shipp

• Decision Date: 15 May 1980
• Docket Number: 46322 and 46289,Nos. 45273,s. 45273
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Joyce Anna SHIPP, Defendant, and Atis Walter Krumins, Appellant. The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Chester E. VAN ANTWERP, Petitioner. The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Darwin Gary HINZ, Petitioner.

Page 510

93 Wn.2d 510

610 P.2d 1322

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Joyce Anna SHIPP, Defendant, and Atis Walter Krumins, Appellant.

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Chester E. VAN ANTWERP, Petitioner.

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Darwin Gary HINZ, Petitioner.

Nos. 45273, 46322 and 46289.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

May 15, 1980.

Seattle-King County Public Defender Ass'n, Robert C. Boruchowitz and Gilbert H. Levy, Allen & Hansen, David Allen, Seattle, for appellant.

Norm K. Maleng, Pros. Atty., Ronald H. Clark, Sr., Deputy Pros. Atty., Mark H. Sidran, J. Robin Hunt, Deputy Pros. Attys., Seattle, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

These three consolidated cases involve challenges to jury instructions which defined knowledge under the Washington Criminal Code adopted in 1975. The instructions directed the jury to find that a person has knowledge if it finds that "he has information which would lead a reasonable (person) in the same situation to believe that (the relevant) facts exist." We find that these instructions were based on an incorrect interpretation of RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b) (ii). We hold that the statute merely allows the inference that a defendant has knowledge in situations where a reasonable person would have knowledge, rather than creating a mandatory presumption that the defendant has such knowledge.

FACTS OF THE CASES

The first case involves a young man, Atis Krumins, who portrayed himself as rather naive and living a lifestyle characterized by sexual permissiveness. Although he often spent the night with his companion Joyce Shipp, he expressed no concern when she spent weekends with other men, from whom she often received gifts. While Atis was at her house, Joyce received a phone call from two men whom she didn't know. She gave the phone to Atis who acted as go-between and arranged a meeting. Using Joyce's car, Atis then chauffeured Joyce and her 14-year-old daughter Yvonne to a drive-in restaurant. They parked near the two men with whom they had talked on the phone. Atis and the two women each in turn conferred with the men about arrangements for acts of prostitution. Joyce accepted $175 and placed it in her car before departing with the two men, who were undercover police officers. Atis Krumins was convicted of knowingly promoting prostitution in both the first and second degrees. RCW 9A.88.070, .080 The second case involves a conviction for knowingly riding in a stolen car. RCW 9A.56.070(1). In the early morning, Chester Van Antwerp was driving a car, in which his girlfriend was riding, when he ran into a parked car. The two fled the scene on foot and were stopped by a police officer a few blocks away. At trial, his girlfriend testified that Van Antwerp did not know the car was stolen until she told him at the time of the accident. She said she had previously told him it was borrowed, when she asked him to drive her to a methadone treatment center, because he would have refused if he had known it was stolen. Van Antwerp claims he was too sick and too sleepy to notice many details that would indicate that the car was stolen. Van Antwerp's conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. State v. Van Antwerp, 22 Wash.App. 674, 591 P.2d 844 (1979).

The third case involves an assault and an attempted rape. Darwin Hinz met his victim at a singles bar and solicited a ride home. At his direction, she drove to his cousin's house and parked in the driveway. When he made sexual advances, she rebuffed him and tried first to start the car and then to get out. He prevented both actions and proceeded to physically abuse her. Intending to run, she suggested that they go inside the house. He escorted her to the door, preventing her escape, and pushed her inside. The defendant's cousin awoke and rescued the victim by fighting with the defendant and ejecting him. Hinz was convicted of attempted rape in the second degree and of a knowing assault with intent to commit rape (second degree assault) under RCW 9A.36.020. The Court of Appeals reversed the attempted rape conviction and affirmed the assault conviction. State v. Hinz, 22 Wash.App. 906, 594 P.2d 1350 (1979).

INTERPRETATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE STATUTE

At the trials for each of these three cases the jury was instructed on the definition of knowledge in the words of the statute which reads:

(1) Kinds of Culpability Defined.

(b) Knowledge. A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when:

(i) he is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or

(ii) he has information which would lead a reasonable man in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense.

RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b).

A juror who reads this instruction might interpret part (ii) in any of three different ways. First, the juror might believe that if he concludes that the defendant had received information which would impart knowledge to a reasonable person then he must find, as a mandatory presumption, that the defendant had knowledge. This interpretation of the instruction would not allow the juror to consider the subjective intelligence or mental condition of the defendant.

Second, the juror might believe that, for the purposes of the law, the familiar word "knowledge" is redefined to be different from its ordinary meaning. That is, if an ordinary person in the defendant's situation would have known a fact, then the defendant is deemed to have had "knowledge" under the law, even he was so unperceptive or inattentive that he did not have knowledge in the ordinary sense.

Third, the juror might believe, from the instructions as a whole, that he must find that the defendant had actual knowledge, and that he is permitted, but not required, to find such knowledge if he finds that the defendant had "information which would lead a reasonable man in the same situation to believe that (the relevant) facts exist."

This ambiguity in the interpretation of a knowledge instruction given in the words of the statute would seriously infringe on the rights of a defendant, if a juror used the wrong interpretation, because only the last of these interpretations is consistent with the statutory scheme created by the Washington Criminal Code, the methods of proving intent in other jurisdictions, and the state and federal constitutions.

The first interpretation, which creates a mandatory presumption, is clearly unconstitutional. Presumptions which direct the jury to find the presence of an element of the crime when the prosecution has proved only circumstantial evidence violate the due process requirement that the prosecution must affirmatively prove every element of the crime, as explicated in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). E. g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); State v. Roberts, 88 Wash.2d 337, 340-41, 562 P.2d 1259 (1977). Because this interpretation is unconstitutional, one of the other two must be preferred.

The second interpretation redefines knowledge with an objective standard which is the equivalent of negligent ignorance. If the defendant is ignorant in a situation where the ordinary man would have knowledge, then the defendant would be deemed to have "knowledge" under the law. Such a redefinition is inconsistent with the statutory scheme which creates a hierarchy of mental states for crimes of increasing culpability. See RCW 9A.04.020(1)(d), 9A.08.010(2). Knowledge is intended to be a more culpable mental state than recklessness, which is a subjective standard, rather than the equivalent of negligence, which is an objective standard. For example, under this redefinition, it would be possible to convict every negligent driver who causes injury, in a situation where the ordinary person would have known that injury would result, of second degree assault, because RCW 9A.36.020(1)(b) makes it a class B felony, punishable by 10 years' incarceration, to "knowingly inflict grievous bodily harm upon another." This punishment is equal in severity to the more serious crime of first degree reckless manslaughter, RCW 9A.32.060.

This interpretation of the statute, as redefining knowledge, is also unconstitutional. Statutes which define crimes must be strictly construed according to the plain meaning of their words to assure that citizens have adequate notice of the terms of the law, as required by due process. "Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 68 S.Ct. 665, 670, 92 L.Ed.2d 840 (1947); Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash.2d 794, 797, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973). The word "knowledge" has an ordinary and accepted meaning. A statutory redefinition of knowledge to mean negligent ignorance would completely contradict the accepted meaning. This redefinition does not appear in the same section or even in the same chapter as any of the sections which specify the elements of the crimes. The ordinary person reading one of the criminal statutes would surely be misled if the statute defining knowledge were interpreted to effect such a drastic change in meaning.

Because the other two possible interpretations of the statutory definition of knowledge are unconstitutional and inconsistent with the statutory scheme, the statute must be interpreted as only permitting, rather than directing, the jury to find that the defendant had knowledge if it finds that the ordinary person would have had knowledge under the circumstances. The jury must still be allowed to conclude that he was less attentive or intelligent than the ordinary person.

This third interpretation is constitutional. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2454, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). It is also consistent with the accepted rule for proving knowledge in other jurisdictions. See United States v. Gallo, 543 F.2d 361 (D.C.Cir.1976); State v....