State v. Sides
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 400A19,400A19 |
| Citation | 852 S.E.2d 170,376 N.C. 449 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Carolyn D. "Bonnie" SIDES |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Keith Clayton, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee.
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Wyatt Orsbon, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
Disability Rights North Carolina, by Susan H. Pollitt, Raleigh, Lisa Grafstein, Raleigh, and Luke Woollard, for Disability Rights North Carolina, North Carolina Psychiatric Association, and North Carolina Chapter of the National Alliance on Mental Illness, amici curiae.
The defendant in this case attempted suicide one evening after her trial had recessed for the day and was thereafter involuntarily committed. The trial court declined to hold a competency hearing and determined that she had voluntarily waived her constitutional right to be present at her trial as a result of the suicide attempt. Because we hold that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a competency hearing under these circumstances, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial.
Defendant was charged with four counts of felony embezzlement.1 A jury trial began in Superior Court, Cabarrus County, on 6 November 2017. The State presented its case-in-chief the first three days of trial, during which time defendant was present in the courtroom. On the evening of 8 November 2017, defendant intentionally ingested 60 one-milligram Xanax tablets—thirty times her prescribed daily dose—in a suicide attempt at her home. She was found unresponsive and was taken to Carolinas HealthCare System NorthEast for treatment.
Defendant underwent medical evaluation that night by Dr. Kimberly Stover. Dr. Stover found that defendant "ha[d] been experiencing worsening depression and increased thoughts of self-harm" and sought defendant's immediate involuntary commitment, checking the box on the petition form stating that defendant was "mentally ill and dangerous to self or others or mentally ill and in need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness." Dr. Stover also wrote that defendant "is not stable and for her safety will need further evaluation."
A magistrate found reasonable grounds to believe defendant required involuntary commitment and signed a commitment order, which provided for an initial period of commitment of twenty-four hours beginning on the morning of 9 November 2017. A separate evaluation was conducted later that day by a psychiatrist, Dr. Rebecca Silver, after which Dr. Silver noted that defendant
That morning, the trial court was informed of defendant's suicide attempt and hospitalization. The trial court told the attorneys that it would try to "salvage" the day "without committing an error that'd be reversible." Defense counsel responded that a decision to proceed without defendant could not be made "without more information." The following exchange then transpired:
Defense counsel informed the trial court that he had "been advised that [defendant] ha[d] a number of medical conditions by her and her family" and offered to attempt to obtain more information from her doctors. The trial court asked the State whether it was "aware of any case law that would give us some guidance on whether this constitutes a voluntary absence or an involuntary [absence]." After the State responded that it had not looked into the issue, the trial court stated as follows:
Defense counsel once again offered to seek additional information about her medical status and to conduct research on the issue of whether her absence should be deemed voluntary. The trial court characterized the information received up to that point—which was limited to the involuntary commitment documents—as "a bare-bones examination, clear description of findings about two sentences, and that's it." The trial court added that "[i]t takes more in depth when you get into the mental aspect, a lot more in depth." The State had prepared a draft order compelling production of certain portions of defendant's medical records to assist the trial court in determining how to proceed. Referencing that draft order, the State stated the following:
But I'd assume, if that order were signed by the Court, that we could find out some information as to how she got there, you know, what she presented with, what, you know, past symptoms, medications that she could have been on. I think it would really open up a wealth of information that this Court could use in being well-informed to make a decision in this case.
A discussion ensued concerning the fact that the proposed order only sought information regarding defendant's condition on 8 and 9 November 2017. Defense counsel stated as follows:
[Y]ou may want to expand the order a little bit, but I believe that what the order says is all information, complete documentation, complaint, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, discharge and any other information that would assist the Court. I think that's rather complete, but it's the Court's order. But I think, you know, if you want to—if you want to put in including current updates to the date and time of the release or current updates through her discharge—
The trial court agreed, deciding that the order should be "comprehensive." The trial court then recessed the proceedings while the State drafted a revised order for the release of defendant's medical records and conducted research on whether the trial should continue.
When the proceedings resumed that afternoon, the State informed the trial court of its position that defendant had voluntarily waived her right to be present by choosing to ingest the excessive number of pills. Defense counsel expressed his belief that there was a need for more information regarding defendant's mental health status, noting that it was not clear whether "her intent was to end her life or to impede these proceedings." The trial court agreed to recess further trial proceedings until the following Monday, at which time defendant would either be released from treatment or the trial court would have received the requested medical records. The trial court then stated the following:
We don't know what her situation is going to be, but I want to take the position, unless something happens that shoots it down, that she voluntarily made herself absent from the trial and continue on Monday.
The trial court proceeded to release the jury until the following Monday and issued an order for defendant's arrest upon the expiration of her period of commitment. Later that afternoon, the trial court also entered an order for the release of defendant's medical records. The trial court mandated the production of "complete documentation of the Defendant's complaint, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, discharge, and any other information that would assist the court in making a determination regarding how to proceed," but limited the temporal scope of the records to the "admittance date of November 8, 2017, and any days following this date for the continued treatment of [defendant]."
The medical records also reflected defendant's "history of a mood disorder" that she managed with daily medication but noted that she had "never been psychiatrically hospitalized." In addition, the medical records stated that defendant had been prescribed Haldol
for agitation, as well as Vistaril for anxiety and Trazodone to help her sleep. She was ordered to continue her prescription of 100 milligrams of Zoloft daily.
The following exchange between the trial court and defense counsel then ensued:
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